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State v. Miller
337 A.2d 36
N.J.
1975
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*1 аpply 2d 570 does (1975), 43 L. Ed. -, 95 Ct. his behalf. With own testify did not here because defendant The majority opinion, I in full agreement. these am holdings exception. approval on to goes imply though, matter of state law Harris as a desirability adopting case, and I would not do so. this need not be considered in my out in dissent fully this are set issue views My Miller, today. 67 N. J. also decided J., in result. concurring Pashman, Justice For part part reversal in affirmance —Chief Sullivah, Justices Jacobs, Mountain, Hughes, Pashman Collester —7. and Judge and Clifford Opposed—None. PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, JERSEY,

STATE OF NEW HINES, MILLER, DEFENDANT- ELAINE ELAINE A/K/A APPELLANT. April 22, Argued 1975. November 1974 Decided *2 Defender, Public B. Arrajj, Deputy Mr. David Assistant G. Van Stanlеy for defendant-appellant (Mr. the cause argued *3 Ness, Defender, attorney). Public Kendall, Prosecutor, the argued

Mr. Bison P. Assistant Posner, Lawrence H. plaintiff-respondent cause for (Mr. Ascii, Karl Prosecutor, brief; Mr. Union Assistant the Prosecutor, County attorney). Court was delivered of the opinion

The in- on a two-count Sullivan, Defendant was convicted bills with $20 counterfeit exchanged two having dictment passed in violation intent to have the same uttered A. N. J. S. She was sentenced to two concur- 2A:109-2(a). terms in Institution rent indeterminate the Correctional Women. trial, testified that she had not entered

At her defendant days when bills were Price-Rite on the two the Market her denied that On cross-examination she passed. following Barile that she Anthony arrest had admitted to Detective she they were counterfeit. knowing had the bills not passed He Barile rebuttal. testified called Detective The State follow- defendant at police headquarters with spoke he her he of her constitu- that first advised arrest and her ing understood. Defendant then she she said rights tional 232

admitted having cashed two bills in question, but denied knowing they were counterfeit. When Barile began Detective to testify the statement defеndant, about he had taken from' defense counsel a on whether or not the requested hearing Arizona, statement met the Miranda v. requirements of S. Ct. L. Ed. The 2d (1966).1 was denied on the request ground that was statement York, admissible under v. New L. Ed. (1971),2 that compliance with of Miranda was not requirements prerequisite on rebuttal. Counsel then admissibilty requested charge limiting jury’s credibility the statement only. This was also denied, request the court ruling statement could be used not to affect credi only defendant’s but bility, also an in a admission. The held that court situation where the contains of fact statement admissions case, at issue in with wоuld be unable to jury comply an instruction that considered as may only be an admis affecting the witness and not as sion of fact. affirmed Division in an Appellate unreported opinion certifica judgment conviction. Court granted This 65 N.

tion, J. 298 v. New to consider Harris supra, in the factual context here presented. police 1Miranda bars from evidence statements obtained interrogation unless, questioning begins,

custodial before the the ac- *4 fully cused, having rights, been advised of his constitutional know- ingly intelligently rights agrees ques- and waives such to answer a tions or make statement. 2Harris in-custody that an holds while taken from a de giving warnings may fendant without first the Miranda not be used by part chief, the State as of its case in if the defendant takes the gives testimony stand as a witness and which is at variance with statement, statement, what was said in if it otherwise satis may admissibility, impeach fies standards of be used to defendant’s credibility recently as a witness. The Harris rationale was reaffirmed by Supreme - Oregon Hass, the United States Court in -, (1975). 95 S. Ct. 43 L. Ed. 2d 570 conclude

We that the trial court’s of interpretation Harris was erroneous. An in-custody statement taken from an accused by the without police first with the complying Miranda rule is not admissible in evidence as of the part State’s mаin However, case. if it satisfies otherwise stan of dards admissibility, impeach it the de may used credibility fendant’s as a should witness take defendant the witness stand and give testimony is at variance with what was said in the statement to the police. But it limited consideration jury should be instructed as to the contents. may to the statement its give a We is recognize this difficult assignment give jury in situation where the statement contains admis- case, nevertheless, sions of fact at issue in the an stands as absolute bar to use statement as substan- tive and the must jury evidence be told it may the statement defendant’s as a only weighing Evidencе, witness. New Buies Buie Jersey 6. This See the uniform interpretation given by courts which have the matter. considered

It been has suggested that because of faced difficulty in this jury situation, type Court, this it has do, should, law, as a matter of state impose restrictions on under greater ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‍police activity than required federal constitutional a non-Miranda and hold that standards statement may not be used the State for any purpose. See State v. Santiago, Haw. 254, 492 P. 2d 657 (1971).

