State v. MillerState v. Miller
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Knoll, Sullivan, Brouillette
Defendant, Lucas Shane Miller, was charged by grand jury indictment with carnal knowledge of a juvenile, a violation of
“A. Carnal knowledge of a juvenile is committed when:
(1) A male over the age of seventeen has sexual intercourse, with consent, with any unmarried female of the age of twelve years or more, but under the age of seventeen years, when there is an age difference of greater than two years between the two persons ...”
Defendant contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to quash because (1) he is not “over the age of seventeen“; therefore,
“OVER THE AGE OF SEVENTEEN”
The district court interpreted the phrase “over the age of seventeen” in
The defendant‘s interpretation of “over the age of seventeen” was rejected by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Miles, 557 So.2d 1375 (La.1990). In Miles, the defendant was charged with the crime of indecent behavior with a juvenile, in violation of
In addition, Miller argues that if the statute applies to him, the phrase “over the age of seventeen” is unconstitutionally vague and does not give a reasonable person adequate notice that certain conduct is proscribed and punishable by law. This argument was also rejected by the Supreme Court in Miles:
“Louisiana‘s criminal law distinguishes between children, meaning persons who have not attained seventeen years of age, and adults, persons seventeen years of age or older. This is in accord with the constitutional mandate of
Art. 5, § 19 , which states, in pertinent part, that: `The determination of guilt or innocence, the detention, and the custody of a person who is alleged to have committed a crime prior to his seventeenth birthday shall be pursuant to special juvenile procedures which shall be provided by law.’ Adult criminal responsibility attaches at the age of seventeen. The statutory line of demarcation between children, who are under the age of seventeen, and adults, who are over the age of seventeen, is readily understandable and gives no reasonable doubt about the meaning of the phrase `over the age of seventeen.’* * * * * *
Since the ordinary person would have no reasonable doubt that a person over the age of seventeen is a person who is seventeen or older, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. [State v.] Saibold[, 213 La. 415, 34 So.2d 909 (1948)] described the argument made here as `absurd.’ ...”
Id. at 1375-76 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted).
The court‘s analysis and reasoning in Miles is sound and is dispositive of the issues raised in the present case. Therefore, we find no merit to defendant‘s first and second assignments of error.
EQUAL PROTECTION
In defendant‘s third assignment of error, he argues that because
In Bell, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the gender classification of
Thirteen years later, the defendant in Vining contended that the reasoning behind Bell was outdated. He argued that males could also develop lingering mental impairment, that because of AIDS, it is incumbent upon our society to protect both males and females, and that there is no rational basis for not punishing females for the same behavior as males. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, stating:
“Although some aspects of society have changed in recent years, the test for determining the constitutionality of a gender based statute remains the same. That test is whether the gender classification serves important governmental objectives and is substantially related to achievement of those ends. In this case, [
La.R.S. 14:80 ] recognizes the inherent danger of pregnancy, the greater possibility of harm to the female genitalia, and the risk of lingering mental damage and neurosis to the female. These objectives continue to exist today. Since the objectives of the statute, and the standard by which to judge them, remain the same, we find no merit to this assignment of error.”
In addition to the two Louisiana cases, we have also considered Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 101 S.Ct. 1200, 67 L.Ed.2d 437 (1981), in which the United States Supreme Court confronted the question of whether California‘s statutory rape law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
“The question thus boils down to whether a State may attack the problem of sexual intercourse and teenage pregnancy directly by prohibiting a male from having sexual intercourse with a minor female. We hold that such a statute is sufficiently related to the State‘s objectives to pass constitutional muster.”
450 U.S. at 472-73, 101 S.Ct. at 1206 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
This line of jurisprudence persuades us that any equal protection issue raised by
ERRORS PATENT
Our review of the record for errors patent reveals that the district court failed to give the defendant credit for time served, as required by
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court denying defendant‘s motion to quash is affirmed. This case is remanded to the district court to amend the commitment and the minute entry of sentencing to give defendant credit for time served in accordance with
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.