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State v. Mercer
618 S.W.2d 1
Mo.
1981
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*1 Missouri, STATE

Plaintiff-Respondent,

George MERCER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 61797.

Supreme Missouri, Court of

En Banc.

May 1981.

Rehearing Denied June 1981.

prior rape accusation of of another victim defendant; and the cross-examination respect previously defendant with ex- cluded evidence. addition to the review error, will the sen- the Court review *3 565.014, tence as mandated RSMo § 1978. Affirmed.

I. convic- supports The evidence defendant’s Keeton, a tion for the murder of Karen female, 22-year-old early in the morn- white ing August hours of 1978. It estab- defendant, 34-year-old lished that a white male, drinking was with friends at the Blue Grandview, Missouri, Lounge Seven evening working before. Karen was there evening, During a waitress. defend- ant made the comment that he would like Gardner, to take her to bed. Steven a acquainted friend of defendant who was Karen, with up went to the bar to talk to her. He returned a short time later and going said he to breakfast and Karen were go and would house after- to defendant’s Gee, ward. with David an- Defendant left friend, other to defendant’s home and went Belton, Missouri, arriving there around Campbell 12:30 a. m. was at John babysitting house with defendant’s ten- year-old daughter. A time later short Gardner and Keeton arrived. Karen visiting defendant

After for some time picked up double-barrelled a sawed-off Lozano, Jr., Harrisonville, Cenobio for de- shells, shotgun, opened it to show the fendant-appellant. Karen, tapped her on the walked over to gun, “get head with told her to her Ashcroft, Gen., Otto, John and Atty. Paul R. upstairs.” ass he Atty. Gen., Asst. When she hesitated Jefferson City, plain- for grabbed pushed her to the stair- tiff-respondent. her and help. He

way. yelled for to She Gardner HIGGINS, Judge. Tiny,” responded, Birthday, then “Happy said, turned to the others and “Seconds.” George was “Tiny” Mercer convicted downstairs with Karen’s dress was tossed murder, 565.001, RSMo telling “put these defendant Gardner to 1978; fixed his at go, you know where they clothes where death, 565.012, 565.008 and 1978. §§ RSMo go.” put the clothes in a Gardner Judgment accordingly. was rendered He money from her pocketed closet and charges errors to the excuse for cause of purse. prospective jurors objections who voiced downstairs; he was penalty; consideration of the death came Defendant later prosecuting went attorney’s opening reference in naked had an erection. Gardner and awhile, stipulation concerning statement and beer for upstairs. Defendant drank this, and dry Campbell reported got showered returned to the table to defendant off what himself at which time he remarked “a bed, grabbed legs, pulled Karen’s and good piece of ass” she was and that her off the bed. took sheets Defendant going go back in the and “fuck her butt.” washing and blanket machine and later, yelled minutes Several Gardner off Campbell wipe told the waste Gee, upstairs. David to come followed Gee back told floor. Defendant came Campbell, complied. by defendant and John put the Campbell get tail- his truck Karen, who Upstairs, defendant told gate put down so he could Karen it. bed, lying on the undress Gee naked Campbell complied, defendant After sucking per- dick.” “start David Gee’s She body put it in brought down and answered, formed as directed. After Gee Campbell defendant climbed in truck. good”, question “Pretty to defendant’s driving Campbell the truck and started performance, said, about her Finally defendant defendant’s direction. cunt, *4 leaky you’d “You do it better.” better Campbell stop. got out and had Defendant now, how doing When asked she was Gee body into a dumped the over a fence field. answered, Defendant, “Better now.” Gard- “Now, Campbell, When he returned he told Campbell ner and returned downstairs. At 17-year-old killed like leaky if I’d that cunt time, this Karen what she was stopped do- on any I I did her ... wouldn’t have been ing, put and on. Gee his clothes Karen right now.” rape charges things and I’m her; going happen asked what was time, rape charge a At that had defendant attempted to When Gee reassure her. Gee 17-year-old by a pending him filed downstairs, told Camp- returned defendant girl. Campbell returned to Defendant and get upstairs all be in bell so would gave defendant defendant’s house where together. Campbell proceeded upstairs and hide, and Campbell shotgun burned cried, Karen and found unclothed. She purse. Karen’s her, to console Campbell trying talked with Campbell and four later Three to weeks her. He too returned downstairs. badly for and found attorney his looked again upstairs as Defendant started They Keeton. body Karen decomposed leaving. was He asked Gardner Gardner The body reported this to the authorities. what he wanted done with Karen Gard- teeth. by of her was identified means replied, ner “Kill the bitch.” Defendant said, if “Okay, brother.” Gardner asked he II. no, any help; would need said 238, 92 Georgia, v. 408 U.S. In Furman get body rid of where it would (1972), the Court 33 L.Ed.2d left, not be found. and Gee de- Gardner provi- penalty Georgia’s struck down death Campbell upstairs, went fendant went may of death holding penalty sions that the sleep downstairs. procedures sentencing imposed not be under by was de- Campbell suddenly awakened pun- risk that create substantial calling upstairs. his from He fendant name arbitrary and in an ishment will inflicted straddling and found defendant responded manner; did not hold the Court capricious her throat. body with his hands on Karen’s per se vio- the infliction Campbell to take Defendant screamed at on cruel and ban Constitution’s lates the Campbell the arm of pulse. grabbed her Georgia, Gregg v. punishments. unusual seemingly body and found a Karen’s lifeless 2909, 2932, 153, 188, pulse. faint At the time he told defendant L.Ed.2d 859 this, he could smell waste which human was Furman Following the in decision Defendant, “hollered”, all over the bed. legislature Georgia en- Georgia, supra, the head, the left Karen’s struck side of scheme. penalty new acted a said, you leaky “Die This is a bitch ... Court held Georgia, Gregg supra, her, strangling Die.” He cunt. continued not violate did statutory system take again Campbell to her screamed at stated: The Court Campbell pulse. no When the Constitution. pulse. found gravating in Furman circumstance or circumstances expressed concerns [T]he imposed penalty of death not be found to exist. capricious can arbitrary in an manner 565.012.1(4), Supp. 1980. Section RSMo by carefully be met drafted statute aggravating circum- one of the Unless sentencing authority is ensures that found, 565.012.2is stances enumerated guid- given adequate information and imposed. penalty cannot be Sec- the death ance. recom- If the verdict is a tion 565.012.5. death, desig- Georgia must Id. at 2935. The mendation of S.Ct. at nate the statute found to meet this test. a reasonable doubt. Sec- beyond it found pat- The Missouri death scheme is judge required tion 565.012.4. The Georgia approved

terned after the scheme jury. impose the sentence fixed Sec- Gregg Georgia, supra. 565.- Section tion 565.006.2. 1978, permits RSMo sen- imposed, the If the death persons those convicted of must be reviewed on the record tence murder.1 In a case murder defend- to con- this Court. This Court is directed guilt ant’s or innocence is determined well as errors sider the stage first of a bifurcated trial. Section appeal, and to determine: raised on 565.006.1, Supp. RSMo 1980. Where the verdict, the sentence of death judge guilty returns a Whether passion, which, the influence of presentence hearing imposed is held at under *5 factor; arbitrary other prejudice, any or jury judge or shall hear additional [T]he extenuation, mitigation, evidence in (2) supports evidence Whether the aggravation punishment, including of statutory finding of a jury’s judge’s or any prior record of criminal convictions as enumerated aggravating circumstance pleas guilty, pleas of or of nolo con- 565.012; and in section defendant, tendere of the or the absence is any prior of such criminal of death convictions Whether the sentence pen- pleas. Only aggravation disproportionate such evidence excessive or cases, prosecution considering as the alty imposed has made known to the in similar prior to his trial shall be ad- the defendant. both the crime and jury judge missible. The or shall also 565.014.3, 1978. RSMo Section argument by hear the defendant or his in its deci- include The Court must also prosecuting attorney counsel and the re- into similar cases taken sion a reference to garding imposed. to be Upon re- 565.014.5. consideration. Section Section 565.006.2. view, may be affirmed sentence for remanded or set aside and the case judge required or to The to consider judge based on resentencing by the trial jury in his for it include instructions to the of counsel. Id. argument record and any statutory aggravating to consider or mitigating supported by guilty of jury found Mercer After the evidence, aggravating any mitigating or murder, evidence no additional capital law, circumstances otherwise authorized hearing; both presented presentence at the and, however, did, make the state and defendant punish- regarding arguments additional cir- Whether a sufficient jury instructed on and ment. The court to war- cumstance or circumstances exist aggravating circumstances: found two imposition

rant the of death or whether defendant, as mitigating sufficient circumstance or cir- 1. Whether Stephen Gardner ag- of outweigh agent employee or cumstances exist which killing being guilty Any per- of another Capital human of 1. murder 565.001. defíned. — unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly, murder. the offense of son who delib- erately, premeditation or causes and with kills direction, and at his murdered Karen A of death cannot sentence be carried 565.012.2(6)] imposed Keeton. out if the recom- or [Section by excluding mended it chosen ve- 2.Whether the murder Karen Kee- simply they niremen for cause because depravity of ton involved mind and that general objections to the death voiced outrageously a result thereof it was or reli- expressed or conscientious or wantonly vile and inhuman. [Section gious scruples against its infliction. 565.012.2(7)] 522, Id. at 1777. The Court S.Ct. The on the court also instructed the noted, however, its decision did following mitigating circumstances: prevent of a death sentence the execution par- 1. Whether Karen Keeton was a where for made veniremen excluded cause ticipant the defendant’s conduct ... “unmistakably clear to the act. consented automatically against imposition vote 2. Whether the defendant acted under regard punishment without extreme duress or substantial domination developed might be at the evidence that person. another 522, them.” Id. at trial the case before age 3. The defendant at the 21, 1777, n. n. 21. also 88 S.Ct. at See of the offense. time 38, 100 Texas, Adams v. 448 U.S. S.Ct. of any prior 4. ... absence crim- [t]he (1980); Georgia, Davis L.Ed.2d 581 pleas guilty inal convictions and U.S. L.Ed.2d S.Ct. pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant. (1976); Bishop, Maxwell (1970); Boulden 26 L.Ed.2d Holman, III. L.Ed.2d 433

A. parties agreement and the were person court a venire could understood that Appellant challenges the trial court’s ex- was, person not be excluded unless that cuse prospective jurors of fifteen cause to vote “irrevocably committed who expressed opposition conscientious *6 of penalty regardless the facts and of death the imposition penalty. the He might emerge in the circumstances that contends the excuse of five venire such questioned state course of the trial.” The persons violated the stan- constitutional juror individually: each Illinois, Witherspoon v. dards of 391 U.S. If, the facts 510, trial of the case 1770, during the (1968), 88 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 776 that come forth as evi- voicing gen- they because were excused for under law the dence the are such objections penalty. Ap- eral to the death penalty, the death jury consider pellant could further contends court’s failure juror, consider the death you, as a to strictly Witherspoon adhere v. penalty? qualifying jury pre- Illinois standard application cluded the constitutional of Mis- any negative an- The follow state would penalty prevent statutes souri’s death venire by questioning swer whether arbitrary capricious jury use of discre- un- person the death sentence could assess addition, charges tion. In he the excuse of any der circumstance. con- persons fifteen venire violated his of the The fifteen trial court sustained rights impartial stitutional to a trial ground on challenges state’s for cause

jury of a of the com- composed cross-section irrevocably com- persons were venire munity. the death imposing mitted Illinois, Appellant supra, prospec- regardless In circumstances. Witherspoon v. appeal that five jurors pun- tive time generally opposed claims for the first equivo- persons were excluded from of these venire ishment had been for cause fifteen questions. The response and sen- cal in to the state’s jury that convicted defendant of the five venire pertinent The him to death. Court held that: examination tenced persons question ap- they in the contained can follow the law. The exclusion pendix. persons those venire who have stated unam cannot, any under cir biguously they questions Review of the and answers cumstances, a certain consider indicates each of the five excused venire violate permissible under the law does not persons “unmistakably made it clear” that representative requirements of cross-section impose would not the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Appellant under circumstances. 582, Wainwright, 578 F.2d Spenkellink v. presents response Harry Bumgarner Cir.1978), denied, (5th rt. U.S. ce 1548, equivocal. response, as the most “I His 976, (1979). 59 L.Ed.2d 796 S.Ct. so,” equivocal don’t think is not in its con right representative jury to a does not text; express it is common vernacular by jurors right include the to be tried who negative. Pride, v. See State 567 S.W.2d fol explicitly inability have indicated an 426, (Mo.App.1978). light In of the trial 586, Ohio, low the law. Lockett court’ understanding stated of the limited (1978). 98 S.Ct. 57 L.Ed.2d 973 excuse, its ability to the tenor of observe Illinois, Witherspoon supra, 391 U.S. questioning frequent and the reluctance 1774, petitioners at at main- S.Ct. lay persons deep- to communicate their tained in the manner that a selected seated opinions cogent in a and emphatic case, necessarily be present in that must manner, it can require be said that the citing biased in two favor conviction Illinois, ments of Witherspoon supra, Witherspoon v. surveys support. See were met. Illinois, supra n. 88 S.Ct. at at Appellant’s challenge to the excuse of all n. data 10. The Court found that persons fifteen venire actually two-fold. fragmen- presented was “too tentative and First, argues he the excuse for cause jurors opposed tary to establish that right violated his under the sixth and four- prosecu- tend to favor the teenth by jury amendments to trial drawn guilt,” tion in the determination of representative from a cross-section of the to conclude that the “exclusion of declined Second, community. argues the excuse jurors opposed capital punishment results cause resulted in a that was not issue of unrepresentative jury in an on the impartial on guilt; the issue of that it was risk of guilt substantially increases the prosecution-prone. argu- Both of these 517-518, conviction.” Id. at Mitchell, ments rejected were in State v. to reverse 1774-1775. The Court refused . (Mo. 1981). 611 S.W.2d 223 banc Bumpers v. North the conviction. See also Carolina, case, As in that there is no evi L.Ed.2d 797 dence to prima establish a facie violation of Illinois, *7 requirement.2 supra, fair cross-section If Witherspoon such Following established,

a prima facie case published could be the a on a number of studies were significant state has impanel jurors a interest in are not theory “death-qualified” ing only jurors those impartial guilt.3 who have stated that on the issue of These stu- Personality; prima Application Psychologi- 2. An The three elements that a establish (1) persons Measuring Techniques facie violation are: the excluded to the Problem of cal “ 734; Bronson, Bias, from service Jury must be members of a ‘dis- 1968 Wisc.L.Rev. E. group community”; (2) rep- tinctive’ in the the Representa- the and On Conviction-Proneness group resentation of this in venires is “not fair Jury: An Em- tiveness of the Death-Qualiñed and in reasonable relation to the number of Veniremen, pirical Study of Colorado persons community”; such underrepresentation in the and (1970); Goldberg, Toward U.Colo.L.Rev. F. “systematic is due to a Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Expansion of group jury-selection exclusion of the process.” 364, in the Bias, Jury Psychological Data to and Use Missouri, Duren v. Law, Presumptions Raise in the 5 Harv. Civil 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1970); Rights Rev. 53 E. Liberties L. —Civil Jurow, of a “Death New Data on the Effect Boehm, following: 3. Defendant cites the Mr. V. Prejudice, Sympathy, Miss and the Authoritari- dies, conclusive, however, August are not and and before 31st of be 1978. She’ll Court will not reverse defendant’s convic- testify. here to presented. tion on of the the basis studies objected and requested Defendant a mis- Campbell la- trial which denied. John jurors to in no was way Those chosen be ter in the testified that after defend- they indicated that were biased for the trial defendant; prosecution against dumped body: they ant had only they consider the indicated would truck, said, ‘Now, got He he in the and permit if the law and facts leaky I’d 17-year-old if killed that cunt Spenkellink ted it. As stated in v. Wain her,’ I did T says, like wouldnt’ve been wright, supra 594: at charges things I’m on any rape on veniremen indicated [T]he right now.' willing perform would be to their civic calling objected Defendant of Debo- obligation jurors obey law. testify rape rah about Middleton to persons accurately Such cannot be brand- charge against defendant. The brought she ed prosecution-prone. court could testi- trial ruled that Middleton juror wholly to ever “A unable con rape fy that she had made an accusation sider what no matter against prior August to case, given clearly facts of be would un murder), provid- (the day of Keeton’s Karen able to law assessing follow the ... in go into ed the state did not the truth Texas, punishment.” supra Adams v. agreed stipulate charge. then Defendant 2526. legitimate The state has a interest in that: administering its death statute female 17-year-old July On permits it to bar from service Mercer, defendant, George accused the capital punishment those whose belief about rape, and as a result that accusation ignore would lead them to the law. Adams rape was com- prosecution criminal Texas, Mitchell, supra. See also State defendant, George menced

supra. Mercer, August prior 1978. ecuting In the en other bitch on the cer We T Keeton’s [*****] trouble I’m in says attorney are back at the location state’s going Campbell: body opening told do B. today rape.’ it, statement dumped, jury: T wouldn’t but Bruce Miller if I’d where killed and Mer- pros- [*] Kar- stipulation and reference pellant mony was inadmissible testify ting statement defendant, choose between testify ment were Appellant now about her contends entering prosecutor that Deborah improper having Deborah Middleton argues he was forced Deborah Middleton’s charges rape charge against into the because there and therefore state Middleton error to stipulation. opening opening permit- nowas state- testi- Ap- it.’ talked me out of referred person defendant evidence that the Campbell was come here and to in his statement to John Deborah Middleton will Middleton, stipulation you because the testify. will tell Deborah Deborah Middleton to con- agreeing July defendant was forced into George that she first met Mercer 26th, 1978, proof separate and distinct an occur- stituted of a basically *8 trial, on was not happened rence in which she later crime for which defendant upon attack brought against George charges Mercer and because it constituted Juries, by Imposed Jury" 58 victions Death-Qualified Determination on Qualified Process, Guilt (1973) (reporting (1971); Har- 1971 Harv.L.Rev. M. Rok- Cornell L.Rev. 1176 84 567 Zeisel, McLellan, Dogmatism data); on Juror each & Poll H. Some Data D. Death ris Penalty: Reinterpretation Duquesne Capital Attitudes Punishment A of the Toward Data, (1969-70); published Duquesne by in Criminal Poll for Studies 125 the Center L.Rev. Justice, Chicago White, University Invalidity School. Law W. of Con- The Constitutional had not been C. defendant’s character which placed in issue. court sustained defend- Prior to trial the cover suppress a mattress ant’s motion to Campbell’s testimo view of John during search de- seized a warrantless ny concerning the defendant’s statement During cross-examina- fendant’s residence. dumping body, after Debo Karen Keeton’s defendant, tion of the state asked: testimony, rah limited to the Middleton’s upstairs You were aware that in the bringing charge against defend rape of a there was a of that house that bedroom prior August 31, have ant human that was covered with mattress been admissible. Therefore the trial court feces— prosecuting permitting did not err in a mis- requested objected Defendant attorney opening refer in his to this suppress motion to ground trial on the his permitting stipulation statement or in sus- had been the feces covered mattress testimony. in lieu of her over- The court by tained the trial court. killing sought Defendant denied the objection and motion for mistrial ruled the portray Campbell John as a liar. It was independent noting was evidence that there necessary for the state establish defend- that would autho- search and seizure motive, ant’s John and to corroborate charges Appellant now question. rize the Campbell’s testimony. Defendant’s state- overruling the court for error to the trial ment Campbell to John was relevant as argues that this objection motion. He killing evidence of his motive in Karen Kee- in- “clearly calculated to statement was ton; he killed her to avoid detection of the against passion flame the of the rape. testimony Deborah Middleton’s mentioning of an in- by defendant matters explained would have defendant’s state- herently abhorrent nature.” ment and John would have corroborated illegal by an Evidence obtained Campbell’s testimony sought state —the is not admissible search and seizure prove 17-year-old there was in fact a If, how in a criminal case. the defendant girl charges against brought rape who had knowledge or ever, same gains the the state prior defendant to the murder of Karen may independent source evidence from an go into stipulation Keeton. The did not Wilkerson, 349 become admissible. State leading disposi- facts charges or the (1942). Mo. 159 S.W.2d charges. tion those independent is evidence There admissibility stipula support cover to suppressed mattress tion is not affected the lack of direct of the defendant the cross-examination establishing evidence that Deborah Middle previously Campbell had John this matter. girl ton was the referred to he of the murder testified that at the time his Campbell. statement John Evidence could relevant, need not conclusive. It is over It was all smell the human waste. logically prove relevant if it tends to a fact sheets, her kind of sheets and and the issue or corroborates relevant evidence the same time came off of the bed principal which bears on the issue. State Lee, (Mo. 1977), pulled her .... banc vacated S.W.2d rendered

relevant evidence on the issue of motive on other 58 L.Ed.2d tend to constitute grounds, inadmissible proof because it Nor is this otherwise of another might crime or also yes. A. You could see Q. [******] Could you see anything the human on the bed? waste, designed to was not question discredit defendant’s character. See State The state’s taken the had Holt, (Mo. jury. banc Defendant inflame S.W.2d Keeton. Karen Richardson, strangling 1980); stand and denied State v. S.W.2d attempted the state (Mo. 1974). On cross-examination *9 10 (3)Whether the in sentence of death getting

and was successful disproportionate pen- excessive or to the given admit that an excuse to some- he had cases, imposed alty considering in similar bed, thereby one for the feces on the ac- both the the defendant. crime and presence corroborating and knowledging its The Campbell’s testimony. John court The record in this case demonstrates that permitted question. properly the state’s George Mercer’s death sentence not passion,