The decision of the United States Supreme Court Harris was anticipated in this State. Kimbrough, 109 N. J. Super. 57 Div. (App. 1970). Since Harris was decided, it Falco, has bеen cited State v. 60 N. J. 570, Burt, State v. (1972); N. J. 165 (1971) (Hall, Slobodian, State v. concurring); 120 N. J. Super. 73-74 Div. (App. 1972), certif. 62 N. J. denied 77 (1972). In Harris the opinion the United Court Supreme States *5 226; 646, 28 L. 91 S. Ct. at Ed. U. S. at (401

states : at 5) provided by perverted into a license Miranda cannot be The shield defense, perjury way risk confronta- from use free a prior tion utterances. with inconsistent is a valuable herein

We Harris as applied conclude that a de- on impinge mechanism which does truth-finding we Uor do state constitutional rights. fendant’s federal or 38 call for different 37 and Rules think that Evidence R. 5. Evid. result. See court trial situation, course, a Harris-type

Of ex 4 to Rulе Evidence have the under always would even for bar and its entirely clude the statement defendant’s purpose impeaching limited of the value that the witness, probative if as a it concludes its that the risk substantially outweighed undue preju danger create substantial admission would jury. misleading or of dice errone was ruling court’s that trial Our holding trial. and new a reversal necessarily require ous does not defend questioning prior Barile testified Detective of her her advised he fully bills about the counterfeit ant then ad She she said she understood. Miranda and rights without knowledge bills but had passed mitted she re noted, As heretofore defendant’s were counterfeit. they and Miranda voir dire” was refused a “full-fledged quest But this proof. admitted as substantive was the statement if, fact, and defendant not have been may prejudicial testified, Barile prerequisites Detective However, to a hearing defendant is entitled satisfied. on this issue. ruling affirm We therefore judgment conviction but re- matter to trial court mand the to hold Miranda hear- the admissibility of defendant’s statement to Detec- ing If, Barile. after hearing tive State’s defendant’s

235 the trial proofs, court finds that the of Miranda requirements met that the statement was аdmissible substan- as tive proof, the judgment conviction will stand, subject to defendant’s right of from If appeal ruling. the trial court finds that the Miranda warnings were fully given and that, therefore, understood and the state- ment was not admissible substantive proof, judgment of conviction is to be set and a new trial had. aside v. Kelly, 61 N. J. 283, Loray, 294-295 State v. (1972); 46 N. J. 179 (1965).

Defendant also her appeals sentence of two concur indeterminate rent custodial terms at In the Correctional stitution for Women. should We conclude that the sentences affirmed, a but Defendant is service of them suspended. young woman with no kind. is any record of She prior the mother aof seven-year-old child whom she lives with in a stable home has environment. She worked steadily her since graduation from high school and presently is New employed by Bell Jersey The Telephone Company. Union County Probation Department, after a full review of situation, her recommended non-custodial sentence. The circumstances of the case, our call particular opinion, for of the sentences with defendant suspension imposed probation for placed period of two The years. fore course, subject going, outcome of the remand. So ordered.

Pashman, (dissenting). This presents case the Court with its first opportunity since the decision of United States Harris v. Supreme Court in New 401 U. S. 222, 643, 91 S. Ct. 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 consider (1971) to purposes impeachment by of statements obtained from police defendant without with the compliance Arizona, 436, set out in Miranda v. 384 U. S. requirements 86 16 L. Ed. 694 S. Ct. 2d has (1966). majority Harris. I chosen follow would not do so.

236 Miranda, the Supreme Court that use at recognized trial of statements from obtained the defendant the police was limited not only found in the by concepts due process fifth and constitution, fourteenth to the federal amendments see, e. g., Haynes 373 U. S. S. Washington, 10 L. Ed. Brown (1963); Mississippi, U. S. 461, 80 L. Ed. see, g., amendment, e. to counsel found in the sixth Illinois,

Escobedo v. 12 L. Ed. States, ; 201, 84 Massiah v. United 2d 977 (1964) *7 de also the by 12 L. Ed. 2d but (1964), so, self-incrimination. In doing fendant’s privilege against for ex rationale the earliest constitutional it returned to Bram United See obtained confessions. cluding improperly States, 42 L. Ed. 568 532, 542, 168 U. S. 18 S. Anglo-Amer in the special place (1897). Emphasizing of the self-incrimination privilege against ican tradition legal in conventional police for unfairness great potential and Miranda, in established the Court practices, interrogation the rights rule encroachment prevent prophylactic of accused of crimes: persons exculpatory statements, may prosecution whether not [T]he interrogation defend- stemming of the inculpatory, custodial from or safeguards procedural effective of the use demonstrates unless it ant By in- privilege against custodial self-incrimination. to secure the by officers questioning terrogation, law enforcement ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‍initiated mean we deprived custody of otherwise person or into has been taken after a procedural way. any significant forAs in his freedom of action safeguards fully employed, de- unless other effective means are to be persons right and assure of their of silence inform accused vised to it, following opportunity measures are to exercise a continuous person any questioning, required. warned that must be Prior to silent, any right make that statement he does he has to remain right against him, may and he has a that to the be as used evidence appointed. presence attorney, retained or The defendant of either an provided rights,

may is made these the waiver of waive effectuation If, intelligently. however, voluntarily, knowingly indicаtes he and any stage process any wishes con- of that he and at in manner questioning, attorney speaking there can be no an with before sult Likewise, any in and indicates manner if the individual alone police may question interrogated, him. he does to be not wish may questions The mere fact some he have answered vol deprive unteered statements on his him of some own does not any inquiries answering to refrain from further until he has questioned. attorney an consulted with and thereafter consents be 1612; 444-45, [384 omitted]. U. S. at S. Ct. footnote York, Harris v. New supra, the Court created an excep- еxclusion, tion to rule of this the state to use for permitting defendant when he chooses to purposes impeaching the testify own defense from him his statements obtained Miranda.1 police violation of the requirements

The reasoning in Harris holding majority are vulnerable to technical criticism on both and policy objections The technical to the decision matter grounds. of federal constitutional are jurisprudence lucidly set out dissent, Harris v. New Justice Brennan’s need 222, 226, 91 S. Ct. 28 L. Ed. 2d here: mentioned only briefly was (1) situation specifically considered Court in the Miranda opinion itself and use for pur- poses impeachment taken by statements the police from the defendant without their first giving Arizona, rejected. was Miranda v. warnings expressly supra, 476-77, U. S. at 1602. *8 The

(2) heavy reliance placed by the Walder on majority States, v. United 347 U. S. 62, 74 354, S. Ct. Ed. 98 L. 503 was (1954) unfounded. Walder allowed the prosecutor to the impeach defendant by use of evidence seized in violation of fourth amendment when such evidence contradicted testimony by defendant on collateral mat- ters. It did permit not use of evidence, even such for pur- recently - Oregon Hass, 1The decided -, case of v. U. S. 95 1215, by S. Ct. 43 L. Ed. 2d majority, 570 cited is not рoint. case, although relying upon in York, That Harris v. New supra, precedental authority, by police did not concern failure give but, warnings, rather, by police to misconduct after warnings properly given. had bfeen 238 evidence bears essen where the of impeachment,

poses United v. case. Walder the prosecutor’s elements of tial States, 65, 74 S. Ct. 354. supra at line of cases well-established majority (3) ignored to any attempt fifth prohibits that the amendment holding as whether to testify choice to burden the defendant’s See, S. e. v. 380 U. g., California, remain silent. Griffin Ed. 106 1229, 14 L. (1965). to amount While are pertinent these technical defects Harris, in policy the decision paid of deference be of much objections greater consequence. to this decision are York, v. New supra, See Harris generally Rhay, Riddell v. S. dissenting); Ct. 643 J. (Brennan, U. 92 S. Ct. 30 L. Ed. 2d (1971) (Douglas, S. certiorari); from denial of writ of dissenting Santiago, Sup. 1971); 53 Haw. 2d 657 (Haw. P. Hass, - S. -, U. 95 Ct. Ed. Oregon L. cf. 2d 570 (1975). Arizona, for

