2 Blackf. 5 | Ind. | 1826
M'Cory was indictedin the Clark Circuit Court for an assault and battery. Plea, that before the finding of the bill by the grand jury, and before the commencement of the prosecution, the defendánt was arrested by virtue of a warrant from a justice of the peace of said county, on a charge of assault and battery, being a charge of a trivial breach of the peace, and the same charge set forth in the indictment; and being so arrested, he was taken before John Peyton, Esquire, a justice of the peace of said county, and put upon his trial for said charge; and after a full examination of the case, he washy the said justice adjudged not guilty of the offence, and finally acquitted. To which plea the attorney for the state demurred; the demurrer was overruled; and the defendant discharged.
The plaintiff contends that the justice had no jurisdiction of the case. The question of jurisdiction depends on the construe-
It should also be recollected, that this clause in the constitution is expressly intended to guard individuals from oppression, by securing to them a jury trial in all cases where they were to ho punished by a fine exceeding three dollars. It is not intended to guaranty to the community, that every offence should receive an adequate punishment. Under this provision, an individual might object, if the legislature gave a justice of the peace power to fine him more than three dollars; hut the state could not complain if the legislature thus placed, under the jurisdiction of a justice, offences which should he punished by a higher fine than three dollars. We consider that the legislature had'full power to determine, that trivial breaches of the peace were but petit misdemeanors; and to place them, as is done by
The 12th sec. of the 1st art. of the constitution does not reach this case. That section declares, that “no person shall be put to answer any criminal charge but by presentment, indictment, or impeachment.” But it is evident from the fifth section, that the framers of the constitution did not consider a petit misdemeanor to be a criminal charge. It should be further considered, that this section also is intended to guard individuals against oppression; and the character of the act under consideration is the very reverse of oppression. We question whether a single individual has ever been heard to complain, that his constitutional rights have been infringed by placing the determination of an offence, of which he has been charged, within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, instead of giving it to the Circuit Court to be tried by presentment or indictment.
This case must then rest on the construction of the act of assembly. And here it is evident, that the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace is not confined to cases where the fine is fixed, and is never to exceed three dollars. His jurisdiction, unquestionably, embraces a class of cases where three dollars may be an inadequate punishment. Of this characterare assaults, and assaults and batteries. And we have no doubt but that the legislature intended to place those offences within his discretionary jurisdiction; authorizing him to hear and determine them, if
The motion to withdraw the demurrer and reply to the plea, and the refusal of the Court to grant that liberty, are no part •of the record.
The judgment is affirmed.
Vide the next case—Clark v. Ellis—and note(1).