212 Mo. 138 | Mo. | 1908
— This cause is in this court by appeal
on the part of the defendant from a judgment of conviction in the Cole Circuit Court, for setting up and keeping gambling tables, and permitting and enticing-others to play thereon. The record in this cause discloses that on the 28th of June, 1907, the prosecuting attorney of Cole county filed in the circuit court of said county an information charging the defendant with setting up and keeping a certain gaming table and gambling device, and that he did then and there feloniously permit and entice divers persons to play at and upon and by means of said gambling device. To this information there was filed a motion to quash, which said motion was by the court sustained and leave was granted the State to file an amended information. Afterwards, on the 30 th day of July, 1907, the prosecuting attorney filed an amended information predicated upon the same state of facts as the first one. To this information the defendant interposed a motion to quash, which motion was by the court sustained and the State given leave to file a second amended information, and afterwards, to-wit, .on the 30th day of July, 1907, the prosecuting attorney filed his second amended information, which was duly verified, and omitting formal parts, was as follows:
“Now come J. Gr. Slate, prosecuting attorney of Cole county, State of Missouri, and in his official ca
To this information there was also filed by the defendant a motion to quash, which was subsequently taken up by the court and overruled. The defendant then presented his application for a continuance, which was by the court overruled, whereupon the defendant was duly arraigned, entered his plea of not guilty and was put upon his trial before a jury.
The evidence upon the part of the State which was developed at the trial tended to prove that J. W. Scott, sheriff of Cole county, in company with J. M. Jobe and W. H. Leslie, visited a gambling room on High street in Jefferson City, about nine o’clock on the night of May 7,1907. In order to gain admittance to said room, the sheriff was compelled to go up a hack stairway, into the building and through one room around into a second room. In said room they found the defendant, McClure and Engelbrecht, and several others. They also found a table, which was seven or eight feet long’ and between four and five feet wide, and a little higher than an ordinary table. This table was covered with a green cover
At the close of the State’s evidence the defendant offered a demurrer and declined to introduce any evidence.
At the close of the evidence the court fully in
OPINION.
The record in this cause discloses the assignment of numerous errors as grounds for the reversal of this judgment., We will give to the complaints of appellant such consideration as in our opinion their importance requires.
I.
The amended information filed on July 30', 1907, upon which the defendant was tried, is in such form as has repeatedly met the approval of this court. [State v. Mathis, 206 Mo. 604; State v. Locket, 188 Mo. l. c. 418; State v. Rosenblatt, 185 Mo. l. c. 120; State v. Holden, 203 Mo. 581.] This being true, the action of the court in overruling the motion to quash the last amended information filed was proper.
II.
The action of the court in denying the application of the defendant for a continuance was not properly preserved in the motion for a new trial. The overruling of such application was not assigned by the defendant as error in such motion, hence that question is not before us for review. [State v. Marshall, 36 Mo. 400; State v. Brannan, 206 Mo. 636.]
Learned counsel for appellant insists that the defendant was tried upon the information filed on the 28th of June, 1907, and in support of that contention directs our attention to instruction number 4, which requires the jury to find that the acts complained of in the information were committed within three years next before the filing of the information herein, to-wit, June 28,1907. It is sufficient to say of that complaint that an examination of the record discloses that the original information was filed on June 28, 1907; it also discloses beyond any question that the defendant was tried upon the amended information filed on July 30, 1907. The one filed on June 28, 1907, and the first amended information filed on July 301, 1907, were both quashed upon the motion of the defendant, whereupon a second amended information was filed on the 30th of July, which was the one upon which the record discloses the defendant was tried. As to the reference in instruction number 4 to the information of June 28, 1907, it was manifestly for the purpose of fixing a time as a basis in directing the jury as to the Statute of Limitations, that is, the original information was filed on June 28, 1907, and the jury were simply required to find that the offense was committed within three years next before the date of the filing of said original information.
IV.
The instructions of the court fully and fairly presented the case to the jury and were in such form as have heretofore in similar cases met the approval of this court. In fact we take it that it is practically conceded that there was no error in the instructions for the reason that learned counsel for appellant did not undertake to point out any error concerning them.
This brings us to the consideration of the earnest insistence of counsel for appellant that the information in this case is insufficient on the ground that it fails to allege that the defendant had been accorded the right of a preliminary examination. Counsel for appellant, with commendable frankness, concedes that that proposition at least to some extent was treated of in the case of State v. Jeffries, 210 Mo. 302, and Ex parte McLaughlin, 210 Mo. 657. In an exceedingly respectful way we are requested to reconsider this proposition, and in obedience to such request we have again given the subject very careful consideration and reviewed all of the authorities to which our attention has been directed. After a full and thorough consideration of this proposition we are unable to see any valid reason for departing from the conclusions indicated in the Jeffries and McLaughlin cases. While we shall not undertake to give expression to our reconsideration of this proposition, it by no means follows that we have not in a very careful way given the subject our most careful thought and attention; hence we must be content with simply repeating our conclusions in the former cases, which were substantially that the fact that the defendant had been accorded the right of a preliminary examination was not jurisdictional and need not be alleged in the information and any failure to accord the defendant the right of a preliminary examination as provided for by statute only went to the regularity of the proceedings which could be taken advantage of by calling the attention of the court to that fact by an appropriate motion and offering proof establishing the fact that he had not been accorded the right of a preliminary examination.
YL
We are now brought to the contention insisted upon by learned counsel for appellant that the court
We have heretofore indicated our views upon the proposition as to the necessity of an allegation in the information that a preliminary examination had been accorded the defendant. We held that such allegation was not essential to the validity of the information; hence if the defendant was in fact not accorded a preliminary examination then the only proper method of preserving that question for review in this court was by offering the proof upon a timely motion to quash for that reason, or upon some other appropriate motion or plea in abatement, bringing the matter to the attention of the court. The mere filing of a motion to quash, or any other motion alleging the fact that the defendant was not accorded a preliminary examination, is not sufficient to preserve such question for consideration before this court. The mere allegation in the motion to quash or in any other appropriate motion alleging the failure to accord the defendant the preliminary examination does not prove itself. It was incumbent upon the defendant to establish the allegations contained in the motion that he was not accorded a preliminary examination. If the trial court refused to hear his proof then he could make an offer of the proof which would establish that fact and properly save his exceptions to the action of the court in refusing to hear the testimony upon that allegation, then under that state of the record the question would properly be before us for review. The record in this cause discloses the mere allegation in the motion to quash that, the defendant was not afforded a preliminary examination; it discloses no proof of such allegation or any offer to make proof of it, or any refusal on the part of the court to hear the proof offered by the defendant to establish
vn.
We are now brought to the consideration of the testimony developed upon the trial of this cause and the law as declared by the court predicated upon such evidence. We have carefully read in detail the evidence as disclosed by the record, and we are unable to find any escape from the conclusion that the evidence was practically all one way in this cause, that is, that it pointed unerringly to the guilt of the defendant of the offense charged. The instructions of the court, which we have carefully considered, presented the law of this case fully and fairly to the jury.
Entertaining the views, to which we have herein given expression, résult in the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.