Miranda v. established standards supra, police ac rights persons conduct so as constitutional protect violation of by cused of crime. It to deter standards sought misconduct. the state of the fruits depriving police v. New to overrule the purport does stan supra, Miranda; it simply permits established in dards conduct their official misconduct in cer eyes police courts to close so, it doing significantly tain circumstances. undermines Miranda rule: value of the the deterrent police longer any Yet, Harris, for no real incentive after there is always Credibility obey an accused an issue when Miranda. granted the Harris defense. The license the stand his own takes pur- impeachment majority statements to use Miranda-violative possible therefore, poses, use of tainted statements foreshadows every opens door to а calculated risk case. This in almost response warnings, If, police interrogators. an ac- to Miranda attorney during ques- present he wishes to have an cused indicates may ignored impunity. request tioning, If with a dam- virtual may certainly forthcoming, aging it almost is thereafter against take if later elects to the stand the accused he be used *9 inability Moreover, is minimal risk his defense. own prosecution’s will result in a in the case-in-chief use acquittal. charges dismissal of the or a directed Unlike verdict exclusionary operate rules to exclude other situations illegally prima physical еvidence, that a facie obtained seldom it requires lips from the accused. [Riddell case corroboration (Douglas, Rhay, supra, J. dis S. Ct. at 338 S. U. certiorari)]. senting from denial of writ of addition, of and judicial tolerance reliance permitting upon evidence, obtained makes the improperly it courts vehicle for government This not demeans wrongdoing. only judicial but process subtly undermines entire founda- tion under law. The government matter was aptly put by States, Justice Brandéis in his in Olmstead dissent v. United 438, 485, U. S. 72 L. Ed. 944 (1927),2 case; an early wiretapping government laws, government In a existence of the will be im-

perilled scrupulously. government if fails it to observe the law Our potent, omnipresent good ill, is the or for teacher. For it teaches people by example. contagious. govern- the whole its Crime is If the lawbreaker, contempt law; ment becomes breeds it it invites every himself; anarchy. man to become law unto it invites documents amply in widespread of police terrogation tactics which on rely subtle forms of deception and coercion and which take advantage defendant’s ig norance of his constitutional rights to remain silent and con sult counsel. U. 86 S. Ct. 1602. These tactics 445 — unfair, not merely they are cast doubt reliability of statements from obtained defendants through their use. The effect of the subtly coercive atmosphere of the cus todial police interrogation, though rendering state ments coerced for purposes of the due process clause, may induce the defendant to misstate or exaggerate facts in ways which, though understandable in the circumstances in which made, they appear as devastating when inconsistencies 2Olmstead was overruled aud Brandeis’s view vindicated in Katz v. States, United 88 S. (1967). 19 L. Ed. 2d 576

240 fact that Harris ignores later trial. produced at cause to advance are calculated rules set Miranda out in fairness. truth well as that of right defendant’s heavily in Harris burdens The decision trial, a to remain at testify to choose to or silent California, v. amendment. fifth protected by is Griffin 2d 106 1229, 14 L. Ed. 609, (1965). S. 85 Ct. 380 U. S. his own only not exposes the defendant testify, By choosing himself to cross-exam subjects credibility ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‍to question but, of his defense on all aspects by prosecutor ination Harris, in rebuttal introduction also the door to under opens has state illegally which the statements prejudicial of highly a this as describes opinion from him. A recent оbtained Woods, Pa. v. 455 Commonwealth choice,” Hobson’s “grisly J. 1973) Ct. 1, 7, 357, Sup. (Roberts, 312 A. 360 (Pa. unfair characterization I do not consider this concurring). exaggerated. consequences of Harris mitigated are

