STATE of Maine v. Brent L. McKEEN
2009 ME 87
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Aug. 11, 2009
977 A.2d 382
[110] Section 3864(5)(D)‘s explicit requirement that counsel be provided in involuntary commitment proceedings is grounded on sound public policy. As the District Court articulated in denying Penelope‘s request to represent herself, involuntary commitment hearings inevitably involve substantial questions regarding the mental status of the person who is the subject of the application. Permitting such persons to proceed without the benefit of an attorney runs the risk of giving those who may be incompetent the task of proving their own competence. That risk does not become any less substantial on appeal, where the questions surrounding the person‘s mental state have already been adjudicated in a judgment finding the person mentally ill.
[111] Although Penelope had the assistance of counsel at her hearing before the District Court, she did not have that assistance in her appeals before the Superior Court and this Court. Because section 3864 explicitly requires that counsel be provided in involuntary commitment proceedings, we vacate the Superior Court‘s dismissal of her appeal and remand for proceedings in which Penelope has the assistance of counsel.
The entry is:
Judgment of dismissal of the Superior Court vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Argued: Jan. 13, 2009.
Decided: Aug. 11, 2009.
Alan F. Harding, Esq. (orally), Hardings Law Office, Presque Isle, ME, for Brent McKeen.
Zachary L. Heiden, Esq., Maine Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Portland, ME, for amicus curiae Maine Civil Liberties Union Foundation.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ.
Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, and LEVY, JJ.
Dissent: SILVER, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ.
CLIFFORD J.
[¶1] The State of Maine appeals from the order of the Superior Court (Aroostook County, Hunter, J.) granting Brent L. McKeen‘s motion to suppress all of the evidence in the operating under the influence case brought against him. Because we agree with the State that the Superior Court erred when it determined that
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Game Warden Joshua Smith testified as follows at the hearing on McKeen‘s motion to suppress. At approximately midnight on August 12, 2007, Warden Smith and a Maine State Trooper
[¶3] Smith approached the ATV and asked McKeen to furnish his certificate of registration. As McKeen searched for his registration, Smith observed that McKeen‘s movements were slow, his speech was slurred, his eyes were bloodshot, and his breath smelled of alcohol. Smith also noticed a beer can in one of the compartments that McKeen had opened. After McKeen performed field sobriety tests, Smith arrested McKeen and ultimately charged him with operating an ATV while under the influence (Class D),
[¶4] McKeen moved to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the search and seizure. The Superior Court held a hearing, and ultimately granted McKeen‘s motion to suppress on the grounds that the warden‘s stop was constitutionally unreasonable and violated McKeen‘s Fourth Amendment rights. Pursuant to
II. DISCUSSION
[¶5] The parties agree that
[¶6] Pursuant to
Stop and examine any all-terrain vehicle to ascertain whether it is being operated in compliance with chapter 939 or any other provision of this Part regulating ATVs, demand and inspect the operator‘s certificate of registration and, when appropriate, demand and inspect evidence that the operator has satisfactorily completed a training course as required by section 13152.3
[¶7] The Legislature authorized ATV stops, such as the one that occurred here, based on its finding expressed in the statute that “activities associated with ATVs constitute a more intrusive use of private property open to recreational use by the public than do other recreational activities, and that abusive uses of ATVS puts access to private property for recre-
[¶8] As the Legislature has found, ATV use—or misuse—puts such access to private land at risk. If private landowners lack confidence in the State‘s efforts to protect their land, they will prohibit the public‘s access to it. Section 10353(2)(G) is vital to the State‘s efforts, and thus to the sustainability of our recreation industry, because it allows wardens to stop ATVs with or without reasonable articulable suspicion in order to assure that they are being operated in accordance with the laws of the State.
[¶9] McKeen argues that section 10353(2)(G) is unnecessary to ensure compliance with the laws regulating the operation of ATVs. McKeen contends that a warden does not have to actually stop an ATV to confirm that it is properly registered because the “highly-visable, large registration stickers” are sufficient for a warden to ascertain whether the ATV is properly registered.
[¶10] Consistent with the legislative finding that ATV use intrudes on private property and puts the recreational use of private property at risk, ATVs are subject to a myriad of regulations, which are currently codified at
[¶11] For example, children as young as nine years old can operate ATVs, but only if they complete a proper training program.
[¶12] Other safety regulations that would be difficult or impossible to check without actually stopping the ATV include the requirement that operators younger than eighteen years old wear protective headgear,
[¶13] Moreover, the difficulty in preventing ATV operators from damaging private property is compounded by the great utility of ATVs. Standard motor vehicles and trucks, whose use is limited—both legally and practically—to roads and highways, are subject to supervision by local, county, and State law enforcement officers. In contrast, ATVs are operated—legally and practically—off road, on land throughout the State, and the regulation of ATVs across a wider expanse of area is primarily left to a limited number of wardens. Provisions allowing wardens to stop watercraft,
[¶14] The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that there are circumstances in which the Fourth Amendment protections may be limited. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). Often, these circumstances involve stops by wardens and others who are charged with promoting safety and protecting natural resources. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (clarifying that restrictions on motor vehicle stops as set out in Prouse do not cast any “constitutional shadow upon the necessarily somewhat individualized and perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens in the performance of their duties“).
