State v. MeadowsState v. Meadows
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶ 1} Appellant, Patrick C. Meadows, pro se, appeals a judgment from the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶ 2} This court affirmed appellant‘s original convictions and sentences for burglary and recognizance bond violations in State v. Meadows (Dec. 17, 1999), 6th Dist. Nos. L-98-1424, L-98-1425. The underlying facts of appellant‘s first appeal were set forth as follows:
{¶ 3} “On October 3, 1997, appellant, Patrick C. Meadows, and two accomplices broke into a home in western Lucas County. The trio had planned the burglary for some time and carried with them a roll of duct tape to restrain anyone found in the residence. Fortunately, at the time of the break-in, no one was home, only the family dog. The intruders beat the dog to death and took jewelry and other property from the house.
{¶ 4} “On October 27, 1997, appellant was indicted for burglary, a third degree felony. Following arraignment, appellant was released on his own recognizance. Shortly thereafter, appellant and one of his accomplices fled the jurisdiction, intending to go to California. The two traveled as far as New Mexico where they were arrested after an incident in which they kidnapped two people at gunpoint.
{¶ 5} “In New Mexico, appellant was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and false imprisonment. He served one year on those charges before he was returned to Ohio to face his original burglary charge and an additional felony indictment for violating a release on own recognizance.”
{¶ 6} Appellant pled guilty to both charges and was sentenced to five years for each count. The terms were ordered to run consecutively for a total term of ten years incarceration.
{¶ 7} On May 17, 2005, over six years after he entered his guilty pleas, appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a motion requesting appointed counsel. The trial court denied both motions, each by separate judgment entry. As to the motion to withdraw his plea, the court found that the motion was actually an untimely motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to
{¶ 8} Appellant timely filed an appeal from both judgment entries. We affirmed the denial of appellant‘s request for appointed counsel in State v. Meadows, 6th Dist. No. L-05-1321, 2006-Ohio-2622; we noted that appellant had not filed a brief or assignments of error challenging the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. Id. at ¶ 12. We granted appellant‘s motion for reconsideration in State v. Meadows, 6th Dist. No. L-051-321, 2006-Ohio-3375, finding that his brief had been misfiled by the clerk in the record. In that decision and later by separate order, we ordered appellee to serve and file its brief in response within the time required by
{¶ 9} Appellant raises two errors for review:
{¶ 10} “The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant‘s Motion to Withdraw his plea pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Criminal Rule 32.1.
{¶ 11} “The trial court Abused its Discretion when it ruled that That [sic] Appellant‘s Motion to withdraw his guilty plea was a Post Conviction [sic].”
{¶ 12} We first address appellant‘s second assignment of error.
{¶ 13} “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.”
{¶ 14} While
The trial court supported its decision to deny appellant‘s motion by citing and applying our decision in State v. Green, 6th Dist. No. S-03-045, 2004-Ohio-3456. In Green, we held that the defendant‘s motion captioned “Motion to Vacate Sentencing Order and Motion for a New Sentence” was actually a motion for post-conviction relief, since it requested enforcement of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. “Where a criminal defendant, subsequent to his or her direct appeal, files a motion seeking vacation or correction of his or her sentence on the basis that his or her constitutional rights have been violated, such a motion is a petition for postconviction relief as defined in
{¶ 15} Citing State v. Bush (2002), 96 Ohio St.3d 235, 2002-Ohio-3993, appellant argues that his motion was improperly converted into a motion for post-conviction relief, and that therefore, the trial court erred in applying the time limit of
{¶ 16} Appellant is correct. In Green, as in Reynolds, the defendant‘s post-sentence motion was converted to a motion for post-conviction relief because it was (1) filed subsequent to the direct appeal, (2) claimed a denial of constitutional rights, (3) sought to render the judgment void, and (4) asked for vacation of the judgment and sentence. Res judicata applies to bar such petitions if the issues raised could have been raised on direct appeal. Reynolds, supra at 161.
{¶ 17} A properly framed motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed entirely by
{¶ 18} “The Reynolds syllabus must be read in the context of the facts of that case. When we decided Reynolds, our rules provided that `[t]he syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion states the controlling point or points of law decided in and necessarily arising from the facts of the specific case before the Court for adjudication.’ Former S.Ct.R.Rep.Op. 1(B), 3 Ohio St.3d xxi. Thus, when read in context, the rule of Reynolds reaches only a motion such as the one in that case — a `Motion to Correct or Vacate Sentence’ — that fails to delineate specifically whether it is a postconviction release petition or a
{¶ 19} Therefore, we correctly applied Reynolds in Green. Here, appellant‘s motion was unambiguously captioned “Request to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant to Ohio Revise [sic] Code Criminal Rule 32.1.” Therefore, Reynolds did not apply, and the trial court should not have treated appellant‘s motion as a motion for post-conviction relief under
{¶ 20} A delay between sentencing and the filing of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, however, while not dispositive, contributes to the motion‘s merits. “Although the rule itself [
{¶ 21} Appellant attempts to explain the delay and supports his motion by alleging an insufficiency in his indictment, citing our decision in State v. Kelly (Feb. 2, 2001), 6th Dist. No. L-99-1405. In Kelley, the defendant was charged with failing to appear, a violation of
{¶ 22} Unlike a plea of no contest, which is “an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment,” a plea of guilty is “a complete admission of the defendant‘s guilt.”
{¶ 23}
{¶ 24} The trial court found Kelley dispositive, and instead applied our decision in State v. McKenzie (Sept. 18, 1998), 6th Dist. No. E-97-040. In McKenzie, we held that although an indictment omits the culpable mental state as a necessary element of the offense, the numerical designation of the statute allegedly violated was sufficient because the statute set forth only one culpable mental state. Here, as in McKenzie, appellant‘s indictment did not contain a culpable mental state as an element of the offense, but it did cite the numerical code sections to which appellant pled guilty.
{¶ 25}
{¶ 26} “Q. * * * You were to have appeared in court on November the 19th of 1997; is that correct?
{¶ 27} “A. Yes, your Honor.
{¶ 28} “Q. And you did not?
{¶ 29} “A. No.
{¶ 30} “Q. Why?
{¶ 31} “A. Because I left.
{¶ 32} “Q. You fled the state?
{¶ 33} “A. Yeah.
{¶ 34} “Q. You went — you were heading out to California?
{¶ 35} “A. That‘s right.
{¶ 36} “Q. That is when you committed certain felonies in the State of New Mexico; is that correct?
{¶ 37} “A. Yes, your Honor.
{¶ 38} “Q. You knew you had violated the terms of the court‘s bond; is that correct?
{¶ 39} “A. Yes, your Honor.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 40} Appellant thus pled guilty to each element of the offense, and additionally admitted to knowingly committing the offense. He has not, therefore, demonstrated a manifest injustice as required by
{¶ 41} The trial court did not err in finding Kelley dispositive, and finding McKenzie applicable. Accordingly, appellant‘s first assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 42} The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Handwork, J., Pietrykowski, J., Skow, J. Concur.