*1 year that in the first Cool Homes would be ORDER improve- on of the value of the taxed 100% On consideration petition for re- ments, gov- nothing deducted for the 24, 1993, hearing, May filed on and the reversionary interest. In the ernment’s response, August filed on 4%, deducted, year second would be and the presented year next No evidence was 8%. IT IS ORDERED: valuing method justifies reversionary interest. Due to error in footnote the recita- dispute Homes does not below, Cool Opinion tion of events No. reversionary Borough may use a method of by P.2d released the clerk of court on begins by “This tax assessment. method 14, 1993, May hereby withdrawn. This valuing property simple at its fee value. having by matter now been settled reduced, discounted, This value is then parties, (corrected) opinion second will representing a factor the restrictions on not be issued. property. The value is further reduced Entered direction of the court at An- pertaining to remove value to the re- chorage, Alaska on November 1993. versionary government interest of straight- the land.” Cool Homes claims a depreciation
line to reduce the initial value salvage
down value at the end of the period
lease does not exclude the value of reversionary pre- interest. Cool Homes straight depreci-
sented evidence that a line salvage
ation over the life of the lease “fundamentally wrong” way
value is a governments reversionary
account for the Borough presented
interest. The no evi-
dence that its method was reasonable. experts
Cool Homes’ testified that the in- approach
come stream was the more sound I method. conclude that Cool Homes’ ar- Alaska, Petitioner, STATE persuasive. gument McLAUGHLIN, Respondent.
David L. No. A-4590. Alaska, By acting Through STATE of DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTA Appeals Court of of Alaska. FACILITIES, Ap TION AND PUBLIC pellants, Cross-Appellees, Oct. 1993.
EASTWIND, INC., Appellee,
Cross-Appellant.
No. 4547.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
Nov. MOORE, C.J.,
Before WITZ, BURKE,
RABINO MATTHEWS
COMPTON, JJ. *2 Gen., Atty. H. Hawley, Asst. Of-
William Appeals, Special fice of and Prosecutions Cole, Anchorage, Atty. Charles E. and Gen., Juneau, petitioner. for Robson, Office, Lyle Arthur Law Robson Fairbanks, respondent. Holland,
Marcia E. Asst. Public Defend- Salemi, Fairbanks, er, B. Public John Defender, Anchorage, as amicus curiae. C.J., BRYNER, Before and COATS MANNHEIMER, JJ.
OPINION BRYNER, Judge. Chief
INTRODUCTION L. David was weapons involving state with misconduct of former AS degree the first violation 11.61.200(a)(1)1 possession of conceala- — previously convicted felon. firearm a ble for a McLaughlin’s case was scheduled Judge Jay Superior jury trial before trial, McLaugh- Hodges.' At the outset of such, 11.61.200(f). enacted, it was the originally As AS As AS 11.61.200defined Former involving involving weapons of misconduct offense of in the most serious form misconduct existing. weapons degree; then After first the offense was class C willingness pellate lin indicated his to concede that generally agreed courts have he had been convicted of a felo- the trial court has broad discretion to limit ny. the amount of evidence allowed on is- regulate sue and to the form in which it is McLaughlin conceded the existence Since *3 presented, particularly when the defendant conviction, Judge Hodges prior found dispute prior does not conviction’sexis- no need for the to consider whether tence.3 previously was a convicted fel- on precise presented and ruled that the would decide issue in review only McLaughlin knowingly pos- whether different, this case is somewhat however: sessed a concealable firearm. Because whether felon-in-posses- the trial court in a McLaughlin’s history appeared prosecution criminal sion may, in reliance on the bearing any remaining have no on issue in willingness defendant’s to concede the exis- dispute, judge prior conviction, further concluded that felony tence of a proof bar McLaughlin’s prior evidence of prior-conviction convictions of the element entirely and would be inadmissible unless it became rel- withdraw the issue jury. from the specific arising during evant to issues review, On argues state that the trial objection, course of trial. Over state’s court authority prosecu- lacked to force the prosecution ordered to re- accept tion to McLaughlin’s concession of a mentioning frain from attempting prior conviction and to bar on this prove McLaughlin’s prior un- convictions Although issue. the state acknowledges less the court first determined them to be disputed evidence was not relevant specific disputed relevant to a issue. any on issue other McLaugh- than the issue petitioned The state this court to prepared review lin was concede—that order; superior granted court’s had been convicted petition parties state’s and directed the felony state contends that —the submit on briefs the merits.2 court had no discretion to rule as it did. 2.Standard Review
DISCUSSION presented by state, As claim 1.Issue Presented pure question law, involves a which is elsewhere, Both Alaska and courts subject to the de standard of novo review. recognized concerning that evidence Langdon Champion, 745 P.2d the number and nature of a (Alaska 1987). defendant’s 1372 n. 2 can pose convictions a serious risk of when introduced a case in 3.Analysis which a conviction is an element of reason, charged. the offense ap- For this No Alaska squarely case has decid charged, legislature Appellate amended AS 11.61. 2. See Alaska Rules 402 and 403. This adding two new and more serious forms of requested court also the Alaska Public Defender involving weapons, misconduct felony one a class A Agency to submit an amicus curiae brief ad- designated that was as misconduct in- dressing the merits of the issue raised volving (AS weapons degree in the first 11.61.- state. 190) and the other a class B that was designated involving weapons as misconduct State, (Alas- 3. See Mead v. 445 P.2d 233-34 (AS degree 11.61.195). the second These addi- 1968); State, ka 794 P.2d 956-57 Weitz required tions redesignated AS 11.61.200 to be amended and App.1990); Elerson v. involving weapons as misconduct (Alaska App.1987); United States v. degree. redesig- in the third In its amended and Dockery, (D.C.Cir.1992). 955 F.2d United form, 11.61.200(a)(1) nated AS continues to Collamore, (1st States v. Cir.1989). F.2d 28-30 McLaughlin’s make the conduct possession a felon in of a conceala- case— punishable ble as a class C firearm — “legitimate moral force of its this case.4 presented issue ed proposition in are not entire evidence”—an unassailable jurisdictions in other Courts unanimous, majority, espous whether but vast the abstract —but rather ly govern ing gained by proving McLaugh- traditional view “moral force” accept pro the accused’s ment need legitimacy lin’s convictions retains element of an off to an posed concession given McLaughlin’s willingness to concede ense,5 judge cannot alto that a trial holds one; point. This close issue its introduc prosecution from gether bar the depends largely resolution on whether necessary element prove a ing evidence to question evidentiary viewed as narrow undisp case, element is even when the involving question relevance or broader policies strictly evidentiary. uted.6 *4 majority urges us to follow the The state standpoint From the evidentia- narrow ruling the trial court’s and to reverse view ry standpoint argued by relevance—the argues The McLaughlin’s case. state McLaughlin strong here—a case can be authority preclude no to the court had that McLaughlin’s made that the evidence of necessary a element proving state from prior properly convictions should be exclud- offense, ruling court’s that of the specific The ed. circumstances of some judicial amend- improper to an amounted might give the cases first-degree weapons miscon- ment of legitimate evi- state reasons to introduce statute, deprived the and that it state duct though even prior dence convictions right to trial. We need consid- of its a willing prior- defendant is concede arguments. of these only er the first cases, In conviction element. most howev- er, prior- once the defendant concedes improper it maintains that is state element, prior