[¶15] We, along with courts in other states, have also recognized the limitations of the Fourth Amendment‘s reach regarding wardens and other officers whose duties include patrolling and protecting vast territories, such as waterways and wooded areas. See, e.g., State v. Giles, 669 A.2d 192, 193 (Me. 1996) (noting the “special exigencies of sea travel” in upholding the routine stop of a boat without articulable suspicion); State v. Sherburne, 571 A.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Me. 1990) (upholding the use of road blocks by game wardens to enforce fishing laws due to the State‘s substantial interest in protecting natural resources); see also State v. Layton, 196 Ill.App.3d 78, 142 Ill.Dec. 539, 552 N.E.2d 1280, 1287 (1990) (stating that “[t]he roving conservation officer patrol stopping hunters, encountered in the field . . . does not violate the fourth amendment” because hunters are deemed to have consented to some intrusions when they get a hunting license or hunt without one); State v. Boyer, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771, 775 (2002) (holding that “a game warden may request production of a valid hunting or fishing license when the circumstances reasonably indicate that an individual has been engaged in those activities“).
[¶16] In the cases cited above, courts have articulated the need to preserve natural resources so that generations to come can enjoy these resources. Section 10353(2)(G) aims to preserve one type of these valuable resources—the thousands of acres of land in Maine owned by private individuals but available for recreational use by the public. Because ATVs are designed, regulated, and primarily used for off-road recreation, and given the State‘s legitimate and substantial interest in its natural resources and the safety of all involved, operators like McKeen have a limited expectation of privacy, even though some operators may use ATVs as a mode of transportation. The intrusiveness of the stops authorized by section 10353(2)(G) is minimal when compared with the State‘s legitimate and substantial interests in regulating ATVs. McKeen has not met his burden to demonstrate the statute‘s uncon-
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for entry of an order denying McKeen‘s motion to suppress, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SILVER, J., with whom MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ., join, dissenting.
[¶17] The Court today infringes on the liberties of Maine citizens by allowing unconstitutional stops of ATVs, which the Legislature itself no longer finds appropriate. The Legislature‘s recent amendment to
[¶18] The Court‘s holding is based significantly on private property risks, yet it fails to recognize that McKeen was stopped at the intersection of an established ATV trail and a public highway. Furthermore, I believe any safety concerns associated with ATVs may be addressed in a far less intrusive manner than by allowing wardens to stop ATV drivers without any suspicion that a violation of the law is taking place. For these and the following reasons, I dissent.
[¶19] To determine the constitutionality of section 10353(2)(G), the State‘s inter-ests must be balanced with the intrusiveness of its conduct. See State v. Ullring, 1999 ME 183, ¶ 21, 741 A.2d 1065, 1071; State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472, 475 (Me. 1996). The Fourth Amendment requires searches and seizures to be reasonable. “A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Although suspicion is not an indispensable component of reasonableness, the United States Supreme Court has “recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. For example, the Court has permitted searches where highly regulated industries are involved and when necessary for administrative purposes. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (upholding a warrantless search of a junkyard where stolen vehicles were found); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (holding that, once in a building to stop a fire, firefighters did not need a warrant to remain in the building for a reasonable amount of time after extinguishing the fire to investigate how it started).
[¶20] The Supreme Court has also upheld suspicionless searches in circumstances where there are special needs beyond general law enforcement. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. Specifically, the Court has permitted highway checkpoints constructed for the purposes of combating drunk driving and intercepting illegal immigrants. Mich. Dep‘t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In addition, the Court has suggested that a roadblock for the purpose of verifying licenses and
at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver‘s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. Pursuant to section 10353(2)(G), however, wardens may stop ATVs without any suspicion at all, and they have unbridled discretion to stop certain ATVs and disregard others.
[¶21] The majority reasons that Prouse and other Supreme Court case law do not apply here because drivers of ATVs do not merit the same Fourth Amendment protection as drivers of automobiles. Likewise, the State argues that while the Supreme Court recognizes an automobile to be “a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to and from one‘s home, workplace, and leisure activities,” Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662, ATVs are in a separate and distinct category. The State likens an ATV to a toy and contends that an individual choosing to operate that toy has limited liberty interests when compared to the legitimate and compelling State interests associated with ATVs.
[¶22] To substantiate its purported compelling interests, the State relies on legislative findings, which state that “activities associated with ATVs constitute a more intrusive use of private property open to recreational use by the public than do other recreational activities, and that abusive uses of ATVs puts access to private property for recreational use at risk.”
