State v. MerskiState v. Merski
The question to be decided in this case is the constitutionality of the statute which requires *324 motorcyclists to wear protective headgear. The statute enacted by Laws 1967, 443:1 reads as follows: “263:29-b Protective Headgear. No person shall operate or ride upon a motorcycle unless he wears protective headgear of a type approved by the director. Such headgear shall be equipped with either a neck or chin strap. The director is hereby authorized and empowered to adopt and amend regulations covering the types of protective headgear and the specifications therefor and to establish and maintain a list of approved headgear which meet the specifications as established hereunder.” (Supp. 1972).
By criminal complaint the defendant was charged with operating a motorcycle without the protective headgear. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty but stipulated for the purposes of this case that he was operating a motorcycle without wearing protective headgear of a type approved by the director of motor vehicles. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint “on the grounds that the statute,
The Highway Safety Act of 1966 requires each State to have a highway safety program approved by the Secretary of Transportation and in accordance with the uniform standards promulgated by him.
The overwhelming weight of authority sustains the validity of laws which mandate the use of motorcycle helmets or protective headgear. Annot.,
be followed, and the power of the legislature to require the wearing of protective headgear for motorcyclists should be sustained as constitutionally permissible.
E.g., Love v. Bell,
*326
There is impressive statistical information which demonstrates that protective headgear for motorcyclists is necessary not only for their protection but for the benefit of the motoring public.
E.g.,
United States Department of Transportation, National Highway Safety Bureau, Staff Memorandum on the Analysis of Fatal Motorcycle Crashes in the United States, 1966-1970. We recognize that the defendant, an ardent motorcyclist, presents his challenge to the statute with conviction and sincerity and that his challenge is made on behalf of “the not-very-numerous, generally unloved motorcyclist.” Nevertheless we cannot say that the statute is beyond the police power of the State or violates the plaintiff’s right to equal protection and due process. This conclusion is supported by the cases previously cited as well as by
Simon v. Sargent,
The defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied and the order is
Remanded.