12 Vt. 437 | Vt. | 1840
The opinion of the court was delivered by
— It is to be taken, that the evidence offered, if admitted, would have proved the facts therein stated. It is also to be considered that, under the charge of the court, whatever facts were there adverted to as constituting no justification, were in evidence. From these it may be assumed, that Merritt, the deputy sheriff, had a writ of attachment, by which he was commanded to take the property of one Elisha Clark ; and by virtue of the attachment, and by direction of the creditor thereon, he did not attach the property of Clark, but did attach as his property, 150 stooks of corn then in the field of one Alien, which were, in fact, the property of one Williams, and in his possession, or in that of his agent, Allen, when attached; and that while the deputy sheriff was in the field where the corn was, and in such possession as he could take of property of that na
Upon this statement of facts, it is obvious that the deputy sheriff would have been liable to Williams in an action of trespass, if he had removed this corn, and, upon the same principle, if the case of the Earl of Bristol v. Wilsmore Page, 1 Barn. & Cres. 514, is to be recognized as an authority, he could not maintain an action against either Williams or the respondent, who took the property from him, as he was not entitled to it against the rightful owner. Still a public officer may not be forcibly or violently resisted, even by the actual owner, when he has attached or is about to attach property which he honestly believes to be the property of the debtor, especially if he acts in pursuance of the direction of the creditor. And for that reason, when an officer was so violently resisted, and an assault and battery committed on him in the resistance, the person,so resisting, was adjudged guilty under the statute, in the case of the State v. Downer et al., 8 Vt. R. 424, notwithstanding he might have had the better right to the property attached. We consider that such a forcible resistance would expose the offender to the penalty of the statute, and we think this a better principle than the one which was established in the case found in the 8th Pick. R. Commonwealth v. Kinnard et al. But some regard must be had to therights which the owner has to his property and they are not all to cease, when the sheriff comes with a process, not against him, but against a third person with whom he has no connection, and it is not always true that the same facts, which would render an entire stranger obnoxious to the penalty of the statute, would make the true owner an offender. A removal of property, about to be attached, by an entire stranger,to prevent such attachment,might be an offence, when such a removal by the real owner, for the same purpose, to prevent its being attached as the property of another, would
We think, therefore, the evidence offered should have been admitted, and if the corn was, in fact, the property of Williams, in the custody of his agent^ Allen, and in the field of Allen, and the respondent removed it by the direction of Williams, without any breach of the peace, and without committing any assault on the person of the officer, or any violence, or using any threats to prevent the deputy sheriff from doing his duty, he would not be guilty of the