264 Mo. 441 | Mo. | 1915
An information filed Tby the prosecuting attorney of Reynolds county charged the appellant, Robert Miller, with murder in the first degree in having shot and killed Richard Mallow. Upon a trial appellant was convicted as charged and his punishment assessed at imprisonment for life in the penitentiary. Prom that judgment he appeals to this court.
Richard Mallow, the deceased, was a single man between fifty and fifty-five years of age. He had no permanent home, but lived at times with his brother-in-law, John Gallahar, near the village of Black in Reynolds county, and at other times with other relatives or friends in the neighborhood. When the weather permitted he camped in the woods and hunted for several days at a time. He lived, as the witnesses state in homely but expressive phrase, “very poorly,” was exceedingly parsimonious, although his pecuniary condition would have enabled him to live differently, as it had been generally known in the neighborhood for years that he carried on his person a roll of paper money consisting of bills of large denominations aggregating not less than $800. On August 27, 1913, Mallow came to the blacksmith shop of his brother-in-law, John Gallahar, at about two o’clock in the afternoon, with a double-barreled shotgun which he carried when hunting, and asked for and was given some loaded shells or cartridges, and left, as he said, to go squirrel hunting. This was the last time he was seen alive. About an hour after he left, a daughter of Gallahar’s, hearing two shots fired in the direction in which Mallow had gone, remarked, “Uncle has killed a squirrel.” Two weeks elapsed, but Mallow did not return. His absence and no word having been received from him, did not occasion anxiety, because from his habits it. was reasonably concluded that he was either camping out or staying elsewhere in the neighborhood. On the 10th day of September, 1913, Hendrix, a son of John ■Gallahar, while hunting cattle discovered the dead
The appellant, Robert Miller, was a young married man, having a wife and two children, and living, in the town of Lesterville in Reynolds county, not many miles distant from the village of Black. Miller had no money or property and was dependent upon his daily labor for the support' of himself and his family. The total amount of property returned by him for taxation was $30. In the early part of August, 1913, he had been employed by the Hub Mill Company in the neighborhood to drive a team. For several weeks before August 27,1913, he was at work for a man named Brown, stacking lumber and railroad ties. "When employed it was his custom to draw his money in advance. About eight or nine o ’clock on the morning of August 27,1913, Miller came to a blacksmith shop in Lesterville, borrowed a double-barreled shotgun and some cartridges, and stated that he was “going up the creek hunting.” He was seen a short time thereafter about a mile northwest of Lesterville on the road leading to the village
At the picnic where Miller contracted for the mules he paid one William George $6.50 in discharge of a debt. He had told George two weeks before that he could not pay him because he had no money. On the same day, while at the picnic, Miller paid Lincoln Shy $10 he owed him. Shy did not ask him for the money, as it was the general opinion that Miller had no money to amount to anything. In the month of June, 1913, while Miller was employed by the Hub Mill Company, he made inquiry of a witness named Eayfield concerning Mallow. Among other things, referring to Mallow, Miller said: “He is supposed to carry a right smart of money?” Eayfield replied, “I don’t know now; twenty-five years ago I counted it and he then had over $800.” Miller said, “Why don’t you kill him for it?” Eayfield replied, “I couldn’t kill a man for his money; I couldn’t kill that old man for his money; I don’t get my money that way.” To this Miller said, “By God, if this Hub mill goes to Clayton Creek I will do it, and if you don’t think so you are dajmn badly fooled.” Subsequently the Hub mill was moved to Clayton Creek, four or five mills from where John G'allahar resided, and Miller assisted in the removal and worked there afterwards. In going from Lester-ville, where he resided, to the mill after its removal, it was necessary for him to pass John Gallahar’s. In
It is contended that error was committed, (1) in the admission at the trial of testimony given by appellant at the coroner’s inquest; (2) in the refusal of appellant’s demurrer to the evidence at the close of the State’s case; and (3) in not sustaining appellant’s challenges to certain jurors.
I. Defendant’s Statements at Inquest. — Witnesses for the State were permitted to testify as to statements made by the defendant under oath at the coroner’s inquest. The objection to this testimony, as preserved in the record, was that defendant’s statements had not at the inquest been reduced to writing as required by section 2934, Revised Statutes 19091. The question involved was not as to the irregularity of the inquest, but the admissibility of the testimony as to defendant’s statements. Time and again it has been announced that specific and pertinent objections must be made to testimony, first, to enable the trial court to rule intelligently thereon, and, second, to authorize a review on appeal.
The rule as to a general objection may be applied with equal force to an irrelevant objection, in that it is no objection and hence not entitled to be considered.
The facts in the instant cause are that the defendant, before testifying at the inquest, was informed by the prosecuting attorney that any statements made by him in his examination could be used against him on the trial and that he was not required to incriminate himself. Armed with this information he made the statements objected to, which related mainly to an attempt to explain where he obtained the money he had recently theretofore been spending and not to the facts immediately concerning the crime. The charges made but not properly preserved for our consideration in regard to defendant’s statements, if prejudicial, were given under such circumstances as to not constitute error.
II. Alibi and Sufficiency of Evidence. — The jury heard all of the testimony and evidently did not believe the witnesses who testified as to the presence of the defendant in the town of Lesterville during the time when all of the circumstances pointed to the assassination of Bichard Mallow.
The evidence in this case was circumstantial. It was sufficient to meet the requirements of the rule that
III. Challenges of Jurors. — It is contended that the trial court erred in not sustaining challenges to jurors who, it was claimed, had talked with witnesses and had therefrom formed opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The transcript of the record does not sustain this contention. None of the facts elicited upon the voir dire examination sustain defendant’s assignment that any juror had talked with a witness or was in any manner biased or prejudiced against the defendant so as to prevent the juror from giving him a fair trial under the evidence and in accordance with the law as declared by the court. The test as to the qualification of a juror is his freedom from prejudice and his consequent ability to give an accused a fair and impartial trial. There is nothing-in this case to indicate that any juror did not possess these necessary qualifications. Defendant’s contention, therefore, in this regard is held to be without merit.
In the absence of prejudicial error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and it is so ordered.