imposed of under the influence arbitrary factor. prejudice any or other IV. aggra statutory as found 565.014.1, requires this Court Section “defendant, vating that imposed. review a of death when sentence agent Stephen employee an or of Gard as provides: Section 565.014.3 direction, Karen ner and his murdered sentence, With the su- regard Keeton”, 565.012.2(6), and that mur § preme court shall determine: depravity of Keeton involved of der Karen (1) death was Whether sentence of it and as a result thereof mind that imposed passion, inhuman, wantonly under the influence of vile and outrageously or factor; prejudice, arbitrary supports any 565.012.2(7).4 or other The evidence § jury’s findings.5 (2) supports Keeton, Whether the evidence a total Defendant forced Karen jury’s judge’s finding statutory of a a sawed- stranger, or into a bedroom aided shotgun. enumerated to show aggravating circumstance as off There evidence Karen, 565.012; with that he had sex section 565.012.2(7) provides: “cases lie at the core” This 4. subsection permit it to a “catch all” and to not become (7) outrageously or wan- The offense was tonly vile, subsection. it horrible or inhuman in that in- mind; torture, depravity volved jury’s Although supports the the evidence 153, 5. Gregg Georgia, 428 96 v. U.S. S.Ct. circumstances, findings aggravating both 2909, (1976), petitioner 49 859 at- L.Ed.2d Georgia, whose death Georgia aggravating this Court notes circumstance tacked the pattern pen- for Mis- imposition serves scheme authorized souri, alty “outrageously or if the murder was wan- vile, tonly it horrible or inhuman in that in- statutory aggravating two or more Where torture, mind, aggra- depravity of volved jury, by * the fail- found circumstances are contending battery vated the victim” * * not taint does ure one circumstance capital punishment could was so broad that proceedings the other so as to invalidate imposed any such case. The Court denied and the sen- circumstance found challenge stating: tence of based thereon. is, course, arguable any It murder State, 458, 796, Burger v. 245 Ga. 265 S.E.2d depravity aggravated involves mind or an denied, 988, (1980), 446 100 S.Ct. 800 U.S. cert. battery. language not be But this need con- 2975, (1980). also Hamil 64 847 See L.Ed.2d way, reason strued in this and there is no 264, (1980), State, 173 271 S.E.2d ton v. 246 Ga. Georgia Supreme assume that the Court of - 900, -, denied, S.Ct. 66 cert. U.S. 101 adopt open-ended will such an construction. State, (1981); 246 Ga. L.Ed.2d 829 Brooks v. 201, Id. at at 2938. 96 S.Ct. 262, State, (1980); 271 172 Collins S.E.2d Georgia recog Supreme Thereafter the Court denied, 261, (1980), cert. 246 Ga. 271 S.E.2d 352 possibility nized of abuse of that “there is a 900, -, L.Ed.2d 101 66 S.Ct. U.S. - 829 statutory aggravating circumstance” [this] 587, State, (1981); 244 Ga. Gates aggra permit emphasized that it would not 938, denied, (1979), cert. S.E.2d 349 vating a “catch all” circumstance to become 1332, (1980). But see L.Ed.2d 772 100 S.Ct. aggravat fitting for cases within other (Fla. 1977); State, Elledge 346 So.2d 998 circumstance; ing it would court stated (Fla. 1979); State, So.2d 1278 Menendez v. “approval un restrict its of the death (Ala.App.1980), State, 382 So.2d Bufford v. statutory aggravating circumstance to der this 1980); (Ala. denied, 382 So.2d rt. ce Harris v. those cases that lie at the core.” Cherry, 257 S.E.2d 551 298 N.C. State v. (1979), State, 732-33, 10-11 230 S.E.2d Ga. denied, 446 U.S. cert. denied, cert. Zant, (1980); Stephens v. 64 L.Ed.2d Likewise, it is inten 53 L.Ed.2d 251 (5th 1980). F.2d Cir. application tion of this to restrict Court

H ty imposed for more. He under stated his intention to return the law effective compelled gunpoint perform her at oral 26, capital May 1977. The records of all sex David Gee while others watched. imposed after cases in which sentence was well-being expressed fear for her date, She pursuant the effective accumulated When Campbell. Gee and John David 565.014.6, Those have been reviewed. § to “kill told defendant Steve Gardner imprison- life cases in which both death and bitch”, agreed grabbed her he to do so. He jury, and which ment were submitted to the her; throat, choking about he struck con- appeal affirmed on are have been fists; having her finally, with his after cases, 565.014.5: sidered as similar State friend pulse, check her he succeeded Mitchell, (Mo. 1981); 223 banc v. 611 S.W.2d strangling her. After this he loaded the Williams, (Mo. banc 611 26 State v. S.W.2d truck, body country, in a drove to the and (Mo. 1981); Royal, 610 946 v. S.W.2d State dumped bridge. body beneath a Borden, 1981); 88 banc v. 605 S.W.2d State Downs, (Mo. 1980); v. 593 banc and State Godfrey Georgia, support (Mo.1980). These cases S.W.2d (1980), 100 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d this penalty in affirmance of the death Supreme Court held that the Georgia Court case; to death for the defendant’s sentence apply had failed to a constitutional con excessive or murder of Karen Keeton is not phrase “outrageously struction of the imposed in vile, disproportionate wantonly horrible or inhuman in that and the considering the crime similar cases [they] depravity involved ... of mind defendant. because the crimes could defendants judgment is affirmed. be said to have reflected consciousness

materially ‘depraved’ more that of than DONNELLY, RENDLEN, WELLIYER any person guilty of murder. His victims MORGAN, JJ., concur. were killed instantaneously. They were BARDGETT, J., part concurs C. family causing members of his who were part separate opinion filed. dissents in him extreme Shortly emotional trauma. SEILER, J., separate dissent- dissents in killings, acknowledged

after his ing opinion filed. responsibility and the heinous nature of

his crimes. 26, 1981. Date of execution set for June Id. 100 S.Ct. 1767. This case is unlike

Godfrey Georgia, supra. “Depravity APPENDIX mind” is demonstrated in this case the Harry Bumgarner: killing preceded by mode of extended sexu BY MR. HAMILTON “EXAMINATION al and psychological abuse of the victim. (Prosecutor): State, Hance v. See Ga. S.E.2d - charge of Q. is a Bumgarner, Mr. (1980), denied, 345—46 cert. U.S. murder, it does which means capital -, (1980). L.Ed.2d punishment, possibility capital carry the legal The enumerated have been errors My inquiry is direct- or the death sentence. stated, the state- denied for reasons is toward your attitude ed to find out what prepared ment of evidence from the record If, during the trial capital punishment. factually substantiates the verdict. Section were and circumstances this case the facts supports the 565.014.7. The evidence also con- jury could developed that in fact the finding you, as a capital punishment, sider and the sentence of a rational trier pos- capital punishment as juror, consider beyond fact a reasonable doubt. Jackson sible alternative? Virginia, L.Ed.2d 560 A. I think so. don’t op- religiously Q. morally you This murder case Are is the first penal- punishment? appeal posed decided on in which the death

Q. No how violent the crime matter *11 be, against that as might you A. Yes. would be punishment, am I correct? Q. bring And back you you feel couldn’t a sentence of—the death sentence under I taking a life. just believe in A. I don’t any circumstances? just sorry. don’t. I’m

A. I don’t think so. [******] Q. ag- regardless So of how severe Counsel): Q. (By Mr. Lozano —Defense are, gravated you don’t circumstances never would you say you that —if—can feel you bring that could back a death under cir- capital punishment consider penalty? cumstances whatsoever? ital tal tion tude as (Prosecutor): death bility can trial are Rosalie M. Q. Q. Basically I am A. “EXAMINATION Q. punishment— murder, consider as [*] [******] is: —would penalty. Mrs. I don’t believe I could.” come out to the death such that the capital If Delange: [*] Delange, which carries with it the the facts you, punishment, during the [*] possible this is as a member of that interested penalty, BY MR. HAMILTON jury, under [*] and circumstances alternative, capi- a charge course of which is the [*] your my of [*] possi- ques- atti- law, cap- jury can possible alternative? this trial are such that tion is about penalty. that tal (Prosecutor): murder, Elston Dalton: A. Q. “EXAMINATION Q. punishment— jury, [******] —the death penalty, Mr. I will say that.” which carries If the facts and consider as Dalton, be your willing this is a attitude penalty. BY to consider you, as a a under possibility MR. HAMILTON charge of alternative as And to the death the law the member that my of capital ques- capi- as a sub- possibil- that like jury, give Well, consideration to that much A. I never did ity? ject. punishment. opposed

A. I am sir, you the, are Q. you ask Let me un- you would be basically telling us that morally Q. you basically Okay, then are verdict? willing return a death against capital punishment religiously punishment? as a I would sir. A. I believe say A. I would that. to, un- willing or be Q. you Would regard- Q. basically, regardless you to, Are such that verdict willing return such are, you are less of what the circumstances evidence is? of what the against capital punishment? you. A. I didn’t understand thought myself as always A. I have you sir, Q. you saying, Are against capital punishment. I don’t being death, a death a result wouldn’t return know, way, really you put when evi- what the result, regardless my could alter deci- maybe circumstances dence is? sion, say have to really but I think I would Well, said, believe I don’t A. as I I’m it. penalty. basically Q. saying Am I correct in is such that opposition Q. Basically the vote for you wouldn’t any circum- it under wouldn’t you return regardless? stances, is that correct? say think, have to right, A. I I would it.” about I feel Yeah, way A. that’s that. Yes, A. I am. Bishop: Juanita Q. you religiously morally op- Are HAMILTON “EXAMINATION BY MR. posed to it? (Prosecutor): Well, know, opin- just my A. don’t its I Q. charge capi- Bishop, Mrs. this is a any- religion or really ion. It’s not from murder, poten- tal with it the and it carries thing like that. penalty, tial of the death the death sen- you Q. you feel But it’s such Basically your tence. I am interested in *12 bring back the death would not capital punishment. attitude as to any under circumstances? brought If the facts and circumstances A. I don’t think I would. during out the trial are such it, penalty, justify justify the death would So, ag- Q. regardless of how severe you giving penalty? consider is, feelings gravated your the situation it’s you impose could not the death sen- (Pause) A. I don’t think so. tence? Q. you your Do feel that inclination is A. I don’t think so. morally religiously you and don’t feel

it. you any case? A. could Yes, bring I don’t back a sentence of death in feel like I’d be a judge of precise. think so. We need to be a little THE COURT: [******] Ma’am, you say you don’t more vote for Yes. any time no matter what the facts? back the death penalty situation, is that correct? Q. A. Yes. Q. [******] Is (By Mr. Lozano —Defense You don’t feel your position capital punishment you regardless could ever you could Counsel) case at of the never bring fense ings? out couldn’t do it. That’s MRS. CHOATE: Q. [death [******] Counsel) (Examination by Mr. Fiorella —De- just my penalty] own .... Would personal feelings; because Well, I you rule that of couldn’t, your I feel- just no. say A. I’d it is.” corporal punishment? A. You mean Priscilla Choate: Q. Yes. “EXAMINATION BY MR. HAMILTON Yeah, just A. I can’t I believe I would. (Prosecutor): go along with it. Choate, Q. charge capi- of Mrs. this is a juror, tal circumstances that come forth as evidence punishment. capital punishment, during the trial of the case the facts and are such that consider the death penalty, bility of the death A. Q. Basically you murder, ¤ consider the death I don’t believe in as to what [*] under the law the I am interested in [*] carries with it the your sentence, capital punishment. my question [*] attitude is toward penalty? or of [*] inquiring you, capital is: [*] possi- could as a If, the reasons stated penalty on the record here and failed to so penalty but allow dissent from the affirmance seek the death part to obtain the death ment of upon I concur in the affirmance BARDGETT, days the state’s of its decision to do so. dissenting conviction notify Chief notifying the state to infra, penalty from a Justice, concurring Court part. anew, capital vacate this Court of its intent again proceed of the death If the state murder. would, for this death sentence within judg- I Q. you opposed punish- parole Are for 50 capital imprisonment of life without ment? years imposed. should be regardless upheld is to be proceedings

The in a murder case “aggravating whether circumstance” are affects only noted, bifurcated and error which by the supra, supported evidence punishment aspect of this crime war- whether cir- perhaps regardless punishment, here, new trial as to can, rants a as under the evidence cumstance provided in 565.006.3 RSMo 1977. rationally regarded “aggravating.” my sup- opinion, In evidence fails to evidentiary amply facts have been port finding “an defendant was support clearly stated and a verdict of agent employee Stephen Gardner.” But, when guilty of murder. is employee There no evidence he was an death, I is then believe strict evidence, opin- is no in my Gardner. There compliance require- with constitutional ion, that the defendant killed deceased authorizing ments and those statutes fact, told because Gardner him to. penalty mandatory. Death penalty position keep killed her state’s that he cases are different from other cases for that rape as the prosecuting her from him simple correctable, It is reason —death. girl other had done. sentences, as are other and therefore strict *13 I have mur- perceive just tried to how a procedure necessary. adherence to is or der such this is worsened the defend- as fact mercy that the no defendant showed to person ant a heinous if he the more killed appears the deceased to and have commit- agent employee deceased as an or of anoth- just ted about as act one could evil an as do understanding er. I no difficulty have in law-abiding jur- does justify not citizens — aggravating pro- # 4 circumstance which ors, judges lawyers straying and —from killing for profit vides for for himself or gowe strictly proceedings from correct as part another the of # and first 6 which legal- deciding task to about the of whether provides the “offender caused or di- ly kill him. capital rected to murder.” another commit I agree part Judge with I of Seiler’s Incorpo- to Murder Number 4 recalls mind juror response to dissent reference the of of yesteryear part rated and the first questions Bumgarner relating to to his abil- recognizes person # 6 if a causes or ity penalty. to consider the death For the murder, directs another to commit juror’s reasons stated there the answers did as surely guilty the is least as director at justify not his for under removal cause I what the ra- the actor. But cannot see Illinois, 510, Witherspoon v. 391 88 U.S. employee or tionale when the actor is the 1770, (1968). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d That agent. does it the act more How make goes error to the death the heinous more evil if or the defendant therefore, system, under bifurcated did the being directed another as defendant trial prejudice guilt part not the of the but I am agent the of another? employee aspect did of prejudice the the here, saying circumstance submitted the Witherspoon, case stated in for reasons actor, “aggra- be as could never an supra. vating the facts of circumstance” but under part opinion and principal Part IV of the see here any this case I do not rational basis Seiler, J., III addresses the of the dissent of exchange saying for between the verbal aggravating statutory of the circum- issue and Gardner made defendant’s appears principal me that the stances. It my aggravated In acts more or heinous. opinion was sufficient evi- holds that there opinion, the evidence was insufficient “defendant, as an to find dence aggravating support giving circum- agent employee Stephen Gardner # stance 6. adopt Geor- Furthermore, I would not direction, Keeton,” murdered Karen his principal in footnote 565.012.2(6). However, appears gia rule noted it also evi- must be my opinion, there opinion. opinion inferen- perhaps principal each support the submission Georgia as set forth dence adopts the rule in tially found circumstance statutory aggravating may in mean footnote which by the requirement has been reiterated This pen- upon the death Holman, which 394 U.S. Court in Boulden based, alty part, in whole or in 1138, 1140, 22 L.Ed.2d 433 89 S.Ct. statutory must be ones that (1969) Bishop, and in Maxwell U.S. rationally perceived aggravating can 262, 265, 1578, 1580, 26 L.Ed.2d 90 S.Ct. particular in the case. # 6 Circumstance not, my opinion, should have been sub- 122, 123, Georgia, In Davis v. mitted because it fails on counts here both (1976), 399, 400, 50 L.Ed.2d 399 in this case. Court held that agree I with the evidence requiring rule improperly exclud- “if venireman is [one] support aggravating each circumstance Witherspoon ed standard] [under submitted as set forth in the dissent of penalty can- subsequently imposed death J., Seiler, and if the evidence is insufficient not stand.” support circumstance Wigglesworth v. The Davis court cited upon penal- the death based Ohio, 29 L.Ed.2d ty, part, whole or in (1971) Wigglesworth, rev’g State v. cannot stand. (1969). In 248 N.E.2d 607 Ohio St.2d (1) judg- I would therefore affirm the Supreme Court that case the United States murder, ment of vacate the apparently disapproved of the Ohio Su- and order that the sentence that, preme Court’s conclusion will be imprisonment entered as life with- could claim that “Even if defendant parole (565.008) out years unless the excusing juror this one for cause state, decision, days noti- within error, seeing difficulty we have fies the Clerk this Court that it intends *14 be es- any prejudice how therefrom can proceed

to with a new punishment trial on tablished, prosecution especially since the pursuant 565.006.3, to whereupon the challenges peremptory still had five or six cause would be remanded to circuit court juror available when selec- to excuse that for a new trial punishment only. on completed.” tion of the SEILER, Judge, dissenting. Bumgarner If was im- 248 N.E.2d at 614. I respectfully dissent and for reasons dismissed, was, properly as I contend he below, stated I would reverse and remand be reversed. then the death must this cause. between the question The and answers

