The appellant, Christopher Ji Miller, was convicted by a jury of armed robbery in connectiоn with the August 2, 1973, holdup of a Phoenix convenience market. He received a sentencе of from five to seven years in the Arizona State Prison.
*322 From photographs taken by a storе camera during the early morning robbery the defendant was identified and arrested that afternоon. He was represented by Thurman Gay, a public defender, at the preliminary hearing on August 10, 1973. Thе information was filed in Superior Court on August 16, 1973, and the arraignment held five days later, at which time the defendant waived his right to a speedy trial and a trial date of October 15, 1973, was set. That date and subsequent settings of November 1, and November 14 were vacated, the trial eventually commencing on November 15, 1973. The record is silent as to the cause of these delays.
On November 8, 1973, the defendant notified the public defender that he was discharged because of an alleged lack of interest in the case. This message was orally confirmed by defendant’s retainеd counsel, Henry Florence, on November 14. Mr. Florence’s motion later that day for substitution оf counsel and a continuance was withdrawn after the trial judge indicated he was not willing to аllow any further delay. The next day, just before trial, Mr. Gay filed motions for a continuance and for withdrawal in order to allow Mr. Florence time in which to assume the duties of defense counsеl and prepare for trial. The trial judge denied both motions on the grounds there had already been several delays and that a jury panel and witnesses were assembled for the second time. Because of this denial the public defender’s office rather than Mr. Florencе represented appellant at trial and on this appeal.
Defendant’s sole assignment of error on appeal is that the trial court’s action in denying the public defender’s motions for a continuance and withdrawal was arbitrary and capricious and constitutеd an infringement of the accused’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
As we stated in Hunter v. State,
“Continuances are, to a great extent, discretionary with the trial court, and an appellate tribunal will not review its action in this respect unless it clearly appears that the disсretion has been abused.”43 Ariz. at 271 ,30 P.2d at 499 . See State v. Lockett,107 Ariz. 598 ,491 P.2d 452 (1971).
It is firmly established that a criminal defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright,
It remains true, however, that the appellаnt was not represented by counsel of his own choosing, a right recognized to be within the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Glasser v. United States,
“The right to choose one’s attorney is not unlimited and, if in the sound discretion of the court, the attempted exercise of choice is deemed'dilatory or otherwisе subversive of orderly criminal process, the judge may compel a defendant to prоceed with designated counsel.” Lofton v. Procunier,487 F.2d 434 , at 435 (9th Cir. 1973). See Nunn v. Wilson,371 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1967).
*323 After the trial had already been pоstponed twice, appellant was notified on November 7, 1973, that proceedings would dеfinitely commence the following week. Despite this appellant waited until the day befоre trial, over three months after his arrest, to retain other counsel and have him move fоr substitution and a continuance.
Moreover, we feel compelled to note that it appears an attorney with unlimited time for preparation and the highest degree of professional skill could not have effected the overwhelming nature of the evidence in this case. Appellant’s criminal exploits were attested to by a store employee and a hidden camera and the money and goods stolen were found with the defendant аt his temporary residence when arrested. The appellant admitted commission of the robbery during his request for leniency at the time of sentencing.
Having found no abuse of discretion or deprivation of defendant’s right to counsel, the judgment is affirmed.