State v. MerrillState v. Merrill
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Haire
OPINION
HAIRE, Presiding Judge.The sole issue in this appeal involves whether the trial court erred by ordering the defendant to make restitution to an insurance company as a condition of probation. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Merrill pled guilty to attempted burglary, received a suspended sentence, and was placed on probation for three years. As a term and condition of probation, the trial judge ordered Merrill to make restitution to an insurance company. On appeal, Merrill contends that this order is invalid.
A trial judge must require the convicted defendant to make restitution as a condition of probation pursuant to
“C. If the court imposes probation it may also impose a fine as authorized by chapter 8 of this title and shall require the convicted person to make restitution to the victim of the crime in such amount and manner as the court may order, after consideration of the economic loss to the victim and economic circumstances of the convicted person.”
Merrill argues that the insurance company is not “the victim of the crime” referred to in the statute and thus the trial court’s order is erroneous.
The cardinal rule in statutory interpretation is to determine the intent of the legislative body.
E.g., Mardian Construction Co.
v.
Superior Court,
113 Ariz. 489, 492, 557 P.2d 526, 529 (1976);
Sandblom v. Corbin,
125 Ariz. 178, 182, 608 P.2d 317, 321 (App.1980). The Arizona legislature’s strong commitment to providing restitution is indicated by the provisions of
Merrill contends, however, that because
Statutes relating to the same subject should be read together and harmonized where possible.
E.g., State ex rel. Larson v.
Farley; 106 Ariz. 119, 122, 471 P.2d 731, 734 (1970);
Arizona State Highway Commission v. Nelson,
105 Ariz. 76, 83, 459 P.2d 509, 516 (1969). With this principle in mind, we find that the mandate of restitution, pursuant to
We also find that the trial court’s ordering payment of restitution to the insurance company is consistent with the rehabilitation purposes of probation.
See
Rule 27.1, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. Unless the terms are not reasonably related to the purposes of probation, we will not interfere with the trial court’s exercise of
Our broad construction of the term “victim” is consistent with the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in
Shenah v. Henderson,
106 Ariz. 399, 476 P.2d 854 (1970), upholding payment to a third party. At the time of the court’s decision in
Shenah,
there were no Arizona statutes authorizing restitution as a condition of probation. In
She-nah,
the defendant was convicted of misdemeanor manslaughter, and the trial judge imposed as a condition of probation the payment of $2500 to the parents of the deceased victim. Concluding that the parents clearly had suffered a loss, the court found that the order requiring restitution to the parents as a condition of probation was properly within the trial court’s discretion. As we have previously noted, the legislature has now required that restitution be ordered as a condition of probation pursuant to
We also find support for our interpretation in cases interpreting the federal probation act, which authorizes as a condition of probation an order of restitution “to aggrieved parties.”
See
Merrill’s primary reliance upon Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 155, 438 A.2d 490 (1981) is misplaced. Initially, the Maryland court determined that under Maryland’s restitution statutes it was unclear whether the insurer of the owner of property was “a victim of the crime.” In order to resolve the ambiguity, the court discussed the legislative history and various provisions of the restitution statutes, and found an intention to give restitution exclusively to the owner of property taken or destroyed. The expression of legislative intent thus found in the Maryland statutory scheme clearly contrasts with Arizona’s previous history in dealing with restitution as demonstrated by our court’s approval of restitution to the third party parents in Shenah. In any event, we note that the Maryland legislature immediately responded to the Montgomery decision by amending its restitution statutes so as to remove any supposed ambiguity. The Maryland statutes now expressly authorize the payment of restitution to an insurer that has made payment to compensate the direct victim for a property loss. See Md.Ann.Code art. 27, § 640 (1982 Repl. & Supp.).
Merrill also relies upon
State v. Stalheim,
275 Or. 683, 552 P.2d 829 (1976), which restricted payment of restitution to the direct victim of a crime. The Oregon statute considered in
Stalheim
authorized, but did not require, “restitution to the aggrieved party” as a condition of probation. We note that the Oregon legislature subsequently amended the pertinent statutes to define victim as “any person whom the
Finally, Merrill relies on several cases in which the trial court attempted to require restitution in situations without either an admission or adjudication of guilt 2 or attempted to extend restitution beyond payment relating to the specific crimes for which the defendant was charged or convicted. 3 These cases are factually distinguishable. Merrill pled guilty to attempted burglary. The trial court’s order of restitution to the insurance company directly corresponded to the claim paid by the company to its insured, the immediate victim of Merrill’s offense.
The grant of probation as ordered by the trial court is affirmed.
EUBANK and MEYERSON, JJ., concur.
Notes
.
“If probation is granted the court .. . shall order restitution pursuant to§ 13-603 , subsection C where there is a victim who has suffered economic loss.”
. See People v. Richards, 17 Cal.3d 614, 552 P.2d 97, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537 (1976).
. See United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Association, 540 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir.1976); Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891, 71 S.Ct. 206, 95 L.Ed. 646 (1950); People v. Grago, 24 Misc.2d 739, 204 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1960); State v. Eilts, 23 Wash.App. 39, 596 P.2d 1050 (1979).