128 Minn. 163 | Minn. | 1915
Lead Opinion
In February, 1913, defendant was convicted of the crime of arson. He is now serving the sentence imposed. The appeal is from the order denying a new trial, and involves but one assignment of error, namely, that the verdict of guilty is not justified by the evidence.
At about 11 o’clock on the night of July 6, 191Í, fire was discovered in a barn on the farm of Adna Pettis, located 2\ miles southeast of St. Peter, Minnesota. About one year thereafter defendant was indicted on the charge that he set the fire. The following facts give a setting to the case: Less than a year prior to July 6, 1911, defendant drifted into the farming community near St. Peter. He was about 35 years of age. He worked for and paid court to a widow upwards of 82 years old, who lived upon and owned a 40-acre farm, nearly a mile west of Pettis’ barn in a direct line. This widow was the mother of Mrs. Pettis. Mr. Pettis was not then living with his wife. Mr. Pettis opposed defendant’s intended marriage, how vig-| orously does not appear. Another married daughter of the old lady, a Mrs. Deubler, with her two grown children, a son and daughter
Pettis’ barn was but a few feet from a much traveled road. It had wide doors opening thereon, so that loads could be driven right in on the floor. One load of hay had been driven in, and the fire was first discovered about 11 o’clock in this hay by a person passing on a bicycle, and the alarm given. Mrs. Deubler and her daughter
One Swenson, a hotel keeper at St. Peter, testified that in the latter part of June, 1913, he met defendant, who accounted for his dressed-up appearance by stating that he was just married. The two struck up a gossipy conversation, wherein Swenson asked defendant if he knew Adna Pettis, reputed to be well fixed. Defendant answered that ho knew him very well, and afterwards in the talk said Pettis’ “wealth might be reduced to a certain extent before long.” That after the fire Swenson again saw defendant across the street in St. Peter, and he came over, on Swenson’s motioning to him. Swenson then spoke thus: “You seems to be wise; that happens what you said.” The defendant answered: “I told you it might happen.” There is also a statement made by defendant, almost a year after the -fire that Adna Pettis was his enemy.
Then there is an alleged admission testified to by Adna Pettis and •his son. It seems that some time in June, 1912, Adna Pettis em
The defendant denied that he left his home on the night of the fire, denied the conversation with Swenson, and also the alleged talk with Kaveny, and absolutely denied all connection with the burning of the barn.
Our statute, section 8462, G-. S. 1913, provides: “A confession of the defendant shall not be sufficient to warrant his conviction without evidence that the'offense charged has been committed.” It would seem that outside of the alleged admissions of defendant there was no evidence that the burning of the bam was the result of the criminal intent of anyone. The law is that in arson cases there must not only be shown that the building burned, but that the fire was wilfully set by someone. Nowhere in the charge was the proposition presented to the jury whether the evidence established the corpus delicti apart from the defendant’s admission or so-called confession.. In fact the only reference thereto is found in this sentence which appears to assume that the destruction of the barn was caused by crime: “Now, gentlemen, it is established here upon the trial that the building of Adna Pettis was burned by someone, or burned, .at least; and the
The state invokes the rule of State v. Nelson, 91 Minn. 143, 97 N. W. 652; State v. Crawford, 96 Minn. 95, 104 N. W. 822, 768) 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 839; and State v. Gardner, 96 Minn. 318, 104 N. W. 971, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 49. In the first óf those cases the present Chief Justice says: “Our examination of the evidence leaves no doubt in óur minds as to their guilt, and we are not in the least hampered by the thought that perhaps they are innocent.” The perusal of the record .in this case creates a grave doubt of defendant’s guilt. It is not. necessary to .point out the particular evidence and
Order reversed and a new trial granted. The warden of the Minnesota State Prison is directed to deliver the defendant to the sheriff of Le Sueur county to be thence taken for such trial.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I dissent.
Apparently, under the statutes of this state, it is possible for a person charged with crime to serve a substantial term in the penitentiary before the question of his guilt or innocence is finally determined, but it is usually so unnecessary for him to do so that when a defendant has served 15 months in the penitentiary this court should scrutinize very closely the record of his conviction before it holds that the jury that found him guilty and the court that sentenced him proceeded without evidence tending reasonably to prove guilt.
In this case the defendant was convicted February 25, 1913. He was sentenced February 27. Execution of the sentence was stayed. A transcript of the evidence was obtained and a motion for a new trial made. This was denied April 29. An appeal therefrom was perfected April 30, 1913. He might have had his appeal determined at any time, under Pule 1 of this court, which provides that appeals taken during term time “may be placed on the calendar by order of the court when an early decision is necessary to the protection of the rights of either party.” The expense of prosecuting this appeal did not stand in his way, for the record had been prepared, and the state guaranteed him “the assistance of counsel in his defense.” Const, art. 1, § 6. But he made no move to bring his appeal on for hearing, either during the April term or during the ensuing October term. In October his bondsmen surrendered him to the custody of the sheriff, and on October 13, 1913, the trial court committed him to the penitentiary. He did not move even then. The appeal was not placed on the calendar of this court until April, 1914. Even then it was continued to the October, 1914, term, at the defendant’s