State v. McGowanState v. McGowan
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
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Bеth A. Tischler, Sandusky County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alexis M. Holtz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Karin L. Coble, for appellant.
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PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} This case is before the court on remand from the Ohio Supreme Court.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} Appellant, Matthew McGowan, pleaded guilty to, and was convicted by the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas of, threе counts of rape in violation of
{¶ 3} Thereafter, appellant filed a pro se application to reopen his direct appeal pursuant to
{¶ 4} Appellant appealed our August 6, 2021 denial of his application to reopen to the Ohio Supreme Court, which accepted review, and held the case for the decisiоn in State v. Maddox. On April 27, 2022, the Ohio Supreme Court released its decision
II. Analysis
{¶ 5} In order to succeed on an
{¶ 6} In his application to reopen, appellant alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the Reagan Tokes law is unconstitutional under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
{¶ 7} At the outset, we notе that this court has now addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes law on several occasions, and after thorough review, has held that the law is constitutional. See, e.g., State v. Stenson, 2022-Ohio-2072, 190 N.E.3d 1240 (6th Dist.); State v. Eaton, 2022-Ohio-2432, 192 N.E.3d 1236 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 8} Appellant, however, raises a new argument not addressed by our previous decisiоns. Specifically, appellant argues that the law violates due process because the Ohio Department of Rehabilitatiоn and Corrections (“ODRC“) has a financial interest in him remaining a prisoner, and thus it will not be a fair and impartial adjudicator of his parole hearing.
{¶ 9} “The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution guarantee procedural due process.” Stenson at ¶ 24. “If due process applies, the question becomes what process is due.” Id., citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Id., quoting Morrissey at 481. For purposes of our analysis in this case, we will presume that the level of process required in a Reagan Tokes hearing includes that the decision maker does not have a “direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion.” Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (“[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of duе process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pеcuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.“).
{¶ 10} In support of his argument, appellant cites Caliste v. Cantrell, 937 F.3d 525 (5th Cir.2019). In Caliste, the Fifth Circuit held that a criminal court‘s practice of using money generated from commercial surety bond fees to pay judicial expenses created a conflict of interest that violated the due prоcess clause. In that case, under Louisiana law, 1.8 percent of a commercial surety bond‘s value is deposited
{¶ 11} We find the present situation to be distinguishable from Caliste in that there is no direct monetary bеnefit associated with the decision whether to hold a prisoner beyond his or her presumed release date. Consequently, the decisiоns of ODRC at Reagan Tokes hearings do not result in direct contributions to a fund that it then administers for its own benefit. Thus, we find that ODRC does not have a direct, рersonal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against the release of a prisoner. As a result, we hold that the Reagan Tokes law does not create a conflict of interest that violates appellant‘s due process rights.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 12} Because appellant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that his proposed assignment of error would have been succеssful on appeal, we hold that his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must fail. Accordingly, appеllant‘s
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
CONCUR.
JUDGE
JUDGE
JUDGE
This decisiоn is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.