Arguably, use an obtained limitation to impeachment illegally would, however, It excessively ingenuous statement. incrim jury that would or could treat suppose highly the defendant as evidence solely statements made inating for all Riddell them other ignore purposes. this 974, 404 92 Ct. 336. Indeed Rhay, v. U. S. S. supra, Boone, J. v. 66 N. rejected such supposition Court 38, admission of sought 48-49 where the State (1974) Bruton v. United plea. withdrawn previоusly guilty Cf. States, 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 U. 88 S. S. Denno, 84 Ct. Jackson v. S. (1968); States, Krulewitch United L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964); 93 Ed. (1949) (Jackson, L. S. concurring). in Harris majority seeks to justify the exception Miranda rule on the grounds to the that other adopt any permit rule to be into “perverted license would by way defense.” Harris New perjury supra, 226, 91 Ct. at 646. S. at It first be U. should noted the Harris that has characterized majority the issue more dramatic than language accurate. The fact defendant at trial makes statements inconsistent with prior statements made to the police does demonstrate his testimony may Prior perjured. inconsistent statements often be harmonized оr If are explained. the statements irreconcilable may it indicate that was prior statement *11 false rather latter, than the a realistic the where possibility prior statement was the under coercive subtly circum- made of stances the station house Nor interrogation. does Miranda bar prosecutor the from exploring the defendant’s credibility. It him all leaves the traditional tools for falsehood, unmasking he use only that fair and methods requiring rather legal than ones are rooted in official misconduct.

Even were the ac majority’s characterization curate, its conclusion would not follow. It is a common phenomenon law the that evidence probative as to sub stantive or issues of a is be witness excluded the cause its admission would conflict with other important Thus, policies. circumstances, we appropirate exclude statements made a criminal to defendant his lawyer, 26, Evid. R. R. spouse, 28, to his Evid. or to his clergyman, R. Evid. 29. We exclude statements whose disclosure would State, Evid. imperil R. 34. We exclude made statements under of previous immunity. We grant exclude offers for a compromise 52, Evid. R. bargain plea, previously Boone, withdrawn State v. guilty рleas. supra. decision in Miranda v. an Arizona involved decision express de of police terrence misconduct and preservation of in of tegrity justice system the criminal policies of suf justify ficient of weight loss some relevant evidence. However unsound decision of the United States Su Court in Harris v. New preme 401 U. S. 222, 91 S. L. Ed. 2d as a (1971) matter federal con law, stitutional its holding nevertheless the definitive con struction the federal constitution. While we may criticize decision, cannot Funicello, we decline obey it. State v. 24:2 Jack C. J. concurring);

60 N. J. 69 (1972) (Weintraub, Bodine, con J. J. (Haneman, v. 43 N. 479 (1964) man decisions, however, power impair . do curring) Such law more rigorous of State as matter adopt of this Court v. individual, Cali Cooper rules for protection Ed. 2d 730 58, 62, L. 87 S. U. fornia, E. g., had do the past. have occasion to as we (1967), Rosenblatt, generally, see 58 N. J. 281 Rodriguez (1971), v. v. Horton, Robinson v. 34 N. J. State 518 (1961). Cf. Cahill, 62 N. J. 473 (1973). of 1947 does not

Although guar the Constitution expressly self-incrimination, against privilege antee privilege as a law very has been common since recognized N. J. 431 Fary, days independence. earliest Zdanowicz, L. 619 1903). State v. 69 N. J. & A. (1955); (E. is so of criminal fundamentally system It woven into our justice basic and as one may fairly that it treated absolute Const. Art. N. J. rights incorporated into Bank, 1. 66 N. v. South National King Jersey § Black, J. L. 446, Ransom 54 N. (1974); (Sup. *12 N. J. In addi 1892), aff’d 65 L. 688 & A. 1893). (E. tion, it is Evid. rules of part as of our evidence. adopted 25, 37, R. 38.

