State of Ohio v. Lucas Velasco Mejia
Court of Appeals No. H-19-017
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HURON COUNTY
Decided: December 23, 2020
[Cite as State v. Mejia, 2020-Ohio-6870.]
ZMUDA, P.J.
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. H-19-017
Appellee Trial Court No. CRI 20180827
v.
Lucas Velasco Mejia DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: December 23, 2020
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James Joel Sitterly, Huron County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Bambi S. Couch, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Brian A. Smith, for appellant.
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ZMUDA, P.J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, Lucas Mejia, appeals the judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him to 25 years to life in prison after he pled guilty to one count of rape. Because we conclude that appellant’s sentence is contrary to law, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing.
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A. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On October 19, 2018, a three-count indictment was filed with the trial court, charging appellant with one count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B), a felony of the first degree (“Count 1”), one count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B) with a specification that appellant “purposely compelled the victim to submit by force or threat of force,” a felony of the first degree (“Count 2”), and one count of sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5) and (B), a felony of the second degree (“Count 3”).
{¶ 3} At his arraignment on October 22, 2018, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the aforementioned charges, and the matter proceeded through pretrial discovery and motion practice. Following successful plea negotiations, appellant appeared before the trial court on March 21, 2019, for a plea hearing.
{¶ 4} At the plea hearing, the state informed the court that the parties reached an agreement whereby appellant would plead guilty to Count 1 in the indictment in exchange for the state’s dismissal of Counts 2 and 3. Thereafter, the trial court engaged appellant in a thorough Crim.R. 11 colloquy and asked the state to recite the factual basis for the charge of rape.
{¶ 5} During the Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the trial court informed appellant that “the mandatory penalty in this case is that the Court would have to impose * * * a prison term
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of 25 years up to life.” In explaining the factual basis for the rape charge to which appellant was pleading guilty, the state informed the court:
On August 18, 2018 through August 25, 2018, and then on August 26, 2018, the defendant in the course of conduct took [the victim], date of birth 4-5-2006 to Shelby in Richland County, Ohio, from her home located in Plymouth in Huron County, Ohio, to have sexual intercourse with her.
They’re seen on video renting a room. He provides the hotel with his passport. The stepdaughter speaks fluent English and provides the innkeeper with all the information. They’re seen going into a hotel room together, and a short time later leaving the hotel together.
On August 26, 2018, a neighbor of the defendant and of the victim had suspicions that the two were engaging in a sexual relationship. She observed the defendant and the victim leave their home and enter the woods behind their house. She followed these two into the woods to a spot where the footprints stopped and located a tied off condom filled with what she thought was semen. She collected the condom, turned it over to law enforcement and an investigation started.
The victim admitted she engaged in a sexual relationship with [appellant] since age of 11; that the sexual relationship was just vaginal penetration with his penis, and that a condom was always used. A SANE
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exam was performed, a sexual assault examination was performed on the victim. The defendant’s DNA was found inside the victim. The condom was sent to laboratory for DNA testing. The victim’s DNA was located on the outside of the condom.
{¶ 6} At the conclusion of the Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the trial court confirmed with appellant that he signed the written plea form indicating his agreement to plead guilty to rape as contained in Count 1 of the indictment. The plea form, which is included in the record on appeal, reflects appellant’s agreement to plead guilty to Count 1 in exchange for the dismissal of Counts 2 and 3 of the indictment. Moreover, the plea form reflects a mandatory sentence of 25 years to life under R.C. 2971.03(A)(3)(d)(i), a statutory section applicable to sexually violent offenders that the state, on appeal, concedes is irrelevant to the present case. Ultimately, the trial court accepted appellant’s guilty plea and continued the matter for sentencing, which took place on April 17, 2019.
{¶ 7} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court considered the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11,
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provided appellant with an explanation of the registration requirements attributable to that classification.
{¶ 8} Following the sentencing hearing, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
B. Assignments of Error
{¶ 9} On appeal, appellant assigns the following errors for our review:
I. The failure of Appellant’s trial counsel to file a Motion to Suppress constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Appellant’s rights under Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, rendering Appellant’s guilty plea not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.
