Thе sole question presented by this appeal is whether the trial judge erred in denying defendant’s motion for a continuance. Defendant argues that the denial of his motion deprived him of his constitutional rights (1) to select counsel of his choice and (2) to have the еffective assistance of counsel. We will consider these arguments in the order stated.
It is well established that a motion to continue is ordinarily addressed to the trial judge’s sound discretion and his ruling thereon will not be disturbed except upon a showing that he abused that discrеtion.
State v. Baldwin,
Justice Ervin, speaking for the court in
State v. Speller,
The holding in
United States v. Bergamo,
The Sixth Amendment provides inter alia that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” The Supreme Court has held that right to the assistance of counsel includes the right to counsel of the defendant’s choosing. In Glasser v. United States,315 U.S. 60 , 70 [62 S.Ct. 457 , 464,86 L.Ed. 680 ], Mr. Justice Murphy citing Powell v. Alabama,287 U.S. 45 [53 S.Ct. 55 ,77 L.Ed. 158 ,84 A.L.R. 527 ], stated that “ * * * the right to the assistanсe of counsel is so fundamental that the denial by a state court of a reasonable time to allow the selection of counsel of one’s own choosing, and the failure of that court to make an effective appointment of counsel, may so offend our concept of the basic requirements of a fair hearing as to amount to a denial of due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment * * * .” Cf. In re Mandell, 2 Cir.,69 F. 2d 830 , 831, and Smith v. United States,53 App. D.C. 53 ,288 F. 259 . In People v. Price,262 N.Y. 410 , 412,187 N.E. 298 , 299, the Court of Appeals of New York stated, “Under both our Federal and State Constitutions, а defendant has the right to defend in person or by counsel of his own choosing,” citing inter alia the Sixth Amendment. See also Burnham v. Brush,176 Misc. 39 ,26 N.Y.S. 2d 397 , 399 and Kerling v. G. W. Van Dusen & Co.,109 Minn. 481 , 483,124 N.W. 235 , 236, 372. The decisions are in accord upon this fundamental proposition.
The case of
People v. Brady,
. . . Due process is not denied every defendant who is refused the right to defend himself by means of his chosen retained counsel; other factors, including the speedy disposition of criminal charges, demand recognition, particularly where defendant is inexcusably dilatory in securing legal representation. . . .
Accord: People v. Simeone,
In
People v. Crovedi,
. . . [T] hough it is clear that a defendant has no absolute right to be represented by a particular attorney, still the .courts should make all reasonable efforts to ensure that a defendant financially able to retain an attorney of his own choosing can be represented by that attorney. . . . This is especially so when defendant is in no way responsible for the absence of his retained counsel. . . .
. . . [T]he state should keep to a necessary minimum its interference with the individual’s desire to defend himself *614 in whatever manner he deems best, using any legitimate means within his resources — and that desire can constitutionally be forced to yield only when it will result in significant prejudice to the defendant or in a disruption of the orderly processes of justice unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case.
We note the case of
Gomez v. Heard,
In our opinion
Lee v. United States,
... It is a fundamental principle that an accused be permitted to choose his own counsel, the practice of assigning counsel being reserved for cases where the accused cannot or does not selеct his own. . . .
. . . [T]he accused’s “right to select his own counsel cannot be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts of justice, and deprive such courts of the exercise of their inherent powers to control the same.” But appellant bore no responsibilitiy for being without counsel on the eve of his trial. He had appeared for trial with counsel of his own choosing, and the record does not show that he had anything to do with that counsel’s withdrawal by leave of court. However that withdrawаl may have obstructed the processes of the court, such obstruction is clearly not chargeable to the appellant and cannot be made the occasion for denying him his constitutional right to counsel of his own choosing. Assuming the trial court has discrеtion in the matter of how much opportunity is to be afforded the accused for selecting counsel, we think it would abuse that discretion by refusing to continue the trial over a weekend for that purpose unless it clearly appeared that the accusеd would not find counsel of his own choosing. . . .
In instant case defendant timely exercised his right to select counsel of his choice long before the case was called for trial. The record does not disclose that he had in any way contributed to his counsel’s аbsence. The fact that his counsel had accepted other employment which prevented his presence at the trial cannot be charged to defendant so as to deny him his constitutional right to counsel of his own choice. We find nothing in this record thаt indicates that defendant exercised his right to select counsel of his choice in a manner calculated to disrupt or obstruct the orderly progress of the court.
The effect of the denial of the defendant’s constitutional right to be represented by сounsel of his choice is so interrelated with his right to effective assistance of counsel that we deem it proper to consider the latter of defendant’s two-pronged argument.
*616
It is implicit in the constitutional guarantees of assistance of counsel and confrontation of one’s accusers and witnesses against him that an accused and his counsel shall have a reasonable time to investigate, prepare and present his defense. However, no set length of time is guaranteed and whether defendant is denied due process must be determined under the circumstances of each case.
State v. Vick,
We wish to make it abundantly clear that we do not approve of tactics by counsel or client which tend to delay the trial of cases. Our clogged court dockets and the tortoise-like progress оf cases through our courts have caused criticism of, and disrespect for, the entire court system. The public is demanding and the legal profession should be searching for means to expedite the trial of criminal and civil cases without depriving litigants of a fair triаl. The judiciary possesses powers to regulate and discipline attorneys who deliberately or negligently impede the progress of our courts. Likewise an accused may lose his constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his choice when he perverts that right to a weapon for the purpose of obstructing and delaying his trial. It might well be said that defendant’s chosen counsel acted improvidently in that he did not consult the trial judge concerning a continuance, or in that, being associated with a reрutable firm of able lawyers, he did not take steps to prepare one of them for the trial of the case and consult defendant as to the possibility that his associate might proceed with the trial in the event that a continuance was not obtained. Hоwever, any fault of counsel without defendant’s concurrence cannot be imputed to defendant so as to preclude him from obtaining counsel of his choice.
*617 We hold that under the circumstances of this case, the trial court erred by denying defendant’s mоtion for a continuance, thereby depriving him of a reasonable time in which to obtain counsel of his choice.
This cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals with direction that it be remanded to the Superior Court of Forsyth County for trial in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.