I would N. J. Art. 1 and construe Const. § of rules principles evidence of Miranda incorporating Arizona, L. Ed. 2d 694 (1971) and reject permitted by the exception would v. New v. South National supra. King Jersey Cf. Bank, 66 J. 161, N. 195 n. 7 J. dis- (1974) (PaShman, senting). Heither the in Harris nor the majority majority in this case has arguments demonstrated adopting this exception outweigh arguments strong policy against so set out above. doing

I find the decision of the majority on this issue particularly in that it does unsatisfying not deal with our rules of evidence. Ev id. R. 25 provides in pertinent part: person right Subject 37, every a natural has to refuse to to Rule any police or official matter in an action or officer other disclose to expose penalty him or a forfeiture him or to a that will incriminate * * * of his estate. Evid. R. 37 states in pertinent part: person right privilege A waives his or or refuse disclose prevent disclosing specified any from another if matter he other or person (a) anyone while the holder thereof has contracted with right privilege (b) or, to claim the or without coercion and with knowledge right privilege, any part his made disclosure of of of privileged any- matter such or consented to a disclosure made added], [Emphasis one. R. 38 Evid. provides: against Evidence or other disclosure is inadmissible privilege wrongfully the holder of the if the disclosure was made or

erroneously required. It .may well be that Evid. R. 37 to be construed ought to require proof giving warnings equivalent those by Miranda. required It is clear that the language the rule at least an requires affirmative demonstration that the defendant had actual of his knowledge to remain ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‍silent of the police time Evid. R. 38 interrogatiоn. provides that the absence of such a demonstration, evidence must be excluded. It makes no exceptions for use for purposes of impeachment. The even majority, if it adopts Harris, the general principle must limit it to at least this extent.

I recognize the vast majority of courts have considered the Harris issue since the decision of that case have chosen to adopt See, exception to Miranda. e. g., v. Jorgenson, Ariz. 502 P. 2d 158 (Ariz. Sup. 1972); People Moore, 54 Ill. 2d 33, 294 N. E. *13 297 2d (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1973), cert. 412 denied U. 943, S. 93 Ct. 37 S. L. Ed. 2d 404 (1973); Commonwealth v. Mass., Harris, 303 N. E. 115 2d (Mass. Jud. Ct. Sup. 244 refused do so. has

1973). jurisdiction expressly One State v. 53 Haw. 492 P. Sаntiago, 657 (Haw. Sup. 2d 1971), Ct. and others have of expressed varying degrees See, Woods, e. g., doubt. Commonwealth v. 455 Pa. the A. I latter view (Pa. 2d Ct. find the Sup. 1973).3 one. sounder

I with concur insofar majority it holds that must be remanded for a hearing matter to determine whether Miranda were I also in its given. holding concur warnings if that defendant should receive non-custodial sentence is sustained. As to the admis- ultimately the conviction if the retrial, of testimony upon Detective sibility Barile’s were given, finds Miranda warnings trial court that no finds is trial court that admissible. If the testimony not available is testimony Miranda were given, warnings for and I therefore dissent. any purpose J. in and part (concurring dissenting part).