[¶23] I address the alleged safety concerns and private property risks respectively. First, the Legislature‘s findings, as explicitly stated in section 13156-A, relate only to private property risks, not safety concerns. In fact, the Maine Department of Conservation and the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife had reported to the Legislature, just prior to the statute‘s enactment, a significant decrease in the number of ATV accidents in Maine (from 239 in 1985 to 120 in 1987), and the two departments asserted that “[e]xisting statutes seem[ed] generally adequate to address issues related to safety. . . .” Me. Dep‘t of Conservation & Me. Dep‘t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, Report and Recommendations on Maine‘s All-Terrain Vehicles (Jan. 1989). There was no legislative debate concerning the statute, nor any other reports present in the legislative record. Furthermore, as I discuss below, the safety concerns associated with ATVs can be addressed in a less intrusive manner.
[¶24] Second, with respect to the Legislature‘s concerns regarding private property, the State does not elaborate on how spot-checking the registration papers of random ATV drivers would serve to alleviate the alleged risks that the use of ATVs poses on private property. The State‘s argument is even less persuasive in a case such as this one, where the spot-checking
[¶25] In addition, it is reasonable to assume that many individuals use ATVs just as they would automobiles: as their “mode of transportation to and from [their] home . . . and leisure activities,” see Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662, bringing about the same expectation of privacy as one would have in an automobile. An individual does not relinquish his expectation of privacy or his constitutional rights simply because he is behind the wheel of an ATV rather than a car or truck. There must be a state interest that sufficiently justifies the intrusion.
[¶26] The majority points to case law in Montana and Illinois upholding the constitutionality of stops made solely for the purpose of verifying fishing and hunting licenses, and it contends that such stops are justified to protect our natural resources. Indeed, Maine has a statute aimed at “protect[ing] fish and wildlife.”
[¶27] The Court compares ATVs to boats, pointing to Giles, 669 A.2d at 193, in which this Court upheld the suspicionless stop by the Coast Guard of a boat in Boothbay Harbor due in part to the “special exigencies of sea travel.” Similarly, the State contends that section 10353(2)(G) is no different than a federal law upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. Hilton, 619 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1980). The federal statute at issue in Hilton allows the Coast Guard to board any vessel at any time to examine its papers and documents, and to search the vessel and ask questions of those on board. 619 F.2d at 130-31. I disagree with the analogy of ATVs to boats.
[¶28] The government interests underlying the suspicionless stops of boats on the ocean differ from those at issue here. The government has a significant interest in being able to identify vessels off its coasts in part because unregistered or unsafe ships could constitute international hazards. Id. at 131-32. In addition, central to the First Circuit‘s holding in Hilton are “the unique circumstances existing on the high seas, the long history of regulatory stops and inspections of ocean-going vessels, the heavy overlay of maritime and international law, [and] the concern of the nation for policing its ocean borders,” among other things. Id. at 132. In Giles, we distinguished vehicles on our nation‘s roads from vessels that have access to the open ocean. 669 A.2d at 193. We noted the “special exigencies of sea travel” and the “historical fact that seagoing vessels have always been subject to boarding by government officials.” Id. In a case upholding a similar federal statute, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983), which we relied on in Giles, the United States Supreme Court recognized yet another unique government interest with respect to the high seas: the need to deter and apprehend smugglers.
[¶29] The First Circuit recognized in Hilton that automobile stops differ from vessel stops also because there are limited alternatives available to the government when securing the high seas. 619 F.2d at 133. Certainly, a roadblock, which would
[¶30] In upholding the federal statute in Villamonte-Marquez, the Supreme Court further distinguished vessels from automobile stops, specifically noting that
[t]he system of prescribed outward markings used by States for vehicle registration is also significantly different from the system of external markings on vessels, and the extent and type of documentation required by federal law is a good deal more variable and more complex than are the state vehicle registration laws.
462 U.S. at 593. ATVs in Maine are required to display two highly-visible, large registration stickers on the front and back of the ATV pursuant to
[¶31] Furthermore, the majority concedes that, in most cases, the safety-related requirements of
[¶32] If the vast majority of the State‘s ATV-related safety concerns may
[¶33] Although I recognize that there are differences between ATVs and automobiles, I do not find them to be so vastly dissimilar as to preclude the application of Prouse. In Prouse, the United States Supreme Court recognized that states “have a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed.” 440 U.S. at 658. However, spot checks in which vehicles are stopped only so that their vehicle registration may be verified amount to intrusions upon Fourth Amendment interests that I believe are not justified by the state interests they serve. See id. at 659. Particularly here, where the same goal can be achieved by a warden obtaining an ATV‘s registration number from stickers on the front and back of the vehicle, I would hold that section 10353(2)(G) authorizes searches that are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
SAMUEL W. SILVER
JUSTICE, SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT