2004 Ohio 3577 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2004
Lead Opinion
{¶ 2} Early in the summer of 2002, Meeds' fifteen-year-old daughter, A., wrote her mother a letter stating that her father had repeatedly sexually abused her when she was seven and eight years old. The following day A. gave more detailed information about the abuse to Detective Burton of the Piqua Police Department.
{¶ 3} On June 18, 2002, Meeds drove to the police department at the request of Det. Burton. Detectives Burton and Taylor showed Meeds to an interview room where he was read and waived his Miranda rights. He also was advised that he was not under arrest. The detectives then interviewed Meeds for two and one-half hours. Throughout the interview, the detectives stressed the importance of Meeds telling them the truth in order to help his children. They also told Meeds that his full cooperation would likely result in fewer charges against him.
{¶ 4} Early in the interview, Meeds admitted that he took nude photos of A. Soon afterwards, Meeds stated, "Okay, fine. I did it, whatever." However, when the detectives tried to get details, he insisted that even though he did not abuse A., he would agree to whatever she said. At that point Meeds was given a bathroom break. Later in the interview, Meeds admitted that A. performed oral sex on him three times, but he denied any sexual contact with a second victim. At this point Meeds was given a cigarette break. After the breaks, Meeds was advised that he was under arrest. He continued to deny any inappropriate conduct with the second victim, but he again admitted that A. had performed oral sex on him three times.
{¶ 5} The Miami County Grand Jury indicted Meeds on September 25, 2002 with two counts of forcible rape of a child under the age of thirteen. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found Meeds guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Meeds to concurrent life sentences on each count and designated him as a sexual predator. Meeds filed a timely notice of appeal.
{¶ 6} Meeds' sole assignment of error:
{¶ 7} "Mr. Meeds was denied his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to file a motion to suppress/motion in limine (followed by an objection at trial) to exclude Mr. Meeds' Statements to detectives where there was a reasonable probability that such a motion would have been granted and the admission of a portion of that statement was prejudicial to Mr. Meeds' defense."
{¶ 8} On appeal Meeds presents only one assignment of error in which he alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for deciding not to file either a motion to suppress his confession or a motion in limine to exclude it under Evid.R. 410. In support, Meeds argues that either his confession was made in the course of plea negotiations or that it was involuntary and coerced. We are not convinced by either alternative.
{¶ 10} Even assuming that counsel's performance was ineffective, the defendant must still show that the error had an effect on the judgment.State v. Bradley (1989),
{¶ 12} A defendant's confession "is made voluntarily absent evidence that his will was overborne and his capacity for self-determination was critically impaired because of coercive police conduct." State v. Otte,
{¶ 13} In this case, we find nothing coercive or overbearing about the physical environment of the interview. The questioning took place in a standard interview room. There Meeds was given his Miranda warnings, and he immediately agreed to waive his rights. Additionally, there was nothing about Meeds' age, mentality, or his lack of any significant criminal record that indicated that his will was overborne during his interrogation.
{¶ 14} The interview was neither intense, nor lengthy. In fact, Meeds was only in the interview room for two and one-half hours, including time for brief introductions, two breaks, and the discussion and signing of a consent to search. Moreover, there was no evidence of physical deprivation. Meeds brought a drink into the interview room, and he was allowed a bathroom break immediately upon requesting one. Meeds was also given a lengthy cigarette break.
{¶ 15} Finally, we do not believe that the detectives made any improper threats or promises, nor did they in any other way undermine Meeds' capacity for self-determination. A review of the entire interview illustrates that the detectives' primary strategy was to emphasize to Meeds that his cooperation would help his children. To that end, they repeatedly told him to just tell the truth. Admonitions to tell the truth are neither threats nor promises. State v. Stringham, Miami App. No. 2002-CA-9, 2003-Ohio-1100, ¶ 16, citing State v. Loza (1994),
{¶ 16} Secondarily, the detectives advised Meeds that he could also help himself by cooperating. Of course, "assurances that a defendant's cooperation will be considered or that a confession will be helpful do not invalidate a confession." Stringham, supra, at ¶ 16., citing Loza,
supra, at 67; State v. Wilson (1996),
{¶ 17} Furthermore, truthful statements regarding the number and nature of charges that are likely to be filed do not amount to threats. The detectives accurately explained Meeds' situation to him and advised him that the prosecutor would likely seek fewer charges if he cooperated. We note that, in fact, that Meeds was charged with only two counts despite A.'s information about ten to fifteen incidents of abuse.
{¶ 18} For these reasons, under the totality of the circumstances, it is apparent that Meeds' will was not overborne. This is illustrated, in part, by the fact that throughout the entire interview Meeds continued to maintain his innocence regarding allegations involving a second victim. Accordingly, a motion to suppress had no reasonable expectation of success, and we cannot conclude that trial counsel was ineffective for choosing not to file one.
{¶ 20} "The test whether an accused's statements were made during plea discussions is to be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of all the facts. In determining admissibility of statements made during alleged plea discussions, the trial court must first determine whether, at the time of the statements, the accused had a subjective expectation that a plea was being negotiated. The trial court must then determine whether such an expectation was reasonable under the circumstances." State v.Frazier,
{¶ 21} Meeds presents a unique argument that the detectives' claims to have spoken with a prosecutor, who might reduce the number of charges if Meeds cooperated, was sufficient proof that a prosecuting attorney was a participant in the alleged plea discussions. In other words, Meeds insists that a prosecutor was involved even though no prosecutor was physically present during any part of the interrogation, nor did a prosecutor ever speak directly to Meeds. It appears that this is an issue of first impression in Ohio. However, while it is an interesting issue, it is not one that is ripe for review in the context of this case,
{¶ 22} because we cannot conclude that Meeds' trial counsel was ineffective for failing to think of presenting such a novel argument to the trial court.
Fain, P.J. and Brogan, J., concur.
Concurrence Opinion
{¶ 24} Although I concur in both the opinion and judgment of this court, I write separately to indicate that, in my view, a prosecutor need not participate in plea negotiations directly with an accused in order to implicate Evid.R. 410(A)(5). In my view, this rule is implicated when a police officer, having apparent authority to do so, purports to be negotiating with an accused on behalf of a prosecutor.
{¶ 25} I understand the reason behind the rule to be to encourage an accused to speak freely in the course of plea negotiations, without having to fear that any statements made in the course of those discussions would be used against him at trial. That policy is implicated whenever an accused reasonably believes that he is negotiating with a prosecutor, even if the prosecutor's participation is through the apparent agency of a police officer.
{¶ 26} I agree with the majority, however, that this issue is sufficiently novel that the defendant's trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for having failed to think of it. Accordingly, I concur in the opinion and judgment of this court.