I attorney venireman Bum- prosecuting exchange garner below. This are set forth agree I cannot principal opin with the basis for provide does not a constitutional ion’s appellant’s objection treatment of to Bumgarner from the for cause of exclusion striking the for cause of venireman Bum- jury service. garner Witherspoon Illinois, under U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 776 charge of “Q. Bumgarner, Mr. this is a

(1968). The principal opinion found that murder, it capital which means Bumgarner “unmistakably had made it capital carry possibility does clear” impose would not punishment, or the death sentence. penalty under any circumstance. In With find out My inquiry is directed to erspoon, supra at 516 n. 88 S.Ct. at 1774 capital your what attitude is toward 9, n. required the Court If, punishment. during trial of unambigu-

Unless an venireman states circumstanc- this case the facts and ously that he automatically would vote in fact developed es were against imposition capital punish- punish- capital jury could consider ment no might ment, juror, matter con- you, what the trial as a reveal, simply possi- cannot be assumed that as a capital sider position.” that is his ble alternative? punish- the imposition capital

IA. don’t think so. ... it simply ment cannot be assumed Q. you religiously op- position.” (emphasis Are that that his morally sup-

posed punishment? plied) A. Yes. U.S. 516 n. at 1774. S.Ct. Q. you And you bring feel couldn’t Bumgarner’s subject was view on the left back a sentence death sen- of—the hanging air, in the unresolved. The With- any tence under circumstances? erspoon test as to was not satisfied Bum- A. I don’t think so. garner. prosecutor get If the not does an Q. regardless ag- unequivocal response, So severe and then of how he is entitled

gravated are, you have venireman dismissed for cause. you bring Texas, 38, 50, don’t feel that could back Cf. Adams v. penalty? 2528-29, death L.Ed.2d 581 Supreme which the Court said: A. I don’t believe I could. nervousness, “[Njeither MR. you, HAMILTON: Thank sir. I emotional in- volvement, questions.” have no other inability deny nor con- firm being effect whatsoever [that principal opinion The on relies State presented option give with the Pride, (Mo.App.1978) S.W.2d prospective would have for the proposition response “I juror] equivalent unwillingness to an don’t equivocal think so” is not in its con- inability part jurors on the text; rather, that it is “common vernacular follow the and obey court’s instructions express negative.” I would first oaths, regardless feelings their their point out that Pride was not mur- (emphasis penalty.” sup- about the death der case in which the death could plied). imposed. case, Pride was an assault where black man. wife of II one of the veniremen “an unpleas- had had fifteen chal sustaining the issue of On ant encounter with in the past.” blacks ground that lenges for cause on the When asked if that would affect him in irrevocably committed persons venire were case, sitting in replied, venireman “I penalty regard against imposing so, really thought don’t think but I I would *15 circumstances, opin principal less of the mention it.” This disclaimer is more em- reverse conviction ion holds will not phatic than that the case before us. indicating on basis of studies that Second, agree while I when would that impartial qualified” jurors are not “death someone says may “I don’t think so” he to guilt. issue of In addition express intend to the negative, may he also by cited defendant and the studies studies best, mean that he is not At it is sure. Hovey of Alame Superior cited in Court equivocal, ambiguous, and uncertain. Bum- da 616 P.2d County, 28 Cal.3d garner say did not he would not be 1980) Grigsby (banc Cal.Rptr. 128 able to decide the issues on the basis of the (E.D.Ark.), aff’d, F.Supp. Mabry, though opposed gen- law and even evidence 1980), should (8th be F.2d 525 cir. there erally to We capital punishment. are talk- White, Death-Qualified Juries: The added ing by judicial about life taking defendant’s Argument Reexam circumstances, Prosecution-Proneness order. it is such not the ined, and Ober trial 41 U.Pitt.L.Rev. proper duty or function of the court or er, Disqualification of Jurors Scru “interpret” phrase by this court to such Does resolving Constitute ples Against Capital the doubt in favor of the state Punishment Guilt?, when a is at and the of man’s life stake United of Fair Trial on Issue Denial Supreme States Court has declared that author latter Tex.L.Rev. predicament well: the defendant’s unambiguous- “Unless a venireman states states charged of- ly automatically would vote I to be with a “Were impartial make an could nevertheless ty but fense, I greatly prefer guilt. should to have the decision as to excluding This error in my guilt issue of by or innocence tried jurors prospective who were not shown to courthouse, first twelve people pass deci- incapable making impartial of an questions by prosecution no asked or de- guilt requires sion as or innocence fense, jury qualified upon than the cause be reversed and remanded. Oberer,

death supra sentence.” at 545. about The studies mentioned earlier (original White, emphasis). supra at qualified juries being less than neu- death “If, Supreme states: as the Court has indi- guilt respect tral with confirm what law- cated, punish- is a conclusion that death yers experience already trial with broad ment pun- different kind from all other believe: it is easier to obtain a conviction of ishments society has committed our objec- jury some sort with a which has no providing ideal of fair proce- and rational just penalty,1 tions to the death as it dures fully safeguard which will the rights easier to a verdict in obtain some amount capital defendants, then examination of damage plaintiff for the in a suit with a the relevant data should lead to the conclu- up only made who have no those sion that qualified jury, the death as it objection awarding large amounts of presently exists, should be eliminated from damages. system justice.” our prosecu- permits present procedure Our tors, filing murder merely by Constitution, I, Under the Missouri Art. convic- qualified, charge, to obtain a 18(a), is entitled to trial an though they promptly even prone jury, tion impartial jury. right. This is an absolute upon conviction waive the There qualification exceptions are no to over- guilt.2 powerful This incentive it. The state is not entitled to the death we restrict if eliminated charge would be penalty against this defendant aas matter along the lines here voir dire examination right. All it is entitled to is a a more provide suggested. It also will consider penalty, assuming guilt impartial jury. has been determined. I do not believe challenges for cause at the outset of the Ill trial are valid prospective juror unless the opin- disagree principal I with the further declares that his capital punish- views on supported holding ion’s the evidence ment are prevent such as would him from cir- finding aggravating both jury’s making impartial decision as to defend- there cumstances. I do not believe guilt. ant’s It does not persons follow that support was sufficient evidence opposed to the death penalty necessarily are cir- first jury’s finding of the thereby unable impartial to make an deci- the vic- killed cumstance —that defendant sion guilt. as to defendant’s But that was of Gardner. “agent employee” tim as the never determined prospective here —the 565.012.3(6), 19783 lists as RSMo Section

