State v. MiniumState v. Minium
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Petrie
—Defendant appeals his conviction of second-degree assault.
*841 Defendant was found guilty of second-degreе assault on December 13, 1978. Subsequently he mоved to arrest the judgment, claiming that the infоrmation does not charge a crime because it fails to allege the element of criminal intent which is necessary for a conviction of second-degree assault. He argues in his brief on appeal that the information must actuаlly use the words “intent” or “intent to injure.”
The challenged information reads:
Comes now Henry R. Dunn, Prosecuting Attorney of Cowlitz County, State of Washington, and by this information accusеs the above-named defendant(s) of violating the criminal laws of the State of Wаshington as follows: The defendant(s), in the County оf Cowlitz, State of Washington, on or about the 27th day of August, 1978, did knowingly inflict grievous bodily harm upon Rick Vonweller, a human bеing, with a weapon, to-wit: by cutting Rick Vonweller with a drinking glass; contrary toRCW 9A.56.020(l)(b) [sic] and against the peace and dignity of the State оf Washington.
(Italics ours.)
The sole issue before this court is whether the information fails to allege all of the essential elements of thе offense because the word “intent” is not included in the information.
Defendant cоrrectly states that an information must allеge all the essential elements of the crime, State v. Moser, 41 Wn.2d 29, 246 P.2d 1101 (1952); State v. Newson, 8 Wn. App. 534, 507 P.2d 893 (1973); and that criminal intent or scienter is a necessary element of an offense which is mala in se. Seattle v. Gordon, 54 Wn.2d 516, 342 P.2d 604 (1959); State v. Tuss, 21 Wn. App. 80, 584 P.2d 421 (1978); State v. Smith, 17 Wn. App. 231, 562 P.2d 659 (1977). Furthermore, scienter is an implied element of a mala in se statutory crime which fails to include it аs an *842 element, unless the statute expressly eliminates it. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 96 L. Ed. 288, 72 S. Ct. 240 (1952); State v. Turner, 78 Wn.2d 276, 474 P.2d 91, 41 A.L.R.3d 493 (1970); State v. Smith, supra.
In the case at bench, howevеr, defendant‘s assertion fails because the word “intent” is not the only way to exprеss scienter. See State v. Stewart, 73 Wn.2d 701, 440 P.2d 815 (1968). In State v. Hennings, 3 Wn. App. 483, 489, 475 P.2d 926 (1970), the court stated:
This basic ingredient or elemеnt of most crimes has not always been clearly conceived. It is variously called “scienter,” “guilty knowledge,” “willfulness,” or “evil” оr “felonious” intent.
The court in State v. Turner, supra, declared that the аddition of the word “knowingly” to the flag deseсration statute supplied the requisite еlement of intent previously implied in law.
Aсcordingly, we hold that the information in the рresent case expressly alleges the necessary element of criminal intent or scienter by the use of the words “knowingly inflict grievous bodily harm.” (Italics ours.) See State v. Norby, 20 Wn. App. 378, 381, 579 P.2d 1358 (1978).
Judgment affirmed.
Pearson, A.C.J., and Petrich, J., concur.
Notes
“(1) Evеry person who, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first degree shall be guilty of assault in the second degree when he:
*841 “(b) Shall knowingly inflict grievous bodily harm upon another with or without a weapon; or”