State v. McQueenState v. McQueen
This is an аppeal by the state from an order granting appellees’ motions to dismiss.
The appellees were previously charged with vаrious offenses under the drug trafficking statute. These charges were instigated as the direct result of a narcotics investigation implemented through the use of a confidential informant, Robert Bennett. Bennett had been previously arrested and charged with trafficking in cocainе and methaqualone. He was found guilty and sentenced to sixty years in prison with a twenty-year mandatory minimum. He also received a $250,000 fine. Although Bеnnett initially refused to render substantial assistance to the authorities, he experienced a change of heart one and onе-half years later after losing his appeal. Bennett instructed his attorney to inform the authorities that he would be willing to cooperate with them if in fact his sentence would be reduced. After several meetings with the authorities, Bennett was released from prison. Although he was not informed at this time as to what his reward would entail, he was informed that his sentence would be reduced if he cooperated.
Before Bennett‘s release from prison, his attorney provided him with a written
Bennett‘s work with the authorities led to the arrest of the five appellees in the instant case, who were charged with variоus drug trafficking offenses. Because the charges against these individuals were dismissed by the trial court, the state has appealed.
At the hеaring on appellees’ motions to dismiss, appellees challenged their prosecutions on the basis that the substantial assistance rendered by Bennett was unrelated to the criminal activity for which Bennett had been previously charged and convicted. Appellees have no standing to assert such an argument, as it is not their rights which would be adversely affected by failure to enforce the agreement, but rather those of the informant. Additionally, in addressing this very point, the court in State v. Stella, 454 So.2d 780 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), stated the following:
No one has a due process right not to be caught for his criminal conduct merely because the person assisting the police is out of prison when properly he should be behind bars.
At the hearing on appellees’ motions to dismiss, the trial court was urged by appellees to dismiss the charges currently pending on the basis of State v. Glosson, 462 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 1985). In Glosson, there wаs an agreement between the sheriff‘s department and the informant whereby the informant would receive 10% of all civil forfeiture proceedings resulting from the criminal investigations initiated and participated in by him. Additionally, the contingency would be paid out of civil forfeitures received by the sheriff. In order to collect the contingent fee, the informant was required to testify and cooperate in criminal prosecutions resulting from his investigations. The state attorney‘s office was aware of the agreement and even supervised the informаnt‘s investigations. After finding that the agreement deprived the respondents of their right to due process, the trial court dismissed the information.
The district court affirmed the trial court‘s dismissal of the information, holding that “... the respondents had been denied due process because Wilson‘s contingent arrangement seemed to manufacture, rather than detect, crime.” Id., at 1084. The supreme court affirmed the lower court and held that the agreement to pay an informant a contingent fee conditioned on his cooperation and testimony in criminal prosecutions violates constitutional due process.
On appeal, appellees contend that Bennett‘s inducement in having а seventeen and one-half year reduction in sentence as well as the elimination of a $250,000 fine is clearly analogous to the сontingent fee conditioned on cooperation and testimony held to be invalid in Glosson. Glosson, however, is distinguishable from the instant case in more ways than one. In Glosson, the defendants were targeted by
Unlike Glosson, however, appellees in the instant case were targeted by the informant rather than by the stаte. In addition, the operation was not conducted with the use of government controlled contraband. Although the assistant state attorney was involved in the operation, he did not sign the written agreement. Moreover, Bennett was supervised by Metropolitan Bureau of Invеstigation agents. Finally, Bennett was not to receive a percentage of any forfeitures, proceeds or cash. Although he was required to testify, when necessary, there was no agreement that convictions must result from his testimony. His sole inducement in entering into this agreement was that the assistant state attorney would recommend a reduction of sentence to the judge. The reduction of sentencе, however, remained in the discretion of the judge.
Accordingly, the orders of the trial court granting appellees’ motions to dismiss are reversed.
REVERSED.
UPCHURCH, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur.