State v. MendezState v. Mendez
Law Office of the Public Defender
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Kimberly M. Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender
Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Petitioner
Raul Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Michael J. Thomas, Assistant Solicitor General
Albuquerque, NM
for Respondent
VARGAS, Chief Justice.
{1} The New Mexico Constitution provides criminal defendants the right of trial by an impartial jury—“a jury where each and every one of the twelve members constituting the jury is tоtally free from any partiality whatsoever.”
{2} We conclude that Defendant preserved the issue by moving to strike Juror 6 for cause and that Juror 6‘s statements, viewed in their totality, demonstrate actual bias that would have affected the jurоr‘s vote. Furthermore, Defendant was prejudiced by the district court‘s denial of his motion to strike Juror 6 because Defendant was compelled to use a peremptory challenge on a juror who should have been removed for cause and then exhausted his remaining challenges before the selection of jurors was complete. We therefore reverse Defendant‘s conviction and remand the matter to the district court for a new trial.
A. The Underlying Incident
{3} On October 18, 2020, a Tularosa police officer observed Defendant, Carlos Miguel Mendez, in a truck thаt was parked at a stop sign with the engine idling. Defendant, the sole occupant of the truck, was asleep in the driver‘s seat. The officer woke Defendant and, upon Defendant‘s exiting from the truck and during the ensuing interaction, the officer detected the odor of alcohol as Defendant spoke. Defendant showed signs of intoxication and admitted to having one drink. Defendant declined to participate in standard field sobriety tests and was arrested and taken to the police station for a breathalyzer test. At the station, Defendant submitted to breathalyzer testing that reported Defendant‘s blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) of .24 and .22. Defendant was charged with aggravated DWI (corresponding to a BAC of .16 or above). See
B. District Court Proceedings
{4} During voir dire, before facts of the case were disclosed to the jury, defense counsel asked the members of the venire:
If [the State] gets up and puts on a whole slew of evidence today, are you saying that you believe that some of that evidence is, it has to be credible or else [Defendant] wouldn‘t be here? Or are you going to weigh that evidence as it‘s рresented to you?
{5} Juror 6, however, made a set of statements to the contrary. When approached, Juror 6 stated, “I‘m disagreeing with everybody else. They obviously had reason to pull [Defendant] over. We would not be here if they didn‘t have enough evidence [to prove him guilty].” Defense counsеl asked Juror 6 whether “at this point [he] assume[d] that [Defendant] has done something.” Juror 6 responded, “Yes.” Defense counsel then asked, “Is that something that‘s going to . . .weigh on you in the final deliberation?” Juror 6 again responded, “Yes.”
{6} Juror 6 made a second set of statements in response to defense counsel asking if anyone “thinks that if law enforcement and another witness had a conflicting story, you would believe law enforcement over someone else because of their training or their experience.” Juror 6 responded, “Yes, I agree.” Defense counsel again asked whether Juror 6 “would give law enforcement testimony more weight than someone else,” and Juror 6 again responded, “Yes.”
{7} After voir dire, Defendant moved to remove Juror 6 for cause, expressly pointing to Juror 6‘s second statements that he would give more weight to law
{8} The trial was simple and had only two witnesses: the arresting officer and the operator of the breathalyzer. The jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated DWI. Defendant appealed his conviction.
C. Court of Appeals Review
{9} Defendant argued before the Court of Appeals that Juror 6 should have been struck for cause based on the right to both an impartial jury and a remedy of excusal for cause identified previously herein. Defendant argued that these statements, in totality, reflect Juror 6‘s bias in favor of law enforcement and indicate he was unwilling to presume Defendant was innocent before any evidence was presented.
