State v. MillerState v. Miller
Thе defendant, Bailey Miller, Jr., was charged by bill of information with two counts of molestation of a juvenile over whom he had сontrol or supervision, in violation of
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting the State’s Prieur motion. The Prieur evidence at issue herein is a sexually suggestive statement allegedly made by the defendant at a barbecue in May of 1996. Specifically, the defendant argues that this statement is not admissible as modus operandi or a signature crime and that, even if relevant, the prejudicial effect of the statement outweighs its probative value.
Genеrally, evidence of other acts of misconduct is not admissible. However, there are statutory and jurisprudential exсeptions to this rule. State v. Jackson,
Except as provided in Article 412 [addressing the victim’s past sеxual behavior in sexual assault eases], evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible fоr other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, аbsence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a сriminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidenсe it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.
The threshold inquiry a court must make before admitting similar acts evidence under this rule is whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other than character. See Huddleston v. United States,
At the Prieur hearing, Debra Humbles testified that she and her boyfriend, Kevin Westmore, had a barbecue in May of 1996. The defendant and his wife attended the barbecue. Ms. Humbles testified that her boyfriend overheard the defendant make a sexually suggestive statement to her eight year old daughter. A seven year old female cousin also was present when the defendant made the statement. Ms. Humbles indicated that her boyfriend reprimanded the defendant аfter overhearing the statement, and shortly thereafter the defendant and his wife returned home. According to Ms. Humbles, her bоyfriend told her that the defendant “told my little girl that he saw her in his bedroom in his bed, lying on the bed with no clothes on, with her arms open and her legs spread open.”
We have reviewed the evidence introduced at the Prieur hearing and find no error in the trial court’s ruling that evidence of the defendant’s sexually suggestive statement to an eight year old female (in the presence of another female age seven) should be admissible at Rthe trial. Apparently, the instant
Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, we do not find the trial court’s use of the term modus operandi to mean that the defendant’s conduct was so unique that it constituted а signature crime. Instead, as the court explained in its ruling, the defendant may first talk sexually to young girls who are his potential victims before he initiates any physical contact. Thus, as the trial court correctly observed, it may establish a prеdisposition to molest young girls. See State v. Jackson,
While we recognize the prejudicial effect of the evidence at issuе, we also find the statements of the defendant to be probative. We conclude the probative value/prеjudicial balance tips in favor of inclusion of the evidence. Accordingly, evidence of the defendant’s statement shall be properly admissible at the instant trial. We hereby affirm the trial court’s ruling granting the State’s Pri-eur motion.
RULING AFFIRMED.
Notes
. We recognize that in rеsponse to defense counsel’s objections regarding the hearsay nature of the testimony, the trial court notеd that the evidence would have to be presented at trial through the testimony of Kevin Westmore or other “proper witnesses.”