jurors simply were excluded because *16 of- circumstance that “The aggravating an would not vote for the penalty. So capital murder as an fender ... committed up defendant jury wound with a which had person.” agent employee of another or no scruples against penalty, the death that defendant is no evidence Since there cry which is a having jury far from a with Gardner, we must as- employee an of was some members oppose penal- who the death study 1981), (Mo., 1. One 1968 concluded that the odds were 612 782 both from Jackson S.W.2d twenty-four jurors filing scruples County, prosecutor to one that without the in each case after against penalty obtaining likely charge the death were more than a death a qualified murder scrupled jurors Zeisel, guilty. jury, the to vote H. imme- waived the death Capital guilty diately obtaining Some Data on Juror Attitudes on the Towards after a verdict (1968). guilt stage Punishment 28-29 or innocence of the trial. example, Strickland, indicated, statutory 2. For in State v. cita- 609 3.Unless otherwise all (Mo. 1980) Hall, S.W.2d 392 banc and State v. tions are to RSMo 1978. argue jury ag-

state to submit and the by supported not gravating circumstances jury sume the found defendant was an that legislature and this agent evidence.4 The Dictionary of Black’s Law the Gardner. (5th 1979) as agent required aggravating “A that properly ed. defines court him, person act for by jury authorized another to consider which the is to one with business.” See intrusted another’s is determining whether Stussie, Pagliara ex v. 549 S.W.2d State rel. by supported warranted be evidence. Black’s, supra, 903 (Mo.App.1977). also finding aggravating If the of the first acts for or agent defines an as “One who evi unsupported under the circumstance is him; place by authority of from another is, dence, sentence as I then the contend substitute, appointed by principal deputy, or more When one of death cannot stand. power principal things with to do the which been im have Tieman, aggravating circumstances may v. do.” Mahler 550 S.W.2d Cf. to, jury by, or found properly submitted (Mo.App.1977): agency “A valid then, ag other may (or court), be where of trial even if found the conduct person legitimately parties manifests the consent of one were gravating circumstances act on his found, another that other shall for sen be remanded case must subject behalf and be to his control and 565.014.5(2). The reason for tencing, § so consent the other to act.” See also simple: “[Rjegardless of the existence is (Second) Agency Restatement § we aggravating factors authorized other ag guard against unauthorized must 565.012.3(6) The part of directed § equation into going gravating factor capital murder one who commits weighing might scales tip which agent employee or another meant Elledge v. death.” concept process in favor of accepted for someone who fits the (Fla.1977); State, See agent employee. There is no evidence 346 So.2d 1278, 1282 State, The only that such was the situation here. 368 So.2d also Menendez v. upon jury evidence which could have way determine (Fla.1979). is no There finding based was an its defendant as to have decided jury would what agent of was asked Gardner that defendant al improperly been had do with Keeton and Gardner what to Karen aggravating circum as an lowed consider Gardner “Kill There is replied, the bitch.” acting as Gard stance no evidence to demonstrate that Gardner free to may have felt agent. ner’s The had defendant. authority control over reprehensible with Gardner’s tar defendant defendant, The that Gardner said to fact For other his own. in addition to conduct bitch”, defendant’s “Kill the followed have decided which the courts cases in victim, strangling of the does not establish aggravating circum or more failure one relationship. It does no a cause and effect for reversal cause stances were ac- more than show the two State, sentence, 382 So.2d see Bufford agen- of an cord. further evidence Without den., 382 cert. (Ala.Ct.Crim.App.1980), cy relationship between de- Gardner Cherry, 298 (Ala.1980); State So.2d fendant, circumstance aggravating first den., (1979), cert. N.C. S.E.2d upheld. cannot be 64 L.Ed.2d appro- statute, 565.012.1(1), Zant, and the 631 F.2d Stephens (1980). See also instruction, 15.48, re- priate MAI —CR2d court 1980) in (5th Cir. circum- those quire observed: be by the sub- supported stances evidence reviewing court impossible “It It mitted for the to consider. *17 ver- satisfactorily the permit the determine prejudicial most to unfair and urged jury the to consider was jury So prosecutor, arguing for the the dence.” 4. The to the aggravating “agent employee” circumstance penalty, told defendant death said that Gardner penalty. How victim, readily justification death for the went kill as a the that defendant they this, not do so? along jury did be said should can it with and that “[rjemember piece important of evi- that as an

19 supplied). I (emphasis 261 S.E.2d at 358 with certain- question that a court can state decisively affect- diet in this case was not imposi- its jury invariably based ty that a ag- ed by statutory an unconstitutional any one of penalty tion of a on multi- death The gravating circumstance. had when the ple aggravating circumstances the authority to return a life sentence aggravating circum- multiple found statutory aggravating even it it found stances. possible It that even if circumstances. is aggravat- other jurors believed that Furthermore, opinion im- principal established, ing circumstances were plies pat- our statute is penalty death have recommended the death would not terned after it Georgia’s and therefore fol- [considering for the of the penalty but lows that we hold the same as should Geor- aggravating invalid circumstance].” Missouri, gia. agree. I cannot This is The that the court held submission of an Georgia. Georgia’s proclivi- traditions impermissible aggravating circumstance to According ties are not ours. most permit jury’s jury did not discretion 1, (Vol. Penalty Reporter recent Death No. channeled, sufficiently to be citing Godfrey 8) 26, p. people at on ninety-two are 420, 1759, Georgia, 446 100 S.Ct. 64 U.S. Georgia compared eight row in Mis- (1980), process by L.Ed.2d 398 and that the respect souri. With to our all due sister which penalty the death imposed state, necessarily we walk should not Geor- reviewable”, “rationally citing therefore not gia’s path just statutes because our are Carolina, 280, 428 Woodson v. North U.S. similar. 303, 2978, 2990, 49 944 L.Ed.2d case, In our similarity between (1976). irrelevant here. Georgia’s statute and is The principal opinion cites Geor- several statute, Every penalty state with a death gia uphold penalty cases which the death contrary including the hold three which one, more, even aggravating after cir- multiple Georgia, permit consideration be improperly cumstance was found to con- See, g., aggravating e. Ala. circumstances. Georgia in arriving sidered. stands alone at (1975); Fla. Code tit. 11-4 and 11-6 §§ Georgia this result. The first four cases (Supp.1981); N.C.Gen. § Stat.Ann. 921.141 principal cited in 5 of the opinion footnote There (Supp.1979). is Stat. 15A—2000 case,