{10} Before considering Defendant‘s bias argument, the Court of Appeals concluded Defendant had not preserved his arguments related to Juror 6‘s first set of statements that law enforcement had enough evidence to prove him guilty and that Defendant must have done something. State v. Mendez, A-1-CA-41075, mem. op. ¶¶ 21 & n.1, 22 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2024) (nonprecedential). In declining to consider all of Juror 6‘s statements, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Defendant‘s appellate argument was “materially different from the argument that he made to the district court,” id. ¶ 21, and that the district court did not have an “opportunity to rule on whether these statements constituted actual bias,” id. ¶ 22. Then, looking solely at Juror 6‘s second set of statements confirming he gave more weight to law enforcement testimony than someone else, the Court of Appeals held that “Defendant ha[d] not carried his burden of establishing that the district court‘s refusal to disqualify Juror 6 amounted to an abuse оf discretion.” id. ¶ 24. The Court of Appeals, therefore, affirmed Defendant‘s conviction but vacated and remanded his case for resentencing based on other grounds. Id. ¶ 28.
II. DISCUSSION
{11} Defendant first argues the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Juror 6‘s first set of statements, suggesting law enforcement had enough evidence to prove Defendant guilty and Defendant must have done something, were unpreserved for appellate review. Defendant then asks this Court to review Juror 6‘s statements, in their totality, to determine whether he was actually biased and, if he was, whether Defеndant suffered prejudice when the district court denied his motion to strike Juror 6.
A. Preservation
{13} To preserve a question for appellate review, a district court‘s ruling or decision on the question must be “‘fairly invoked.‘” State v. Jason F., 1998-NMSC-010, ¶ 9, 125 N.M. 111, 957 P.2d 1145 (quoting
{14} A general “objection that does not state the grounds for the objection preserves no issue for appeal.” State v. Baca, 1997-NMSC-045, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 55, 946 P.2d 1066, overruled on other grounds by State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-025, ¶ 36, 146 N.M. 357, 210 P.3d 783. However, appellate courts “do not apply the preservation requirement in an ‘unduly technical manner.‘” Chavez v. Baca (In re Estate of Baca), 1999-NMCA-082, ¶ 15, 127 N.M. 535, 984 P.2d 782 (citation omitted). Thus, the objection need not be so specific if the ground is apparent from the context. See id.
{15} Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals employed a hypertechnical preservation analysis by improperly limiting its review to the specific statements Defendant identified before the district court and not the broader argument that Juror 6 disрlayed actual bias in favor of law enforcement. Defendant, citing State v. Holtsoi, contends that precedent does not require trial counsel to list every troubling comment by a challenged juror to preserve the argument of bias for appellate review.
{16} The State responds by reiterating the Court of Appeals’ conсlusion that Defendant‘s argument on appeal is “‘materially different‘” than the one he raised in the district court and that the first set of statements by Juror 6 were not mentioned in his motion to strike. Therefore, according to the State, the first set of statements are not preserved and this Court should not consider the statements when assessing Defendant‘s actual bias argument.
{17} While true that Defendant points to additional statements made by Juror 6 to support his argument of actual bias, we conclude that his appellate argument is not
{18} “We review the trial court‘s rulings regarding the selection of jurors for an abuse of discretion because the trial court is in the best position to assess a juror‘s state of mind, based upon the juror‘s demeanor and credibility.” State v. Johnson, 2010-NMSC-016, ¶ 31, 148 N.M. 50, 229 P.3d 523 (brackets, internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court acted in an obviously erroneous, arbitrary, or unwarranted manner.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While district courts maintain “a great deal of discretion in dismissing a juror for cause,” State v. Wiberg, 1988-NMCA-022, ¶ 21, 107 N.M. 152, 754 P.2d 529, it is an abuse of such discretion to fail “to excuse a juror who could not be impartial,” Johnson, 2010-NMSC-016, ¶ 31.
{19} “The challenging party bears the burden of proving juror bias.” Id. In evaluating a party‘s challenge, we start with the presumption that all potential jurors are capable of impartiality “so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of a particular case.” State v. Romero, 2023-NMSC-014, ¶ 7, 533 P.3d 735 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Partiality by a prospective juror which requires them to be excused for cause is established by showing actual or implied bias. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Actual bias, at issue here, is “the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the
{20} Defendant argues that Juror 6 should have been excused for cause based on the two sets of statements he made during voir dire which he contends establish actual bias in favor of law enforcement to the extent that it undermined Defendant‘s
{21} The State responds that Defendant is taking Juror 6‘s first set of statements out of cоntext. It contends that jurors at that stage of voir dire were not discussing Defendant‘s innocence or guilt, but rather their reasonable belief that Defendant was the subject of a traffic stop. In that context, the State claims that Juror 6‘s statement is consistent with the common sense idea that a person likely did something, even if later proved lawful, to draw the officer‘s attention and cause a traffic stop. The State further argues that Juror 6‘s second statements, standing alone, do not show sufficient bias to excuse him for cause because Juror 6 only agreed thаt he would give law enforcement testimony more weight if there was conflicting testimony, and conflicting testimony was not presented at trial. The State maintains that Defendant failed to establish actual bias because Juror 6 did not state that he would disregard the evidence presented at trial or that he could not be fair and impartial.
{23} Here, Juror 6‘s statements went beyond expressing a favorable impression of law enforcement and demonstrated that his bias in favor of law enforcement would undermine the presumption of innocence to the extent that it “would actually affect the juror‘s vote.” Id. ¶ 9. Juror 6‘s first statements made it clear that he did not presume Defendant was innocent and instead believed—based on his favorable view of law enforcemеnt—Defendant would not be charged with a crime unless there was enough evidence to prove him guilty. While the State contends that Juror 6‘s statements are being viewed out of context, the record does not support its characterization. Viewed in context, Juror 6‘s first set of statements were made in response to other jurors who stated they would weigh the evidence as presented. Juror 6 stated, “I‘m disagreeing with everybody else. . . . We would not be here if
{24} These statеments reflect more than a commonplace assumption that a driver likely did something to prompt a traffic stop. Rather, Juror 6‘s disagreement with other jurors and statements about law enforcement and the evidence it had raise doubts about his ability to decide the matter objectively. See State v. Anderson, 2019 MT 190, ¶ 18, 397 Mont. 1, 446 P.3d 1134 (“We have rejected jurors whose biased preconceptions were determined to be fixed opinions about the guilt of the defendant, which could not be laid aside.“). His statements cut against the foundational principle that “every man is presumed tо be innocent of the offense of which he is charged,” Territory v. Lucero, 1896-NMSC-017, ¶ 7, 8 N.M. 543, 46 P. 18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), a “presumption [that must] remain[] with [the defendant] until his guilt is established by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,” State v. Henderson, 1970-NMCA-022, ¶ 12, 81 N.M. 270, 466 P.2d 116. See also Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.“).
{26} We conclude that Juror 6‘s actual bias in favor of law enforcement can be inferred from his statements that “bespeak[] a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the . . . excus[al of] the juror for cause.” Romero, 2023-NMSC-014, ¶ 11; see also McFall, 1960-NMSC-084, ¶ 6 (“Accordingly, the jury which one сharged with [a] crime is guaranteed, is one that does not favor one side more than another, treats all alike, is unbiased, equitable, fair and just.“); State v. Sims, 1947-NMSC-071, ¶ 2, 51 N.M. 467, 188 P.2d 177 (holding that bias was established where a juror said he would decide “against the defendant” if the evidence were “that close“). The district court erred in denying Defendant‘s motion to strike Juror 6 for cause.
{27} Having concluded that the district court erred in denying Defendant‘s motion to strike Juror 6 for cause, we turn to the question of prejudice. Our courts have long followed the approach set out in Fuson, concluding, “prejudice is presumed where, as here, a party is compelled to use peremptory challenges on persons who should be excused for cause and that party exercises all of his or her peremptory challenges before the court completes the venire.” 1987-NMSC-034, ¶ 11. In reaching this conclusion, the Fuson Court relied on the right to a trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution, citing to McFall, 1960-NMSC-084, ¶ 5, which also relies on that provision in our state constitution.
{28} Fuson also relied on a series of federal cases that generally held “‘[t]he denial or impairment оf the right [of peremptory challenge] is reversible error without a showing of prejudice.‘” See 1987-NMSC-034, ¶¶ 7-8 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). However, as the State points out, these cases were later abrogated by the United States Supreme Court. In Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988) the United States Supreme Court concluded, “[s]o long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve
{29} Other than citation to the New Mexico Constitution and the now-abrogated federal cases, Fuson gave little explanation of where the right is derived and the manner in which it operates, leaving us with many questions and concerns, most relevant here, whether the presumption of prejudice it announces is rebuttable or not. Fuson boldly, if not offhandedly, announced that, in the case before it, the state had not rebutted the presumption of prejudice. In reaching this conclusion, it provided no analysis or other explanation of the requirements or timing of any such rebuttal.
