3 P.2d 489 | Kan. | 1931
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Hal Mendenhall was found guilty in the first degree of the murder of his wife, Anna Ritchey Mendenhall. He has appealed and contends that the court erred (1) in overruling defendant’s motion to be discharged at the close of the state’s evidence in chief; (2) in the admission of evidence; (3) in refusing to give instructions requested, and in instructions given; and (4) in refusing to grant a new trial, (a) because of misconduct of the prosecuting attorney, especially in his closing argument, and (b) because of misconduct and prejudice of the jury. And generally it is argued that defendant did not have a fair trial. We shall discuss these questions in the order stated.
Defendant does not contend that a motion for an instructed verdict in his favor, if made at the close of all the evidence, should have been sustained — indeed, no such motion was made at the time — but does contend that at the close of the state’s evidence in chief the motion for his discharge, which was then made, should have been sustained for the reason that the evidence was insufficient to sustain any charge contained in the information. The state’s evidencé in chief may be summarized as follows:
The above is a summary of the state’s evidence in chief. The trial court, in denying defendant’s motion to be discharged, correctly held the evidence sufficient to go to the jury on the charge of first-degree murder, or at least on some of the offenses embodied in the charge of first-degree murder on which defendant was being tried. It should be remembered that in his statement to the officers he made no suggestion that the shooting was accidental, justifiable, or excusable, or that it was otherwise than intentional on his part. Before discussing other questions argued by defendant a further statement of the evidence is deemed proper. The principal defense
In rebuttal the state called Silas Barber, the groceryman who had been there to take the order just before the casualty. He testified that he knew defendant and his wife, but transacted no business with them except to sell them a few groceries. He testified that on the morning of October 1, the day of the tragedy, defendant came to him and wanted to borrow a gun to shoot a dog. The witness said he had no gun and to speak to the law. Defendant replied that he had called the law and an officer came out there and looked around and said he didn’t have time to look for a dog, and went back. He further testified that in the afternoon of that day, along close to two o’clock, he went to the Mendenhall house to get an order for groceries. Defendant and his wife were sitting on the porch. Defendant saw him come and said, “No groceries to-day,” that he started to go on past and defendant’s wife said, “Yes, I will make out an order,” and started to get up; that defendant got up with her and his wife told him to stay out there and talk to the man while she went in and made out an order, but that defendant went on in the house with her; that he stayed there and waited a few minutes and he soon heard some one halloo for help twice, and it occurred to him that it was a family quarrel, and he started to go away. When he got fifteen or twenty feet away from the house he heard a gun fired; that is, he heard a noise that was either a gun or a door shut. He also heard the boy crying inside the house, and heard defendant say: “Shut up, nobody’s going to hurt you.” He thought possibly the parties in the house didn’t want him to hear .their quarrel, and had shut the door. He walked on across the street and stopped a few minutes to talk with a neighbor. While they were standing talking the ambulance and officers came to the house.
It was also shown in rebuttal that defendant had no clothes at the house at the time he went down there on October 1, having taken them away a week or two before, at the urgent request of his wife, and not having returned them. There was quite convincing evidence, also, to the effect that neither the evening before the tragedy, nor at any time, was there any misconduct between defendant’s wife and O’Dowd, who a few days prior to the tragedy had rented a room from Mrs. Mendenhall and had employed her to take care of his little boy, then about five years old, dr less, while he was at work. It was also shown that the gun used had a safety device, which first had to be operated, and then'the trigger pulled, before the gun could be fired.
Turning now to the complaints made by defendant with regard to the admission of evidence. Four of these items relate to evidence offered by the state in rebuttal. Defendant had testified that when he asked the porter at the garage that morning for a gun he also asked him to go down to the house with him to get his clothes. The porter was called in rebuttal and testified that defendant said nothing about getting his clothes, but did talk with him about taking his gun to kill a dog. We see no reason why this was not proper rebuttal testimony. Defendant complains that the groceryman, Silas Barber, was called as a rebuttal witness, and contends that his evidence should have been produced in chief. Counsel for the state admit that the evidence would have been proper in chief, but state they did not know of this witness, or of what his testimony would
The state offered evidence as to its efforts to subpoena and have the testimony of certain material witnesses. The trial court admitted this, with the admonition to the jury that it should not presume anything those witnesses would testify to, but the evidence was received simply as an explanation of- why those witnesses were not called to testify. We see no reasonable objection to that. For
Complaint is made of the refusal to give instructions requested and of instructions given, particularly on the question of self-defense. The summary of the evidence above given discloses there was little in it upon which to base self-defense. But the court took the view that, under some views of the testimony, the doctrine of self-defense, at least in a limited way, might be in the case. Defendant requested an instruction embodying that view of the evidence, and on that question the court instructed substantially as requested by defendant. There is therefore no error in this particular.
Defendant complains of misconduct of counsel for the prosecution, particularly in the language used in the closing argument. We have read the argument in full, also the argument of the leading counsel for defendant. There is nothing seriously wrong with these arguments. It would serve no useful purpose to detail the criticisms made by defendant. The case had taken a week or more to try, the arguments lasted a full day, and counsel on both sides, in their arguments, made a few — not many — excursions beyond the line of strict propriety. It would have been better had they not done so, but it is clear there is nothing in the complaints here made that would justify a reversal on this point.
Defendant argues that there was misconduct of the jury, and particularly of the juror Ralph Daughaday. On his voir dire he had answered satisfactorily the usual questions, that he was not acquainted with the defendant, that he had no bias or prejudice against him, and that he had not formed or expressed an opinion concerning his guilt. On the hearing of the motion for a new
To some extent in the printed briefs, but more forcibly in the oral argument, it is contended on behalf of defendant that he did not have a fair trial, that there was a mob spirit prevailing, that the court room was crowded, that at times there were disturbances, that persons crowded up near the jury box and made remarks adverse to defendant, and that the jury had to pass through a crowded corridor where remarks adverse to defendant were made by persons in the crowd. We have carefully examined the record and find nothing in it to justify a complaint of this character. It appears to have been argued to the court on the motion for a new trial. The court stated that it was true there was a crowd, but bailiffs sufficient in number were provided to look after the crowd,
Taken as a whole, the defenses offered were not convincing, and it is clear that much of defendant’s testimony was false. On the other hand, there is an abundance of substantial evidence to sustain a finding of all of the elements of murder in the first degree; indeed, it is not argued that such evidence is lacking. The transcript of the record, all of which we have carefully examined, discloses that defendant had a fair trial.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.