rely State, on the fifth Gates 244 Georgia in this nothing peculiar about re- (1979), Ga. S.E.2d cert. den. we gard. peculiarity The is that are U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d does. Georgia alone In proposing hold as (1980). Gates, however, did not address in the my opinion, reasoning found cited how aggravating which circumstance Florida, Alabama, from North Caroli- cases improperly to, had been submitted or con- na, the Fifth in the other cases Circuit by, jury may sidered affect the decision- by goes discussed below unanswered both making process jury; merely it opinion. Georgia principal cases and the that, makes unsupported conclusion circum- aggravating one statutory aggra- “Where two or more Where sentencing jury is vating stances found a death circumstances are found analogous one jury, improper, the the failure of one does situation circumstance has been guilty general verdict proceedings not so taint as to invali- where a alternative on by jury instructed aggravating date returned the other circumstance conviction, not all of but one found and the sentence of death based theories upon an be rested guilt to permitted thereon.” Georgia Supreme conclusion, reversed the arriving When the Court 5. In court Gates improp- State, because Gregg one count death erly on cited S.E.2d Ga. circumstances, (1974), submitted aff'd sub nom. 428 the other count on Gregg, affirmed 49 L.Ed.2d 859 how aggravat- properly ever, case, found on inapposite. which was based were there completely differ- ing Such is circumstances. two different counts of murder. instant case. or the given situation from Gates had ent been both counts. *18 had he limited his only consideration to the ground. Under Stromberg unconstitutional Likewise in the case be- violation shown. California, us, MAI— required by jury, fore the (1931) many following L.Ed. 1117 cases statute, and 565.012.4, by § CR2d 15.48 and the it, such a conviction will not stand. aggravating set cir- forth in its verdict the beyond a reasonable cumstances found poli- Missouri analogy An can be made to such circum- jury doubt. The set forth two cy “jury in civil cases that a should not be circumstances, stances. of these how- One any theory recovery instructed or on ever, “agent employee” and circum- the supported by defense which is not the evi- ” stance, by unsupported the evidence. dence Farm ... . Hounihan v. State Mu- Here, case, as in the Chilton the death Co., 441 tual Automobile Insurance S.W.2d (there liquor it was the license revo- (Mo.App.1969); also Committee’s See cation) imposed strength “on 1.02, p. (2nd 1969): MAI Comment to ed. circumstances), (aggravating two violations “The jury Committee believes that unsupported.” one of which has been found theory should not be instructed on a or If for reconsidera- we reverse and remand supported by defense not the evidence involved, license is only liquor tion where and that any such submission should be a life is at no less where surely we can do reversible theory recovery error. A or stake. defense should not be submitted unless it present practice can stand alone. The cir- aggravating Submitting jury to the has been a crutch which has done little by the evidence supported cumstances not but by presenting imaginary confuse is- in the minds can create confusion jury’s sues for the determination.” tip impermissibly jurors may “ Further, sup- on issues not [instructions penalty. We death balance in favor of the ported by any evidence tend to authorize given have say jury would cannot that the reaching to rove in their verdict.” in this case the death Higdon, State v. 356 Mo. 204 S.W.2d aggravating cir- agent employee had the (banc 1947). submitted. When cumstance not been Wright, In Chilton v. S.W.2d us, we should not penalty is before (Mo.1972), by written the author of the conjecture. affirm on the basis of

principal herein, opinion liquor license of Modene Gatewood and Edd C. Chilton IV by supervisor liquor

was revoked (1) control grounds: on two unlawful sell- of. the agree avowal While I with the ing possession for resale and unlawful not and opinion we should principal refilled containers. Our review showed a 565.012.2(7) to become permit will not support lack of substantial evidence cir- “catch all” subsection ground, although first was substantial there cumstances, we dis- agree that I do not support ground. evidence to second 565.014.2(3) to charge duty our under § The license revocation was reversed and the of death “[wjhether the sentence determine cause remanded for reconsideration pen- disproportionate is excessive liquor supervisor, for the reason that restricting alty imposed in similar cases” strength license was revoked “on the of two which both to cases in our consideration violations, one of has which been found sub- imprisonment were and life unsupported”. supervisor was directed have been mitted to the to reconsider the matter assessment of is too limited appeal. affirmed on This single if penalty, any, on the basis of the all scope. eliminates from consideration It charge supported by the evidence. state waived cases in which the imprison- which life penalty, all cases in In the was evident Chilton case it taken, all given appeal no supervisor ment was had revoked the license on which life us in pending before grounds, two but one was bad. It could not cases all cases imprisonment given, be determined what he would have done *19 Baldus, al., Identifying in et Com- As said A of Death: paratively Excessive Sentences charged but the capital murder was which 1, Quantitative Approach, 33 Stan.L.Rev. of a lesser guilty defendant found (1980), exam- 20-21 All these capital crime than murder. jury convicted

ples are cases in which the efficacy procedure of the review “The not to im- chose defendant of murder but ‘similar’ the number of depends also purpose of pose penalty. the death comparison in the and the cases used is to review of the death appellate the information available completeness of or arbi- against random serve “as a check In other concerning those other cases. penalty.” death trary imposition of the pro- words, efficacy apparent 153, 96 Gregg Georgia, 428 U.S. S.Ct. v. comparative excessiveness tection (1976). It is our sol- 49 L.Ed.2d theoret- review can proportionality guarantee my opinion, emn in duty, misleading. may ically provide mitigating circum- similar death defendants sentenced Whether sentence bring stances do not about a death depends al- really protection receive that in anoth- imprisonment in one case and life thoroughness and entirely upon the most Supreme Court er. The statute and the process.” accuracy of the actual review penalty be im- require cases that the death Texas, Jurek v. posed with an even hand. easy do so is no Realizing I do that to L.Ed.2d 929 nevertheless, task, principal opinion ar- Florida, (1976); Proffitt v. which the review no standard ticulates We are 49 L.Ed.2d how the cases was in this case or made proportionality review. required to make which a life opinion in mentioned in the Gregg Georgia, supra. v. affirmance given support sentence was capi- By “similar cases” is meant similar penalty. of the death murders, tal not limited to those where after capital We see murder ease one imprisonment both life were sub- death and killing was horrible or in which the another mitted to the and then affirmed on color word appeal, way whichever the case went on atrocious or whatever other punishment. defendant The evil deed is the murder in which the comes to mind and that, See, accompanied and what it and as well death. imprisonment, received life not defendant, Strickland, as the is what must be looked at 609 S.W.2d example, for State v. comparing what one defendant received (Mo. 1980) (one shot in the banc victim capital under a murder head; room three other adjoining in an charge with what another received. The up and two of them were people were tied does capital fact that a murder defendant head; escaped when shot in the third get gets the death or a new fire, did not gun pointed to her head trial or that the state waived the death shotgun with a although she was later hit penalty in his case or that his case is still blast; v. penalty); State state waived mean that we pending before us does not 1980) Holmes, (Mo. banc 609 S.W.2d making compari- ignore can his case in our sixty-four (sixteen old victim stabbed year must, idea, accept we as we son. Once pick; state waived times with an ice cannot be inflicted Baskerville, No. penalty); v. State random, inconsistently, arbitrarily imprison- life pending this court on before into consider- necessarily then we must take including (multiple murders ment sentence about. capital ation all murders we know mother; boy was year-old boy seven and his special assistant We are furnished with a life). for his begged last to be killed and He is 565.014.6. purpose. Section (Mo. Mitchell, 611 S.W.2d In State capital of all cases to accumulate the record was 1981), year-old May banc imposed after which sentence another sentence, along with convicted, life says “sentence was 1977. The statute 61974, pending, Turner, No. (see mur- State imposed”. It is not limited murder sentence) of the imposed. life ders where death sentence employee,

owner of a tobacco store and his Missouri, Respondent, STATE aged 72 respectively. and 61 The murders were robbery. committed in the course of a BROOKS, Appellant. *20 Paul James Both victims received blows to the head instrument, with a blunt such as a beer No. 62495. bottle, ribs, both had fractured and both Missouri, Supreme Court of wounds,

received multiple apparently stab En Banc. from a broken beer victim bottle. One times; stabbed fifteen other June 1981.

stabbed five chest and times in the several Rehearing July Denied 1981. parts times in the abdomen and other body. Downs, (Mo. State v. 593 S.W.2d

1980), the defendant was convicted of the couple murder of a married eighteen year-old daughter,

their with a life

sentence. The defendant and others robbed couple store owned and shot

them each in the daughter head. When the approached

returned-from her classes and opened grabbed by door she was defend pulled

ant and another and into the store parents lay girl

where her dead. The fell to

her begged knees and for her life. The put gun to her head and shot

her.

It seems to me Justice that what Mr. Georgia,

White concluded in Furman v. 238, 313, 2726, 2764, 33 L.Ed.2d (1972) (concurring) remains the fact.

He said there that great is exacted with

“[t]he

infrequency even for the most atrocious meaningful

crimes and that there is no distinguishing

basis for the few cases imposed

which it is many from the cases

in which it is not.” outset,

As said at the I would reverse

remand for a new trial.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Mercer
Court Name: Supreme Court of Missouri
Date Published: May 11, 1981
Citation: 618 S.W.2d 1
Docket Number: 61797
Court Abbreviation: Mo.
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