II. Appellant’s sentence was contrary to law.
III. The failure of Appellant’s trial counsel to advocate for a lesser prison sentence for Appellant constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Appellant’s rights under Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
IV. Appellant’s sentence was not supported by the record.
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II. Analysis
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 10} In appellant’s first assignment of error, he argues that his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress prior to his plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and resulted in a guilty plea that was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.
{¶ 11} To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must first show that trial counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Because “effective assistance” may involve different approaches or strategies, our scrutiny of trial counsel’s performance “must be highly deferential” with a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), quoting Strickland at 689. Should appellant demonstrate her trial counsel’s performance was defective, appellant must also demonstrate that prejudice resulted. Bradley at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 12} In order to satisfy the “prejudice” element for an ineffective-assistance claim following a guilty plea, “‘the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 89, quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d
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203 (1985). “In many guilty plea cases, the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through trial.” Hill at 59.
{¶ 13} In the present case, appellant argues that he would not have entered a guilty plea but for trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to file a motion to suppress statements, including admissions of sexual intercourse with the victim, that he made during custodial interrogation without being first completely advised of his
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by appellant below. Indeed, we previously ordered this evidence stricken from the record pursuant to a motion to strike filed by the state, and noted in our decision that we would not consider the supplemental materials containing said evidence in rendering our decision in this appeal.
{¶ 14} Because there is no evidence in the record to support appellant’s assertion that he was deprived of his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination when he was interviewed by law enforcement on August 27, 2018, we find that appellant cannot establish that his trial counsel acted incompetently in failing to file a motion to suppress on that basis. Therefore, we find that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to file a motion to suppress in this case. State v. Gott, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-14-1066, 2015-Ohio-917, ¶ 28 (to prove ineffective assistance due to counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress, the record must support both a finding that the motion would have been granted and a finding that the absence of the motion prejudiced the appellant’s case).
{¶ 15} In light of the foregoing, we find appellant’s first assignment of error not well-taken.
B. Sentencing Issues
{¶ 16} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that his prison sentence of 25 years to life was contrary to law.
{¶ 17} Our review of felony sentences is governed by
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remand a sentence only if the record demonstrates, clearly and convincingly, either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant; or
{¶ 18} Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s findings under
{¶ 19} At the plea hearing in this case, appellant pled guilty to one count of rape under
(A)(1) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another who is not the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of the offender but is living separate and apart from the offender, when any of the following applies:
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(b) The other person is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of the other person.
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(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of rape, a felony of the first degree. * * * Except as otherwise provided in this division, notwithstanding sections 2929.11 to 2929.14 of the Revised Code, an offender under division (A)(1)(b) of this section shall be sentenced to a prison term or term of life imprisonment pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code. * * * If an offender under division (A)(1)(b) of this section previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to violating division (A)(1)(b) of this section or to violating an existing or former law of this state, another state, or the United States that is substantially similar to division (A)(1)(b) of this section, if the offender during or immediately after the commission of the offense caused serious physical harm to the victim, or if the victim under division (A)(1)(b) of this section is less than ten years of age, in lieu of sentencing the offender to a prison term or term of life imprisonment pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code, the court may impose upon the offender a term of life without parole.
{¶ 20} Depending on the facts of each case, the foregoing statute authorizes a prison sentence of life in prison, life without parole, or a shorter indefinite sentence for
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offenders who are convicted of rape in violation of
{¶ 21} Because it did not impose a prison sentence of life without parole in this case, and since
(B)(1) * * * if a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1)(b) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code committed on or after January 2, 2007, if division (A) of this section does not apply regarding the person, and if the court does not impose a sentence of life without parole when authorized pursuant to division (B) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose upon the person an indefinite prison term consisting of one of the following:
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(a) Except as otherwise required in division (B)(1)(b) or (c) of this section, a minimum term of ten years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.
(b) If the victim was less than ten years of age, a minimum of fifteen years and a maximum of life imprisonment.