Clifford, narrow, fundamental, rather but I respect one do only I judgment agree from the of the Court. that depart trial determina- be sent back judge case should Miranda v. whether or not the requirements tion of Arizona, Ed. L. were, the conviction they that if met, then that process, If conviction survives stand. should sentence. in the revision I concur also conclusion if the join I cannot the Court’s that But were not warnings given determines judge trial understood, value weigh probative he should nevertheless non-Miranda statement against inconsistent of thе prior “create would substantial danger its admission risk misleading jury.” sugges- undue prejudice many worthy perhaps courts that while considered note 3It decision, Supreme very prior few issue to the Court anticipated New Harris v. See the cases collected decision. (Brennan, York, supra, n. 91 S. S. at 231 U. dissenting). *14 tion is that the statement could admitted on the limited of issue find the credibility danger trial to judge of be- undue is minimal. I dissent prejudice respectfully cause I am of case we can and should the view that in this of decide the issue defendant’s against admissibility prior statement matter of law. as statement, That while it not be direct admission may of nonetheless to the heart of the offense guilt, goes directly and comes to such an admission. It consti- perilously close an tutes that she acknowledgement by passed defendant bills, albeit their ob- without awareness of apparently would vious counterfeit character. in evidence receipt Its rec- likelihood, be at the risk with the as (and high indeed on it considering the trial ognized by judge) jury of solely of the criminal rather than charge the substance the issue of defendant’s Therein lies the “sub- credibility. undue I think it unwise to stantial of danger prejudice.” risk, run when what is stake is the priv- that particularly To me the compelled propo- ilege against self-incrim'ination.1 state- of this jury that could limit consideration any sition issue in the face of the plain ment to the of flies re- of courtroom. quite simply notion reality That public companion 1JChe defender’s brief v. case State Davis, (1975), notwithstanding, Jersey 67 N. the New Con provision stitution contains no similar Fifth Amendment setting expressly privilege against the Federal Constitution forth a involuntary although process self-incrimination. And the due clause 1, paragraph 1, constitution, Burlington in Article of the state see S. Cty. Township Laurel, (1975), N.A.A.C.P. v. Mt. 67 N. J. might liberty well warrant fundamental scheme of ordered incorporation privilege reasoning expounded of the in accord with the Malloy Hogan, 84 S. Ct. L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964), opinion I need not frame this in constitutional terms. Either public policy, as a Vince, mandate of see re 2 N. J. 448-49 part law, or as Zdanowicz, our common see (E. N. J. L. 1903), 621 — 22 & A. state law embraces the no person compelled tion no against can be to be a witness him For origins self. a discussion of privilege against the state of the self-incrimination, Jersey Evidence, see New Rules Rule com (Gann ment 1972). sec. 25.1 at 112-13 fun is the to do the So jury clearly quires impossible. damental the instant case privilege jeopardized in allowing view the respectful majority’s my position against value trial the statement’s judge weigh probative *15 to the risk of the protection undue falls short prejudice Thus, accept I would which that is privilege entitled. U. invitation of v. S. Cooper California, under (1967), L. Ed. 788, 791, 17 2d S. state aas matter exercise our power, circumstances these stan higher protective with law, privilege to surround Amendment right accorded Eifth than dards those New in Harris v. Court Supreme Hass, and Oregon Ed. 643, 28 L. 2d (1971), - Ed. 570 (1975). 43 L. -, approach Harris-Haas not, howevеr, reject

I would to jury would permit I example, its Eor entirety. in instruction a limiting with statement non-Miranda receive if only, admissibility to its on the issue as than one fact with collateral rather that statement dealt priv- On balance the or bearing directly on innocence. guilt against self-incrimination would not ilege exposed there risk. If to unwarranted the fact contained in the statement is issue collateral, nevertheless of value on the but probative being likelihood of jury then there little credibility, confused or misled.

Such is the situation in of State companion case Davis, 67 N. J. 222 where day, decidеd this in challenged statement went whether was defendant Camden, New Chicago (his alibi or witnesses’ position), Jersey (prior statement). The offense in was committed Pleasantville, New Jersey, and therefore the statement itself tended only show that defendant, had he to the testified 'same effect as did his alibi witnesses, was untruthful being whereabouts; as to his but the challenged statement prior did not tend to demonstrate that defendant in in was fact Pleasantville or the victim’s store. The Davis is, case view, on my only facts, decided its but the rightly opin discussion ion’s of the use to which the inconsistent prior testified, statemеnt could have been had defendant there put, is also in with to which my the extent keeping position we I take should follow the Harris-Hass therefore analysis. opin the Court’s joinder explain my opportunity this in Davis. ion affirm

I would remand the instant case and the convic- the trial that Miranda judge’s finding tion conditioned upon I would afforded defendant. that event warnings If Miranda were not warnings given, the sentence. modify waive her to these effectively if did not defendant conviction warnings, should be case reversed trial, for a new tes- remanded Detective Basile’s inconsistent non-Miranda prior defendant’s timony any pur- received in evidence for not be should pose. *16 Hughes, Moun- Justices Justice

For remandment —Chief Collester —4. Judge tain and Sullivan Pashman ‍‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌‍—1. Dissenting —Justice Concurring dissenting Clieeord —1. —Justice

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Miller
Court Name: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Date Published: Apr 22, 1975
Citation: 337 A.2d 36
Court Abbreviation: N.J.
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