{30} Here, the State argues that the presumption is rebuttable, and in this instance, it was rebutted. The State contends that the dearth of evidence introduced at trial in support of Defendant‘s guilt renders harmless any error on the part of the district court to excuse Juror 6. We reject any attempt to employ a harmless error standard that relies on the weight of the evidence of the defendant‘s guilt to evaluate potential structural errors impacting the trial itself. Compare State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶¶ 25, 27, 275 P.3d 110 (applying a harmless error test to the erroneous
{31} Alternatively, the State asks us to overrule Fuson. Before overturning precedent, however, stare decisis requires that we evaluate a number of factors, including:
[(1)] whether the precedent is so unworkable as to be intolerable; [(2)] whether parties justifiably relied on the precedent so that reversing it would create an undue hardship; [(3)] whether the principles of law have developed to such an extent as to leave the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; and [(4)] whether the facts have changed in the interval from the old rule to reconsideration so as to have robbed the old rule of justification.
{32} The State‘s arguments focus on the first and third of our stare decisis factors. The State first argues that the rule set out in Fuson is unworkable and intolerable because it too often has the practical еffect of forcing retrial of a case. We disagree in light of the numerous requirements that must be met before a defendant is entitled to retrial. The Fuson rule applies only in the narrow circumstance where: (1) a defendant is able to establish that a member of the venire was biased, (2) there is insufficient rehabilitation by the state, (3) the district court erroneously denies a motion to strike the potential juror for cause, (4) the defendant uses a preemptory challenge on the potential juror, and, finally, (5) the defendant uses all their preemptory challengеs before the venire is complete. 1987-NMSC-034, ¶¶ 5-11. C.f. State v. Medema, 2025-NMCA-011, ¶¶ 11-18, 584 P.3d 846 (concluding the defendant did not establish juror was biased); Johnson, 2010-NMSC-016, ¶ 32 (concluding juror confirmation that they could be fair and impartial cured potential bias); State v. Duran, S-1-SC-39978, dec. ¶ 9 (N.M. Feb. 27, 2025) (nonprecedential) (holding Fuson presumption of prejudice inapplicable when the defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges); Holtsoi, 2024-NMCA-042, ¶¶ 5-12 (reversing the defendant‘s conviction when juror stated he could not be fair,
{33} The State next contends that Fuson is inconsistent with the development of federal law, including that set out in Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 317 (2000) (holding “a defendant‘s exercise of peremptory challenges . . . is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause“), making the presumption of prejudice a remnant of abandoned doctrine. The Statе‘s contention fails to acknowledge that both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have determined that prejudice, in the context of peremptory challenges, is a matter of state law. See Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 152 (2009) (“Just as state law controls the existence and exercise of peremptory challenges, so state law determines the consequences of an erroneous denial of such a challenge.“); Johnson, 2010-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 31-32 (citing the prejudice standard from Fuson as our approach and acknowledging that under Rivera, this is not a matter of federal constitutional concern). The current condition of our state law, as set out in Fuson identifies the right to a trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by Article II, Section 14 of the New
{34} As we explain above, Defendant has established that Juror 6 was biased and was not rehabilitated by the State. The district court erred when it denied Defendant‘s motion to strike Juror 6. As a result, Defendant used a preemptory challenge to excuse Juror 6 and subsequently exhausted all of his preemptory challenges before the venire was complete. See Fuson, 1987-NMSC-034, ¶¶ 5, 11. Under the circumstances of this case, Defendant is entitled to a new trial.
III. CONCLUSION
{35} For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by denying Defendant‘s motion to strike Juror 6 based on actual bias in favor of law enforcement and that Defendant was prejudiced by the district court‘s abuse of discretion. As a result, we reverse Defendant‘s conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
JULIE J. VARGAS, Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice
C. SHANNON BACON, Justice
DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice
BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice