State v. . MillerState v. . Miller
The State then introduced the boy, Wm. Lucas, who testified that the defendant and one Dick had employed him to keep Boyd‘s dogs off, while they went into Boyd‘s room and stole his money; that оn the night of 15 September he did keep the dogs quiet, and they went
On his cross-examination he said it occurred a week or so before 16 September.
The defendant then introduced as a witness one Wm. Thomason (one of the owners of the store mentioned), who testified that on the occasion alluded to by Lucas, he, Lucas, and the prisoner came to the store owned by his brother and himself — that Lucas took from his pocket the $10 bill alluded to, and handed it to prisoner, and the latter handed it to witness — that Lucas bought some articles from the store, and directed him to take payment from the bill — thаt he did so, and placed the change on the counter, and prisoner pushed the money to Lucas and said: “Here is your money,” and Lucas took it up and handed $3 to the рrisoner. This was about dark on 1 September. James Thomason testified to the same facts. The prisoner then, in his own behalf, testified, denying the statements of Lucas as to the stealing, and testified as to the transaction at Thomason‘s store, giving precisely the account given by William and James Thomason.
The case states that: “There were other circumstances relied on by the State as corroborative evidence, but which are not material to the exception.”
“The court instructed the jury, that it was unsafe to сonvict the defendants (Miller and Dick were both on trial) upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. That the most
His Honor then recapitulated the testimony of the witnesses Lucas and Boyd, witnesses for the State, and of the prisoner Miller and W.
There was a verdict of guilty, and judgment and appeal. It has been reрeatedly laid down, that a conviction on the testimony of an accomplice uncorroborated is legal; Roscoe‘s Criminal Evidence, 121; and this has been well settlеd as the law of this State, certainly since the cases of S. v. Haney, 2 D. B., 390; S. v. Hardin, ibid., 407; S. v. Holland, 83 N.C. 624.
It is, however, the almost universal practice of the judges to instruct juries that they should be cautious in convicting upon the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices, and Gaston, J., in S. v. Haney, says: “The judge may caution them against reposing hasty confidence in the testimony of an accomрlice. . . . Long usage, sanctioned by deliberate judicial approbation, has given to this ordinary caution a precision which makes it approach a rule of law.”
If the unsupported testimony of the accomplice produce undoubting belief of the prisoner‘s guilt, the jury should convict. The manner and bearing of the witness upon the stand, the probability of his statements, are all matters for the sole consideration of the jury.
We understand the counsel for the defendant to concede that his Honor, in charging thе jury that they ought not to convict upon the testimony of Lucas, unless corroborated, erred in favor of the prisoner, but it is insisted that he erred in telling them that what occurred at Thоmason‘s store was corroborative, and that the jury were, or might have been misled thereby.
The corroboration of an accomplice ought to be as to some fact or facts, the truth or falsehood of which goes to prove or disprove the offense charged against the prisoner; Rex v. Addie, 6 Carrington Payne, 452; Commonwealth v. Barnett, 22 Pick., 397.
In this case, we do not understand his Honor as charging the jury that the testimony of Lucas was corroborated by what was done at Thomason‘s store, but he was giving the State‘s contention, and said the “State alleged” that the сircumstances and transactions were corroborative. It is admitted that Lucas was a thief and that the money of Boyd was stolen.
The defendant was in company with Lucas аt Thomason‘s store — they seemed to be associates, and whether Lucas or the defendant had the money, it was passed from one to the other, and these circumstances were doubtless subjects of comment by the solicitor for the State, and his Honor did nothing more than recapitulate the evidence and the aspects in which it had bеen presented by counsel. The charge was altogether as favorable to the prisoner as was warranted by the evidence, and there was no error of which he could justly
No error. Affirmed.
Cited: S. v. Rowe, 98 N.C. 637; S. v. Mitchener, ibid., 694; S. v. Barber, 113 N.C. 713; S. v. Register, 133 N.C. 753; S. v. Ashburn, 187 N.C. 728.