212 Wis. 15 | Wis. | 1933
The state contends that the inheritance taxes must be determined and imposed according to the statutes providing therefor, and that there is no authority in the statutes for postponing their determination and imposition.
The statutes of 1929 in force at the time of the testator’s death declare as follows: “A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon any (every) transfer of property ... or income therefrom in trust or otherwise.” . . . Sec. 72.01. “Such tax shall be imposed when any . . . (legatee) becomes beneficially entitled, in possession or expectancy, to any property or the income thereof.” Sec. 72.01 (4). The tax is to be imposed upon the clear market value. Sec. 72.01 (8). On application the insurance commissioner shall determine the value of any future or contingent estate, incomes or interests . . . dependent or determinable upon the life or lives of any person or persons and certify the valuation to the county court; Sec. 72.15 (4). In case of computations by
The statutory provisions above stated disclose a complete scheme for the valuing of interests in estates given by will and for the imposing of the tax upon such interests transferred as of the date of the death of the testator, and for the payment of the tax upon its imposition, whether the actual enjoyment of the interest transferred be present or future.
Respondents cite sec. 72.15 (9), Stats., as authority for holding in abeyance the imposition of the taxes on the interests of the brother and sister and the Masonic Lodge. This section states that “estates in expectancy which are contingent or defeasible, and in which proceedings for determination of the tax have not been taken, or where the taxation thereof has been held in abeyance, shall be appraised at their full undiminished clear value when the person entitled thereto shall come into the beneficial enjoyment or possession thereof without diminution for or on account of any valuation theretofore made of the particular estates for purposes of taxation upon which said estates in expectancy may have been limited.” This section on its face seems to indicate that there are exceptions to the general rule above stated that all
This view derives some support from the decision of the appellate division of the supreme court of New York in Miller v. Tracy, 93 App. Div. 27, 86 N. Y. Supp. 1024. The provision was taken without change from the New York statutes. From the case cited we infer that the New York law originally contained a provision that contingent or de-feasible expectant estates should be appraised when the persons entitled thereto came into the beneficial enjoyment thereof. This provision was repealed, but afterwards restored. Before its restoration the law was amended to contain the provision of our statute now under consideration. This provision was held in the case cited “not to change the (then) general policy of present, instead of future assessments” of contingent or defeasible expectant estates, but to apply only to cases in which there had been a postponement of the assessment under the repealed provision. The provision was taken over by us before the restoration of the repealed provision. Thus when the provision was taken over it did not operate in New York to defer the imposition of taxes on contingent or defeasible interests because the provision of the New York statute providing for the postponement of taxation of such interests had been repealed. No more should it so operate here since our provision authorizing such postponement has been repealed. It covers, just as it did in New York, cases, if any there are, in which before our repeal of our provision for postponement of taxation of such interests the imposition of taxes had been postponed.
There seems no escape from the conclusion that the taxes, the imposition of which was deferred, should have been imposed. The respondents’ argument is in effect that because
By the Court. — The order of the county court is reversed, with directions for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.