149 P. 1021 | Or. | 1915
delivered the opinion of the court.
“It was intended [by this provision of the Constitution] to prevent the practice, common in legislative bodies not thus restricted, of embracing in the bill matters having no relation to each other, wholly incongruous, and of which the title gives no notice, thus securing the adoption of measures by fraud. * * A reasonable construction permits the single subject to be comprehensive enough for practical purposes, and great latitude is allowed the legislature in stating the subject in the title. It was not designed to require the body of the bill to be a mere repetition of the title. Neither is it intended to prevent including in the bill such means as are reasonably adapted to secure the object indicated in the title. * * ‘To require that every end and means necessary to the accomplishment of this general object should be provided for by separate*155 act relating to that' alone would not only be senseless, but would render legislation impossible.’ * * If the title cover the object of the act, the degree of particularity with which it shall be expressed or set out is for the legislature to determine. A disregard of this constitutional provision will be fatal, but the departure must be plain and manifest, and all doubts will be resolved in favor of the law. * * If all the provisions of the law relate directly or indirectly to the same subject, are naturally connected, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title, they will not be held unconstitutional as in violation of this clause of the Constitution. * * This clause is not violated by any legislative act having various details properly pertinent and germane to one general object”: Oregon v. Portland General Electric Co., 52 Or. 502 (95 Pac. 722, 98 Pac. 160); 36 Cyc. 1022, and note 99; State v. Brown, 41 La. Ann. 771 (6 South. 638); Miller v. Hurford, 13 Neb. 13 (12 N. W. 832). Therefore exception 2 has no merit.
“We would ask at this time to withdraw from the consideration of the jury all the testimony relative to this colt case and the warrant, for the reason that the witness did not disclose to the defendant that he had a warrant for him upon any other charge, and under the facts and circumstances as disclosed the defendant had a right to believe he was under arrest on this charge. ’ ’
The statements of the defendant to the witness at any time in regard to the mare or his possession of it was competent, but it could not have been prejudicial to him in any case, for the reason that he made no admissions against his interest. He was therefore not prejudiced, and no objection can be raised now on that point.
Exception No. 7 as to when Staats was last in Oregon is of no substantial consequence.
We find no error made upon the trial, and the judgment is affirmed. Affirmed. Rehearing Denied.