con- conviction evidence proving from an prosecution preclude evidentiary no victions would have rele- that, in and asserts element of offense except vance to establish the defendant’s case, “excluding present all evidence commit crimes—an general propensity to [McLaughlin] prior has conviction is a that illegitimate, impermissible, and therefore support In of this contention unfair.” of Evidence purpose under Alaska Rule proposition Wigmore for state cites 404(b)(1). stipulate required to that should not be it admission” of an element of to “colorless good provides illustra- case offense, stipulation such a would since McLaughlin fully unequivocally tion. legitimate unjustifiably deprive it “of the that his conceded IX John H. evidence.” moral [its] force precluded possessing him conceala- (Chadbourn 2591 Wigmore, Evidence § McLaughlin’s conces- firearm. Given ble 1981). rev. sion, inform able to the trial court would be agreed McLaughlin has that jury that view, however, the crucial issue
In our carrying by law from right to he was forbidden state has the not whether the Right Block the Admis- to “Plead Out"Issues and of this court and the 4. A number of decisions Prejudicial pass sion Evidence: Court have commented Alaska Differential arising ing Litigants or on similar issues and the Criminal on this issue Treatment Civil situations, squarely Protection, analogous no has but case Equal Accused as Denial of 40 See, State, e.g., v. Mead 445 P.2d decided it. 341, (hereinafter (1991) Emory "Im- L.J. 353-56 State, 229, (Alaska 1968); v. 794 Weitz 233-34 winkelried”). (Alaska App.1990); v. Elerson P.2d 956-57 State, (Alaska App.1987); Az P.2d 195 732 Collamore, Compare v. United States 868 F.2d State, (Alaska v. 703 P.2d zarella v. (1st Cir.1989), and United States State, App.1985); P.2d Wortham (3d Cir.1979), Williams, 739-40 612 F.2d Morgan (Alaska App.1984); n. 4 1138-39 Davidson, (Minn. with State v. 351 N.W.2d App. n. 1984). 1983). of the traditional view on this 5. For a discussion Imwinkelried, generally issue, J. see Edward
concealable firearm. The state did
evidentiary
not ar-
row issue of
relevance. The
and,
think,
state
gue
and does not contend here
raises
below
ulti-
valid—
mately persuasive
McLaughlin’s
points
criminal record has
out
—concern:
McLaughlin’s
legitimate
has a
evidentiary
except
proof
relevance
right
of all
informed
of the elements
McLaughlin prepared
the element
to con-
of the crime
bear-
Moreover, the trial
cede.
court has ex-
ing
jurors
on those elements so that
will
pressly
open
left the door
to reconsidera-
they
not be misled
being
to think
asked
McLaughlin’s prior
tion should
convictions
possession
to convict
for mere
any disputed
relevant
issue
become
of a firearm.
during
arise
course
trial.
argues
The state
that if
is left
circumstances,
Under these
McLaugh-
impression
inaccurate
wholly superfluous
lin’s
crimes are
prosecuted
for con-
purely evidentiary standpoint:
from a
their
duct that most
surely know to be
only evidentiary relevance
on an
issue
permissible, the jury may
tempted
that has been conceded and therefore re-
nullify
by returning
the law
guilty
a not
quires
proof.
no further
Because of the
verdict,
though
even
convinced that
obvious
this evidence
McLaughlin possessed a concealable fire-
*5
would create as otherwise inadmissible
out,
arm. As the
correctly points
state
proof
general
McLaughlin’s
pro-
of
criminal
many
danger
justi-
courts have cited this
pensity, see Alaska Rule of Evidence
fying
rejection
the
of defense concessions
404(b)(1),
legitimacy
of its “moral
cases.8
may
properly questioned:
force”
prospect
of
certainly
nullification is
prosecu-
defense offers the
[W]hen
legitimate
concern. Two courts have
full, unequivocal
tion a
stipulation of an
nonetheless
concluded
of
ultimate,
fact,
historical
there is an “ut-
nullification can
by appropriate
be avoided
legitimate
ter absence of a
state inter-
jury
Supreme
instructions. The California
justifying
rejection
est”
of the offer.
Court found the nullification argument un-
of
introduction
evidence is a means
persuasive
Hall,
in People
v.
28 Cal.3d
only legitimate
to the end.
purpose
Cal.Rptr.