(c) If the offender purposely compels the victim to submit by force or threat of force, or if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to violating division (A)(1)(b) of section 2907.02 of the Revised Code or to violating an existing or former law of this state, another state, or the United States that is substantially similar to division (A)(1)(b) of that section, or if the offender during or immediately after the commission of the offense caused serious physical harm to the victim, a minimum term of twenty-five years and a maximum of life imprisonment.
{¶ 22} Under this statutory framework, the default mandatory sentence is ten years to life under
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to the victim of the offense.” State v. Morris, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 19 CAA 12 0069, 2020-Ohio-5361, ¶ 26. The state only argues that the use or threat of force element is applicable in this case.
{¶ 23} Under
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{¶ 24} In Eskridge, a father was charged with, and convicted of, the rape of his four-year-old daughter. The indictment specifically alleged that Eskridge used force or the threat of force in the commission of the rape. Eskridge at 56. Under the version of
{¶ 25} In its decision, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the portions of the trial transcripts that were relevant to the use of force and concluded that “the child’s testimony, the child’s tender age, and the relationship of parental authority that defendant had with his four-year-old daughter” constituted “substantial evidence from which the trial court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Eskridge committed the act with force.” Id. at 58. The court went on to explain that
the victim testified that Eskridge removed her panties and there was testimony that he laid her on the bed – both acts of compulsion and constraint that are independent of the act of rape. The victim’s testimony also expressed her revulsion at her father’s conduct. Further, we note the age difference and disparity in size between Eskridge, a twenty-eight-year-old man, and the victim, a four-year-old child. A four-year-old child
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cannot consent to sexual conduct. The victim here did not and could not have participated in the sexual conduct of her own free will.
{¶ 26} Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that coercion is inherent in the parent-child relationship and stated that “force need not be overt and physically brutal, but can be subtle and psychological.” Id. at 58-59.
{¶ 27} Ten years after Eskridge was decided, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision in Dye. There, Dye, a 44-year-old non-relative and weekly caregiver of the nine-year-old victim, was indicted on five counts of rape and five counts of felonious sexual penetration, each with the specification that he had used or threatened force. Following a jury trial, Dye was convicted of all five counts of rape and three counts of felonious sexual penetration.
{¶ 28} On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, the issue was whether Dye could be convicted of raping the victim with force under
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“recognize[d] that it is nearly impossible to imagine the rape of a child without force involved,”
{¶ 29} While instructive as to the state’s burden of production at trial regarding the force element in rape case under
{¶ 30} Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision in Bowers, supra, --- Ohio St.3d ----, 2020-Ohio-5167, --- N.E.3d ----. There, a defendant who also pled guilty
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to rape under
{¶ 31} On appeal, the First District reversed the trial court’s imposition of sentence, finding that the sentence was not authorized because “none of the prerequisites for such a sentence under
{¶ 32} In affirming the First District’s judgment, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed with Bowers that “a sentence of 25 years to life under
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express findings to be made so long as there is evidence of force in the record, because the court found that force is an element of the charged offense. Id. at ¶ 24.
{¶ 33} Subsequent to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers, the Fifth District issued its decision in Morris, supra, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 19 CAA 12 0069,
{¶ 34} Consistent with the reasoning articulated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Bowers and the Fifth District in Morris, we find that the trial court’s prison sentence of 25 years to life under
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Count 1 of the indictment, and thus the indictment language regarding force is inapplicable here.
{¶ 35} It appears from our review of the record that the trial court sentenced appellant to 25 years to life under the mistaken understanding that said sentence was mandatory under
{¶ 36} Because Count 1 of the indictment did not include a specification that appellant used or threatened force during the commission of the offense in this case, we conclude that
{¶ 37} Our resolution of the second assignment of error in appellant’s favor requires us to reverse appellant’s sentence and remand this matter to the trial court to resentence appellant in accordance with
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Consequently, appellant’s remaining assignments of error are moot and we will not address them.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 38} In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing. The costs of this appeal are assessed to the state under App.R. 24.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J. _______________________________
Gene A. Zmuda, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR. _______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.