2007 Ohio 1353 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2007
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} Defendant/Appellant, Michael L. Miller, appeals from his conviction and sentencing in the Medina County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶ 2} In November 2005, Defendant was indicted on one count of receiving stolen property, in violation of R.C.
"The trial court erred by denying [Defendant's] motion to discharge pursuant to R.C.2945.73 where: (1) more than two hundred seventy days had elapsed for purposes of calculating speedy trial time under Ohio's speedy trial act, R.C.2945.71 et seq.; and (2) [Defendant's] failure to respond to the state's demand for discovery did not toll time pursuant to R.C.2945.72 (D) because the state never filed a motion to compel discovery and [Defendant] had no discoverable material to provide the state in any event."
"[Defendant's] trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of thesixth amendment to the United States Constitution, where he failed to promptly respond in writing to the state of Ohio's demand for discovery thus resulting in both the trial court's determination that speedy trial time was tolled pursuant to R.C.2945.72 and its denial of [Defendant's] motion for discharge pursuant to R.C. 2945.73."
{¶ 3} We are obligated to raise sua sponte questions related to our jurisdiction. Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Geupel Constr. Co. (1972),
{¶ 4} Crim.R. 32(C) states, in pertinent part, that,
*3"A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the sentence. * * * The judge shall sign the judgment entry and the clerk shall enter it on the journal. A judgment is effective only when entered on the journal by the clerk."
{¶ 5} This Court examined the Rule's requirements almost 15 years ago in State v. Morrison (Apr. 1, 1992), 9th Dist. No. 2047, where we held:
"This rule requires that the trial court's judgment of conviction contain:
"1. the plea;
"2. the verdict or findings;
"3. the sentence;
"4. the signature of the judge; and
"5. the time stamp of the clerk to indicate journalization." Id. at *2.
{¶ 6} We are compelled to revisit this holding in light of the number of cases that do not comply with Crim.R. 32(C).
{¶ 8} Notwithstanding the importance of stare decisis, there are times when courts must reconsider their prior decisions; this is one of those times. We *4
hold that trial courts must comply with the specific language of Crim.R. 32(C) in judgment entries entered after the date of this decision by setting forth the plea in the final judgment entry. This result will accomplish the Supreme Court's goal of insuring that "the parties, particularly the defendant in a criminal case, be fully aware of the time from which appeal time commences running." Tripodo,
{¶ 9} After a review of the trial court's journal entries (because the plea is not set forth in the judgment entry), we find that Defendant entered a plea of no contest to one count of receiving stolen property. Therefore, following Morrison, we find that the trial court complied with the first requirement of Crim.R. 32(C).
{¶ 10} For judgment entries entered after this decision is journalized, this Court will not search the record to determine what plea the defendant entered. The trial court's judgment entry must comply fully with Crim.R. 32(C) by setting forth the defendant's plea of not guilty, guilty, no contest, or not guilty by reason of insanity. To the extent Morrison held that this Court would review the entire record or review multiple journal entries, Morrison is overruled.
{¶ 12} In this case, the trial court failed to set forth a finding of guilt. Instead, the judgment entry stated that the Defendant "has been convicted" of receiving stolen property:
"The Court finds the defendant has been convicted of `Receiving Stolen Property', a violation of Revised Code section
2913.51 (A), a felony of the fifth degree."
{¶ 13} This language fails to enter a finding of guilt. The trial court must, as mandated by Crim.R. 32(C), enter a finding of guilt. The Fifth District recently reached the same conclusion:
"[T]he trial court never entered a finding of `guilty.' The only reference to a guilty finding is contained in the trial court's October 10, 2005 judgment entry of sentence wherein the trial court stated, `Defendant has previously been found "GUILTY" of violation(s) of Sec. 2917.21A5.' This statement does not reflect that in fact a guilty finding was ever made." State v. Meese, 5th Dist. No. 2005AP11075,
2007-Ohio-742 (emphasis added).
{¶ 14} In this case, the trial court's judgment entry failed to enter the requisite finding of guilt. Crim.R. 32(C) requires the trial court's judgment entry to set forth the verdict or findings. We note that, in the context of a guilty or no contest plea, it is also not sufficient for the trial court to note only that it accepted the defendant's plea. The trial court must enter a finding of guilt to comply with Crim.R. 32(C). *6
{¶ 15} Finally, we agree with the Fourth District's analysis inState v. Sandlin, 4th Dist. No. 05CA23,
"[Although it is obvious that the trial court found Appellant guilty of this remaining charge (because a sentence for that charge was imposed), Crim.R. 32(C) requires that the verdict itself be recorded in the court's journal. Without the journalization of this information, there is no judgment of conviction pursuant to Crim.R. 32(C), and therefore, no final appealable order." Sandlin, at *3.
{¶ 16} In this case, we find the trial court failed to set forth a finding of guilt as Crim.R. 32(C) requires. Therefore, the judgment entry does not constitute a final appealable order and we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Defendant's appeal.
Appeal Dismissed.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
*8Costs taxed to Appellant.
WHITMORE, J. CONCURS
Concurrence Opinion
{¶ 21} Although I do concur that this Court lacks jurisdiction in the case instanter since no finding of guilt was made here after the entering of a no contest plea, I do not agree with the remainder of the majority's analysis under Crim.R. 32(C). *1