(1980) (en
167
a —those precluded imagina- traditionally criminal modicum of courts less awareness but a conceding worse, unilaterally ele- far defendants from tion—the instruction could be by Id point recent is well illustrated the 9. The Appeals Ap- reasoning of in of the Minnesota Court Court of decision the Minnesota Carnahan, (Minn. 482 N.W.2d convincing State App.1992). peals insofar as concerns seems Carnahan, appeals court of In the Davidson-type probable a instruc- the effects of specifically the declined to extend Minnesota charged with in the case of a defendant tion Davidson, holding in State Court’s driving plausible, revocation. Far less after 1984), (Minn. the case of a N.W.2d 8 to however, conclusion is the Carnahan court’s driving license after defendant felon-in-possession "no such cases stipulate had offered to that his revocation who problem." Perhaps con- the Carnahan court’s Carnahan, 482 license had been revoked. distinguish clusory unconvincing attempt to and that an The court reasoned N.W.2d felon-in-posses- and between license revocation suggested in similar to one instruction pragmatic explained terms: cases can be in sion driving in a after li- would futile Davidson Davidson, follow the Minnesota reluctant revocation case: cense obviously Appeals constrained to was [T]elling defendant admitted he distinguish ground find some colorable suggests nothing not entitled drive ... was Supreme Court’s decision. Minnesota license; on a revoked different than evidence event, any drawn in Carna- the distinction In necessarily equivalent its are or revocation colorable; hardly we fail to more than han problem implied by No such the instruction. difference between realistic discern Davidson, the Davidson involved in since Davidson-type instruction probable effects legal- could that the defendant not instruction driving and in the context of imply pistol con- ly possess did after revocation cases. viction. A prosecutor’s power meats offenses.10 different rule has But the go does arena, applied in in untempered. political civil cases: the civil Our tradition holds permitted party-defendant commonly liberty high regard to individual in and teach- healthy es the public skepticism concede the existence of an element of the need claim; plaintiffs government power. toward Bill concession removes Rights dispute, United the element from obviates the States Constitution’s need system elaborate of checks litigation, for its active and allows and balances submis- exemplify these values. In the arena of sion of case to finder of fact—be it justice, always criminal our laws have rec- or evidence on the is- —without ognized power imbalance At between sue.11 least one commentator has at- the government and the individual. The explain disparate tempted treatment right grand to indictment jury, the of concessions in civil and criminal cases as trial, guarantee public privilege expla- historical accident.12 We think this self-incrimination, against presumption questionable. nation innocence, proof beyond burden of pit private parties cases tend to Civil doubt, right reasonable of confronta- against against one or gov- another various tion, the right process compulsory agencies equal ernment on relatively foot- procedural are all holding devices aimed at ing: disputes in most property, over mon- disproportionate government power affairs, like, ey, domestic what one check. may party compel demand or of another— right to a plays trial likewise procedurally or substantively other —the integral part this balance. The may generally compel or demand return. historical role in justice sys- our criminal contrast, In pit criminal cases the individ- tem is more than fact finder: the against government ual on terms that always has as the served vehicle of unequal. inherently govern- When the community conscience the courtroom— charges crime, ment an individual awith public skepticism mechanism which power favor, clearly balance brought against power bear of the scope government’s power and the is public prosecutor: unique power enormous. The of public Our guarantees constitution the accused *7 prosecution empowers government the right the of a by jury peers, trial a of his bring against bear individuals the full primarily in order to ensure the ac- authority of its representative judged by prevailing cused is community good. the At common stake is the individu- Judge stated, As mores. Learned Hand liberty, respective al defendant’s not the jury the institution of the “introduces a legal rights opposing litigants. Upon a law, slack the into enforcement of tem- charge wrongdoing, govern- formal rigor pering its mollifying influ- compel ment can the defendant’s arrest and ence of current ethical conventions.” trial; pending upon conviction, detention the defendant can be pro- incarcerated for Gilliam, United v. States F.2d periods longed (2d Cir.1993) time. The defendant en- (quoting United States ex rel. joys reciprocal right no gov- Adams, to demand the (2d McCann v. 126 F.2d liberty prevail. Cir.1942)). ernment’s when it does Imwinkelried, supra against 10. See special note at 353-56. courts set their face admis- longer sions for reasons which no obtain. 11. See id. at 347-53. appears primary Judicial inertia to be the explanation for the continued insistence that says 12. As Imwinkelried on this score: guilt an who accused chooses to contest resort today is an It historical accident that even general guilty plea. to the "invariable" specifically accused an cannot admit truth Id. at 356. allegation an accusatory historical in the law, pleading. early At common the criminal justice beyond are their ability to ful whose rules jury’s Essential to system’s The of jurors is full trust. distrust will role its understand fill its traditional eventually upon mirror back the court in wrongdoing ing at issue—the of the cause public suspicion. the form of held Citizens has been for the accused which Gilliam, upon jurors bring called to serve as will In answer. United States them, healthy skepticism argu with not a rejected the toward F.2d the court power, a felon-in-posses prosecutor’s but subversive that a defendant in ment process legal of the distrust itself.13 have been allowed to with sion case should prior felony issue of convictions draw the statutory definition of the concession, by unilateral jury from the any given case crime is relevant significant “a difference ... be finding jury. This information for holds true limit a rule formulated to the admis tween regardless of elements of which the crime potentially prejudicial sibility of evidence actually disputed, knowing for without and a rule that eliminates element charges, jury nature of the true is legislated by Congress.” The Gil crime deprived of context its consideration of the roots this differ liam court traced actually dispute.14 issues When representative jury’s ence to the role as legitimate there to make defen is cause community’s conscience: dant’s neces knowledge full of the nature of Without sary element of a crime—and no one dis crime, speak cannot for the putes proposition this as to the crime of authority. If people or exert their an being felon-in-possession of a concealable crime is element conceded surely legitimate firearm —then there is away jury’s from the consider- stripped apprise element, reason to of this ation, no become more than proof. and to allow its why must factfinders. know juries system regularly Our entrusts defendant, acquitting convicting or evidence; unpleasant, shocking, often judicial how simply because that is our regularly juries will use trust system designed to work. proper purpose, for its without evidence Barker, Id. at 101. United States Cf swayed potential to prej- cause Cir.1993). (9th F.3d nothing to the accused. There is udice this, provided transcending improper issue one undesirable guilt actually necessary. In or innocence in that the evidence ability determine view, informing implicates pub- our of the ele- individual case. It system justice. necessary, an offense is and the lic’s our of criminal ments of trust prove necessary inner sanctum of the crimi- of evidence If those admission improper nor un- justice system judge, prosecu- nal those elements is neither —the tor, find little to distrust defense counsel—cloister to them- desirable. We basis *8 prose- jury’s ability proper to make use of the true nature of criminal selves evidence, cution, when that evi- inevitably manipu- necessary even jurors will sense participants game previous wrongdoing they that are in a dence reveals lation: 467, California, Bouzas, Cal.Rptr. experience People v. 53 Cal.3d 279 of where Witness 13. 847, (1991) (describing the decision of the California in the man- P.2d 1076 807 Hall, 143, 844, Cal.Rptr. People v. 28 Cal.3d 167 People abrogated). ner which v. Hall was See in 826, 851, (1980) (en banc), P.2d 833 which 616 Valentine, People v. Cal.3d 228 Cal. also 42 approved unilateral concessions convic- (1986). Rptr. P.2d 916 cases, abrogated felon-in-possession tions in was years by public amending two later initiative State, (Alas- Dulier v. 511 P.2d Cf. require California's constitution be State, 1973); 1042- ka 488 P.2d McKee any open prior felony court of informed 1971). (Alaska is an whose existence charged. element offense Const, I, (f); art. subd. § See Cal. conviction, accused.15 risk that the would be
unfairly prejudiced against McLaughlin is State, substantial. See Oxereok v. CONCLUSION (Alaska 1980). P.2d 913 If we look this strictly matter, evidentiary issue as an superior We conclude that court clear Judge Hodges seems that prop- could barring presenting erred in the state from erly determine that the evidence of McLaughlin’s prove previous evidence to McLaughlin’s prior conviction had little felony. conviction of a probative value and that admission superior is court’s order RE- evidence had a substantial of unfair VERSED. prejudice McLaughlin. A.R.E. 403. The majority evidentiary point. concedes the J., COATS, dissents. However, majority persuaded is by argument right state’s that the jury has a COATS, Judge, dissenting. to be informed all of the elements of the charged, crime so jurors that the will not I dissent from the court’s decision that be thinking they misled into Judge Hodges did have discretion to McLaughlin asked to convict pos- for mere remove consideration evi- session a firearm. argues The state previously dence that had been that if the is left with the inaccurate McLaughlin fully convicted impression McLaughlin being prose- unequivocally conceded his con- cuted conduct that most will viction. The state has never contended permissible, jury may know is tempt- McLaughlin’s prior the evidence of nullify ed to returning law a not felony conviction pur- was relevant for guilty though verdict even convinced that pose than other as of an element of McLaughlin possessed a concealable fire- the offense which has con- arm. Furthermore, Judge Hodges ceded. ex- pressly open left reconsideration of admit- It not necessary allow state to ting McLaughlin’s prior the evidence of prove every element every offense with proved if this evidence relevant which a charged. defendant is The majori- during issue that disputed became ty recognizes opinion by pointing this out circumstances, trial. Under these that the decision case apply does not McLaughlin’s prior felony conviction had to offenses such as we discussed in Mor- evidentiary no relevance. gan State, (Alas- 661 P.2d 1103-04 hand,
On the other if ka presents App.1983). Morgan the state McLaughlin’s felony bootlegging evidence to sale in a of alcohol —unlicensed course, indicated, already unlawful; already 15. Of independently duct that is cases, prior-conviction trial court vested with broad discretion to such element serves regulate scope crimes evidence and only to enhance seriousness of the offense. admitted, See, the form in which it will order e.g., Morgan v. 1103- unnecessary prejudice. to avoid When exis- (unlicensed App.1983) sale alcohol qualifying prior felony tence of a unequivocally conviction is area, option normally in a local a class A misde- conceded meanor, becomes class C when the case, fact, unembellished, evidence of that will defendant has been convicted of a normally necessary be all to allow the offense). similar *9 prove state to this element the offense. case, type failing In this latter to inform the jury prior-conviction arguably of the element We further note that our decision addresses problems presented case, entails few of the only in the specific the circumstances this in case; type consequently, strong charged a former argument which the offense consists of conduct lawful, ordinarily might significantly be made for that is is a which rendered un- only range prior lawful because of the broader of trial court See defendant's discretion. contrast, State, By types (Alaska a conviction of other v. 703 P.2d 1188 Azzarella App.1985). prior of crimes that the a require include existence of facts of this case do not felony conviction an element as deal with con- us decide to the issue.
1279
previously-
possession
had
of a concealable firearm is not
option
Morgan
area.
local
all
criminal under
circumstances.
of this offense. Under
convicted
been
statute,
subject
was
to
bootlegging
Morgan
Id.,
Cal.Rptr.
167
at
28 Cal.3d
616
felony if
a class
the state
for
C
conviction
omitted).2
(footnote
P.2d at 832
1) Morgan
that
com-
proved two elements':
2)
bootlegging, and
that
mitted the crime of
jury
The trial court can instruct the
that
this
had
been convicted of
he
charged
possessing a
was
offense.
law prohibit-
concealable firearm when the
doing so,
expressly
ed him from
that he
willing
was
to
Assuming
Morgan
that
agreed
prohibited
law
that the
him from
prior
convic-
concede the existence
possessing a concealable firearm at the
tion,
had no other
prior
and the
conviction
offense,
alleged
time of the
that
than
evidentiary relevance other
to estab-
required
accept
agreement
to
this
jury
offense,
element of
lish
second
speculating
without
about the reasons that
inform
reason to
there seems to be little
possess
it is unlawful for
if
jury
prior
the defen-
of this
offense
firearm. The state
concealable
seems
willing
stipulate.
Evidence of
dant
such an
not
contend that
instruction would
offense
conviction for the similar
prejudice
the potential
cure
that
danger
unfair
would have a substantial
knowing
jury
arise from the
the reason
It
prejudice to the defendant.
would there-
possess
why McLaughlin could not
a fire-
proper
judge
trial
to deter-
fore be
However,
consistently
has
arm.
state
trial
focus
mine that the defendant’s
should
argued in
cases and
dispute:
whether the
only on the matter
has
prejudicial
other cases where
material
bootleg-
crime of
defendant committed the
presented
jury,
limiting
to a
that
in-
been
ging.
adequately protect defendants
structions
against prejudice arising from
analysis ap-
It seems to me that similar
frequently
We
ac-
prior conviction.
fact of
plies
case. The
cepted
position
that the trial
can
McLaughlin’s prior
is not in dis-
conviction
that a curative instruction will
determine
pute.
It is therefore irrelevant. Proof
which
limit
risk of unfair
poses
conviction
substantial
potentially prejudicial
materi-
results
only
prejudice.
of unfair
dis-
State,
794 P.2d
956
al. See Weitz
fact
in the
boot-
tinction is the
that
P.2d
App.1990); Roth v.
bootlegging
legging example,
is a crime
(Alaska App.1981).
weapon
possession
concealable
jury
fears
nullifi-
not.
state therefore
accept
position
Similarly, we should
However,
Supreme
cation.
expect
a trial
follow
that we can
Supreme
Court of Cali-
Minnesota and
instruction,
explains to
which
trial court’s
argu-
found the nullification
fornia have
agreed
has
the defendant
unpersuasive.
State v. David-
ment
possessing a
prevented
law from
he
(Minn.1984);
son,
People
also
trial court faces a dilemma. See Wortham App.1984). required
If court is allow the state to
inform the defendant’s the felon-in-possession conviction on
charge, danger faces defendant
having jury prejudiced by this evidence. argu- strong defendant would have a
ment that the court must sever the two
charges, resulting Allowing in two trials. stipulate
the defendant to to the existence conviction, prior felony thus remov- HARRISON, Appellant, Michael ing prior felony the evidence of the convic- consideration, from tion limits could and allow the state to Alaska, Appellee. STATE against proceed the defendant in one trial. No. A-4338. beings. Jurors are human As human beings, they passions prejudices. and of Appeals of Alaska. this, recognized frequent- The law has Oct. ly jurors acts to screen which facts passion tend to prejudice, arouse or
make harder for a fair to reach
verdict. The has allowed trial law weigh exercise discretion to
probative against value of evidence that the un- evidence arouse passion prejudice.
fair has law
recognized limiting the evidence at
trial to relevant evidence makes it easier notes (1980) ("Possession Marshall weapon a concealable 422, 447, 843, 857, 459 U.S. S.Ct. 74 L.Ed.2d per illegal; jury se if the is not allowed to (Blackmun, J., (1983) dissenting)). picture, jurors may see the whole be baffled at guilt finding asked determine on a See, Collamore, e.g., United States v. 868 F.2d possession may they where be well aware that ("Doubt criminality at 28 as to the defen- [the offense.”). possession mere may jury conduct dant's] influence the when it element.”); possession People considers for it would amount to little more than an potential believe that In this case we open speculation. for The de- clearly outweighed invitation for unfair relevance, imagination hardly could any, if mons of be lulled evidence by court should bland admonishments to refrain from other issues. The had to issue; awakened, and speculating motion on the once granted the defendant’s jury to instructed the demons would free to roam should have those stipulated had landscape Apart defendant dimension. effect that boundless he not entitled distracting Minnesota law was the facts under from from pistol issue, and that therefore the possess speculation pose of this sort would to the jury should direct attention pernicious the far more risk that or not the state had of whether might issue guilt decide on inaccurate as- based beyond a reasonable doubt established sumptions about the reasons behind the possessed pistol, actu- he either prohibition against posses- the defendant’s constructively. ally or sion a firearm. view, however, jury instructions In our Compared prospect inevitable and, fact, problem, cannot cure the jury speculation, uncontrolled alterna- purely practical it. As exacerbate informing ele- tive of of the true matter, highly questionable think charged crime and of the bare ments of the purpose can be served whether useful fact and unadorned that the defendant has precluding convicted of a been instructing that the defendant if to us the evil. But even we seems lesser law, some reason prohibited speculation assume that could be controlled disclosed, possessing a that cannot be instruction, hiding through proper the true firearm. elements of the offense from the