State v. . Mincher
100 S.E. 339
N.C.
1919
Check Treatment
AlleN, J.

It has, been the uniform practice in this State to join a count for larceny with one for receiving in one indictment, and this has been repeatedly approved. S. v. Baker, 70 N. C., 685; S. v. Stancill, at this term.

The evidence as to the watch and the article from the Daily News belong to'the same class of testimony, and both were competent on the question of guilty knowledge.

The defendant admitted he received the watch as well as the property charged in the indictment from Gorham, a convict in his charge, who had lio opportunity to make money, and who was in the habit of leaving camp at night, but he denied that he knew that any of the property was stolen, and this was the real question in controversy before the jury.

The number of the watch had been scratched out, the hands changed, and the defendant testified he was to pay Gorham $8 for it, while Hearne said it was worth $40.

It was also shown that the Daily News was delivered to him as a subscriber regularly, and that it contained an account of the stealing from the house of Adrey before the defendant received the property from *701 Gorbam, and the defendant, testifying in bis own behalf, did not deny that he knew of the newspaper article.

This evidence comes clearly within the principle of S. v. Simons and S. v. Stancill, at this term, in which the authorities are collected and discussed.

The Court says in the first of these cases: “There are offenses which are committed in sudden temper, or under violent provocation or by the impulse of passion. As to these, the only competent evidence is what took place at the time, S. v. Norton, 82 N. C., 630, but the crime of illicit dealing in intoxicating liquor is in the same class with larceny, counterfeiting, forgery, obtaining money under false pretenses, and burglary, which are all committed with deliberation, in defiance of law, and for the ignoble motive of making profit thereby. In all such cases it is competent to prove intent by showing matters in like nature, before or after the offense”; and in the second, in which the defendant was charged with the larceny and receiving of tobacco, the property of J. H. Little, and evidence that other tobacco, in his possession was stolen from one Wilkinson, was admitted. “The testimony as to the theft of the Wilkinson tobacco was offered merely to show the intent with which the defendants stole this tobacco, and not to prove the accusation substantively. It was sufficiently connected with the main charge to render it competent for this purpose. It was all taken to Eaymond Stancill’s, the common storehouse for the loot of these defendants. . . . It is said in S. v. Murphy, 84 N. C., 742: ‘Evidence of a “collateral offense” of the same character and connected with that charged in an indictment, and tending to prove the guilty knowledge of the defendant, when that is an essential element of the crime, is admissible; therefore, on the trial of an indictment for the larceny of a hog, where the prosecutor testified that he identified the property as his in an enclosure of the defendant and demanded its delivery to him, it was held competent for the State to prove by the testimony of another witness that, at the same time and place, and in the presence of the prosecutor and defendant, such witness said that the other hog therein was his, and he then and there claimed and demanded it of defendant.’ In that case the Court says, in an opinion by Justice Ashe, who always wrote clearly, accurately, and vigorously, and reviews the law at length: ‘Wherever the question of identity or intent is involved, or where it is necessary to show a guilty knowledge on the part of the prisoner, evidence may be received of other criminal acts than those charged in the indictment,’ citing and approving Yarborough v. State, 41 Ala., 405; Thorp v. State, 15 Ala., 749. The whole question is considered, and fully reviewed, in Gray v. Cartwright, 174 N. C., 49, where the authorities are collected. This question is fully discussed by the Chief Justice in S. v. Simons, at this term, and evidence of the kind *702 admitted in this ease is beld there to be competent to show knowledge, intent, and motive.”

The other exceptions to evidence are untenable and require no discussion, and an examination of the charge shows that it is clear, accurate, full, and fair.

No error.