{¶ 2} On December 17, 2004, a Brown County farmer called the police and complained that a vehicle was stuck in his field. The police arrived and found appеllant in the *2 vehicle, and, upon further investigation, also discovered that the vehicle contained a methamphetamine lab. Appellant was arrested and later released from jail after posting bond on December 22, 2004. However, appellant failed to appear at his arraignment on January 21, 2005, as well at his pretrial hearing on February 10, 2005. It was later determined that he was incarcerated on other methamphetamine charges during that time.
{¶ 3} On August 2, 2005, while serving a prison sentence in the London Correctional Institute, appellant filed a request for speedy trial, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 4} Appellant appeals, raising two assignments of error.
{¶ 5} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 6} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY BRINGING [APPELLANT] TO TRIAL AFTER THE 180 DAY DEADLINE FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL PURSUANT TO R.C. 2941.041 (sic.) HAD PASSED."
{¶ 7} Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because his conviction for illegal manufacture of methamphetamine violated his statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 8} Appellate review of speеdy trial issues involves a mixed question of law and fact.
State v. Messer, Clermont App. No. CA2006-10-084,
{¶ 9} In Ohio, the right to a speedy trial is implemented by statutes that impose a duty on the state to bring the defendant to trial within a specified time. City of Cleveland v. Sheldon, Cuyahoga App. No. 82319,
{¶ 10} In order for a defendant to avail himself of the sрeedy trial provisions in R.C.
Ohio App.3d 292, 296. If the state fails to comply with the 180-day restriction, the court loses *4
jurisdiction and the indictment or complaint is void. R.C.
{¶ 11} Ohio courts, including this court, have found that the right to a speedy trial may be waived as long as the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. State v. Evans (Dec. 30, 1999), Butler App. No CA98-11-237, at 6, citing State v. King,
{¶ 12} Appellant complied with the statutory requirements of R.C.
{¶ 13} Even if the matter had gone to trial as scheduled, the state's speedy trial deadline would not have expired.
{¶ 14} As stated previously, appellant's notice of his place of detention and request for disposition of untried indictments were received by the prosecutor and the common pleas court on August 2, 2005, and therefore, the 180-day speedy trial time began to run on that date. See State v. Hairston,
{¶ 15} Appellant's guilty plea was entered on March 22, 2007, which was 597 days *5
after he filed his nоtice for a speedy trial on August 2, 2005. However, appellant expressly waived the time limitations imposed when he signed a limited time waiver on September 21, 2005, 1 which stated that "speedy trial times [are] extended until jury trial scheduled."2 Our review of the record indicates that the jury trial was set upon the trial docket on February 21, 2007. However, although appellant never formally withdrew the limited time waiver, his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds filed on September 27, 2006 effectively revoked it. Messer,
{¶ 16} Based on the foregoing, only 164 days were tolled against the state's speedy trial deadline.3 Therefore, appellant's argument is without merit because the state's180-day time limit had not expired at the time he pled guilty.
{¶ 17} Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 18} Assignment of Error No. 2: *6
{¶ 19} "TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHICH HARMED [APPELLANT]."
{¶ 20} Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he "should have renewed the Motion to Dismiss on Speedy Trial grounds as the case was over 180 days when it came to the date of the plea." This argument lacks merit.
{¶ 21} In determining whether сounsel's performance constitutes ineffective assistance, an appellate court must find that counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonаbleness and that appellant was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington (1984),
{¶ 22} A guilty plea waives claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon statutory speedy trial issues. State v. Mayle, Morgan App. No. CA 07-3,
{¶ 23} Judgment affirmed.
YOUNG, J., concurs.
*7 WALSH, P.J., concurring separately.WALSH, P.J., concurs separately.
{¶ 24} I write separately to emphasize that it was appellant's execution of time waivers in this case that permitted the trial court to make the finding of guilt, and without thosе waivers the court would have lost jurisdiction over this matter. See R.C.
{¶ 25} While the majority addressed the merits of the issues presented by appellant's assignments of error, they did so only after they held that appellant's guilty plea waived his right to challenge the issues. I would base our holding solely on the analysis of the merits of appellant's appeal.
{¶ 26} Notwithstanding the differencеs in my approach to the analysis, I concur with the decision to overrule appellant's assignments of error and affirm the judgment.
Notes
{¶ b} 50 days tolled from August 2, 2005, the date appellant complied with R.C.
{¶ c} 114 days tolled from November 28, 2006, the date the trial court ruled on the motion to dismiss, and March 22, 2007, the date appellant pled guilty. *1