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State v. McDonald
500 N.W.2d 243
S.D.
1993
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*1 perpetrated upon him. But per- offensive fraud from all I abstain will here, no fact the freedom sonality, advance was not free. As life and reputation on, or or if goes petition change to the honor he can there is a witness, required by justice unless circumstances. charged; I am with which

the cause any consider- reject, from

I will never the cause of the myself, personal

ation delay or oppressed,

defenseless (Em- or malice. cause for lucre

man’s mine). supplied

phasis is trou- aspect of this decision

Another dissertation of a concerns the

bling. This Attorney stipulation.” “default divorce Dakota, of South Plaintiff STATE using phrаse. this Rachetto is rebuked Appellee, usage of this Perhaps the reference to spawn study etymol- a phrase should i.e., tracing history of this a ogy, McDONALD, Defendant Lisa components thereof. or the word phrase Appellant. a say, parties entered into it to Suffice No. 17879. Property Settlement “Stipulation and (10) days only ten after Agreement” Supreme of South Dakota. Court agree- instituted. This divorce action was on Briefs 1993. Considered Jan. caption. This heading or ment bears that phrase it into this now condenses Court May Decided Attorney Agreement.” Ra- “Stipulated stipula- it a “default divorce dubbed chetto century of quarter

tion.” In over judge— acting as a trial practice referred divorce case was

an uncontested “Default di- a “default divorce.”

to as calendar on a heard on a

vorces” were Lawyers judges and trial day.

certain again, and over language, over

used The “default di- “default divorce.” “stipulation.” Attor- arose

vorces” phrases

ney married these two Rachetto

together and called it a “default ‍​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‍divorce my opinion, majority

stipulation.” Rachetto

being unduly harsh to Mr. strained, extremely It is

specific criticism. instance, imply to infer or specific

in this by Mr. Rachetto such a reference Wilmarth, be, in of In re

could the words (1919), decep- “a

42 S.D. 172 N.W.

tion.”

Finally, express I that Kevin wish being judgment

Klein exercised bad predicament by counsel. His

represented af- from his other decisions which

stems responsibility. He want-

fixed his domestic Then, a child. He wanted Cristen. voluntarily He quickie

wanted a divorce. for freedom. No

signed agreement *2 trial,

At her McDonald testified fold- containing paper packet the cocaine Mike, young man been days at a Falls five she met bar Sioux her arrest. claimed Mike before She *3 Gen., Barnett, Atty. M. Stroh- John Mark bought her a drink and handed her a folded Gen., Pierre, man, plaintiff ‍​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‍Atty. Asst. thought phone she contained his paper appellee. which she tucked into her billfold number Arneson, & Gienapp, Issenhuth David R. looking. without аppel- Madison, for defendant Gienapp, raising from appeals her conviction She lant. order, we not- four issues which address necessary. facts where ing additional WUEST, Justice. (Mc- Lisa McDonald juryA convicted ANALYSIS pos- Donald) count of unauthorized of one THE TRIAL DID NOT ERR I. COURT ap- She a controlled substance. session of OF IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY affirm. peals judgment. BAD EVIDENCE. OTHER ACTS trial, the filed a motion Prior to FACTS seeking to evidence of other bad acts have place her of arrested at McDonald was pur- of admitted into evidence McDonald’s charges drug unrelated to employment on court 19-12-5.1 The trial suant to SDCL arrest, appeal. Pursuant appeal, some of the On admitted at the Police purse searched Mitchell claims trial court erred arresting matron and the jail Station. The admitting too unreli- the evidence as it was packet in paper a folded officers found admissibility, meet the standard of able to testing Subsequent McDonald’s billfold. in time to prior acts were too remote co- folded contained showed the value, pro- its probative sufficient caine. prejudi- its outweighed by bative value charged possession effect. cial McDonald was of 22-42-5 and of cocaine in violation SDCL to admit The trial court’s decision trial, 34-20B-16(l). intro- At will not overruled other act evidence be prior Mc- of three acts of duced evidence of absent an abuse discretion. First, involving cocaine. a Mitchell Donald Werner, 286, 288 testified that on a different police detective two-step ap must trial court follow occasion, conducting legal search while admissibility of proach ruling on the when a mirror purse, McDonald’s discovered testimony: other powdery substance on and

with white purpose for of- (1) the intended Whether pen. chemist BIC The state hollowed-out rele- other is fering the acts evidence was co- powdery testified the substance to some material issue vant Second, testi- a former co-worker caine. case, and her cocaine fied that McDonald (2) probative value Whether working together Octo- they while outweighed substantially is she A third witness testified ber its effect. snorting cocaine while had seen McDonald Additionаlly, Werner, Mc- N.W.2d at 288. she was at McDonald’s residence. exception identify must trial court not convicted of crimes Donald was arising prior which the bad acts acts. under proof purposes, such provides: admissible for other 1. SDCL 19-12-5 intent, motive, crimes, preparation, opportunity, wrongs, or acts is of other Evidence knowledge, identity, mis- prove plan, not person the character or absence admissible to show he acted in order or accident. take however, conformity may, It therewith. eight years properly 482 act earlier was admit- to be admitted. ted). lapse year of one since three involving long prior acts cocaine was not so claims outweigh probative a time as to value admitting acts evi bad erred and render admission the evidence un- finding requires a the act is dence Rose fairly prejudicial to McDonald. supported by substantial evidence. State Rose, specified The trial court the other merely points out trial court Rose “[t]he intent, acts evidence was admitted to show the other crimes careful to insure that knowledge, and of mistake or acci absence It does not substantial.” Id. evidence was knowledge dent. The element of is an es beyond SDCL 19- a new standard creates *4 part of 22-42-5.3 Where Mc sential SDCL of strength of the evidence 12-3.2 Donald claimed she did not the folded know relevancy deter already part is of the fered cocaine, knowledge paper packet contained mination. and absence of mistake or accident were requires a McDonald asserts Sieler clearly We held that an relevant. by clear and prior bad act be established may element of a crime be established Sieler, 397 convincing evidence. State v. through testimony: use of other acts the (S.D.1986). Again, the lan N.W.2d [Wjhere it is made clear at the outset of only notes the trial court guage Sieler principal the the defendant’s “clear and convinc found the evidence was intent, knowledge or defense is lack of standard. ing.” It does not create new unarguably the and thus issue is dis- fact, rejected adopting an we Sieler pute, government may ... introduce requirement additional for admission the [other acts] evidence[.] acts evidence under SDCL 19-12-5. bad (quoting 482 N.W.2d Unit Sieler, reliability at 93. The 397 N.W.2d Estabrook, 774 F.2d ed States v. the evidence to be admitted is al (8th Cir.1985)). The Estabrook court rea ready part of the tests the an inherent soned, “The admission of other act evi Titus, 426 perform. court must prove knowledge premised is dence to (S.D.1988). We deсline to N.W.2d unlikely repet hypothesis that it is adopt standard for a trial an additional in criminal conduct will itive involvement deciding to admit or court to balance before a defendant oblivious to the character leave prior bad acts. exclude question.” (citing at 288 of the acts Id. McDonald next claims the Berger, 2 J. & M. Weinstein’s Weinstein their acts so remоte in time that (1982)). 404(13),at 404-72 Evidence § prejudicial. All three acts admission was other acts evidence was admissible to es previous occurred thirteen within knowledge. tablish stated, “[wjhether prior months. We have balancing realistically required court did the are too remote must de The trial on the record: “the other acts evidence pend on their nature.” State Wede [is] mann, probative substantially relevant as its value 339 N.W.2d totality outweighs prejudicial its effect.” The look at of the circum We exceptions limited un- an act is too court identified the stances to determine whether determining probative the evidence was admitted remote in time in its der which (similar intent, Titus, knowledge, and of mistake at 580 absence value. may knowingly possess person a con- provides: No 2. SDCL 19-12-3 relevant, drug such sub- may trolled or substance unless Although evidence be exclud- probative substantially directly pursuant value is out- to a ed if its was obtained or stance weighed by danger prejudice, of unfair practition- prescription or from a valid order issues, misleading of the or confusion er, acting profes- in the course of his while jury, by delay, of undue or considerations except practice, autho- or as otherwise sional time, presentation of waste of cumulative evidence. or needless by chapter A violation of this 34-20B. rized felony. is a Class 5 section provides: SDCL 22-42-5 During testimony, ing accident. the trial admission of third jury four times that instructed acts, admitted for limited bad adopted this court separate in purposes. Additionally, third perpetrator said, rule. the other “to again struction cautioned admissible, only acts evidence could be considered for the evidence must show change circumstances, limited purposes stated. State v. Bash some facts or er, (S.D.1991); N.W.2d of facts possible train out the guilt Chapin, of a third party other than the defendant.” Luna, 378 at 232. The balancing N.W.2d of other crimes “While the evidence requires test the court to balance the im appellant, undoubtedly portance against of the State’s 19-12-3 operative of SDCL are ‘sub- words ” interest in excluding unreliable evidence. stantially outweighed’ ‘unfair.’ Luna, 378 at 234. The Here, balancing Rose, 324 the trial necessary protect right both probative acts had court determined the against defendant to defend substantially value which out- accusa tions and the weighed danger unfair State’s interest prejudice. reliable and efficient The court trials. at 233. In performed carefully balance Id. *5 by party perpetrator fact that it we reiterated ‍​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‍third rejeсt evidenced the did the adopted

some evidence to be rule was avoid introduced to consideration of being Additionally, too remote. the court matters the crime collateral to and avoid repeatedly jury as to Braddock, directed the the limit- the use of suspicion. bare 452 purposes ed for it could which consider the at

testimony. stаtement, During opening defense The trial court did not abuse its discre- began story counsel McDonald’s of how the admitting

tion in other acts the packet given with had been cocaine to Mc by objected. Donald Mike. A State meet II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ing was held in at chambers which time the THE ERR IN GRANTING STATE’S judge ruled not McDonald could introduce IN LIMINE MOTION CONCERN- party perpetrator the third evidence with THIRD PARTY PERPETRA- ING permit out sufficient to the court to notice TOR EVIDENCE. balancing required the under Upon Luna. prejudiced a. during McDonald was courtroom, return to the defense counsel by her the opening statement court’s bar; related how McDonald met Mike in the party regarding perpe- order third objected and was overruled. When trator evidence. defense Mike giving counsеl told about Mc in State filed a motion limine re paper packet, objection Donald the State’s questing prohibit the court McDonald from was sustained and the was to directed presenting party perpetrator any third evi disregard defense counsel’s last statement. dence “until and unless the defendant opening Defense his counsel finished state showing mаkes a that such evidence meets ment, telling the did not McDonald in forth Luna." standard set State v. young what in know was (S.D.1985); 378 229 also See man had her. Braddock, (S.D. N.W.2d 785 defense, During presentation of the 1990); Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710 State v. ruling. trial court reversed its earlier Both argument, After is McDonald and a defense witness testified prohibiting sued an order McDonald from balancing events No perpetrаtor as to in the bar. introducing any party third evi party showing perpetrator third evidence was done. dence unless a was first to made prejudiced prevented claims she was the court. from now She was being prevented making making general by a “full” denial. McDonald did showing regard opening not make to the court statement. 109 S.Ct. 105 L.Ed.2d 218 requiring order U.S.

Despite judge’s denied, 937, 110 (1989),reh’g showing to thе court U.S. S.Ct. make defense (1989). party perpetrator third presenting L.Ed.2d before present evidence, was able Supreme held The United Court States evidence with her third Franklin, in- permissive Francis showing required under making the out Due fluence would violate ‍​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‍the Process all of eventually As in Luna. only suggested if “the conclusion is Clause came before McDonald’s and сommon sense not one that reason N,W.2d of defense flow proven justify light of the facts before interrupt opening statement was counsel’s Franklin, jury.” 471 U.S. Francis idea was by objections, but main (1985). 307, 105 85 L.Ed.2d 344 S.Ct. during opening statement presented permissive This court has held a inference fully developed later the case was conclusion, suggests possible but preju McDonald suffеred proceedings. require drawing of the conclu- does not through interruption opening dice sion, constitutionally if ‘only “is infirm significant evidence statement —all is not reason suggested conclusion one that eventually jury, heard justify light and common sense ” denying not err Mc- The court did b. proven jury.’ facts before regard- motion mistrial Donald’s Traversie, (S.D.1986) perpetratоr evidence. ing third 314-15, Francis, (quoting 471 U.S. at 353-54). jury, Mc- presence of the at L.Ed.2d Outside the S.Ct. during for a mistrial Donald motioned both Testimony at trial established McDonald opening statement after familiar cocaine knew that it on Mc- rested. The motion was based square, packets of stored in folded give argument Donald’s she was unable *6 proved Testimony the cocaine was paper. opening full statement. a previ- possession. in McDonald’s ruling a disturb trial court’s We will not ously held: motion a mistrial a “clear on a for absent permit suffices to alone [Possession Kidd, 286 of discretion.” State v. abuse possessor inference that the knows what 120, (S.D.1979). al- 122 We have N.W.2d possesses, especially, if it is his ready determined that McDonald suffered vehicle, hands, person, on his or on his fully de- prejudice the evidence was premises. his jury. The trial court did veloped before the 426, (S.D. Jahnz, 428 v. State denying Mc- its discretion in not abuse 1978). The free infer from the jury was to for mistrial. Donald’s motions know presented that McDonald evidence ingly possessed jury cocaine. The was also DID NOT III. THE TRIAL COURT instructed must find all of the elements it INSTRUC- ERR IN GIVING JURY reason possession proved beyond a of TION NO. Mc pronounce it could doubt before able No. 10 Jury Instruction stated: jury guilty. Donald The instructions a Though an inference not conclusive and provided full and correct statement a whole may possession the defen- you reject, Owl, applicable Grey law. State v. person permit to an is sufficient dant's (S.D.1980). N.W.2d 751 trial pos- shе knows she inference that what giving did err in Instruction No. sesses. jury. 10 to instruction claims the McDonald DID NOT THE TRIAL COURT IV. un permissive inference which a created MCDONALD’S ERR IN DENYING proof constitutionally shifted burden OF FOR JUDGMENT MOTION relieving “Jury instructions State to her. ACQUITTAL. reason proof beyond a burden of [the of review pro The standard due violate Defendant’s able doubt] acquittal court’s of motion California, v. 491 trial denial rights.” cess Carella expresses companion later to a that he was prima out a has made is whether kept jury). a killer for hire—all reason- jury could from which case facie guilty. defendant State ably find the Regarding jury instruction # (S.D.1983). Blakey, language instruction plain of the was determination, court will making this “per- “mandatory” presumption; it was a the most favorable accept the evidence Furthermore, presumption. missive” fairly can be drawn inferences judge by specif- limited the instruction light most favorable instructing the evidence ically jury that it “not Wilson, 297 support you may the verdict. State conclusive” and “an inference re- (S.D.1980). See, McDonald, ject.” N.W.2d presented evidence The State I affirm trial court concur would knowing posses guilty of

McDonald respects. in all The court then ruled cocaine. sion of evidence for presented sufficient SABERS, (concurring specially). Justice go to the matter to my agree- specially defense and introduced I write out presented her then ruling admissibility ment the cocaine clear that the three acts once was conflicting party. Where unknown third issue was whether McDonald knew real jury to it is for the presented, packet contained cocaine. This differs the cred and determine weigh the evidence which is re- from the situation testimony and the ibility of the witnesses majority opinion. upon by lied See Peck, 459 N.W.2d presented. State v. 844- Champagne, found J., (S.D.1988) (Sabers, dissenting) re- guilty. knowledge garding and intеnt. Unlike out a the State made It is clear that in- Champagne, knowledge situation against McDonald which prima facie case a material issue this case. tent was correctly The trial court believed. writing agree I Henderson’s with Justice judgment for a motion denied McDonald’s third-party perpetrator my rule. on the acquittal. view, seriously argue that Mc- no оne can she did not know the Donald’s defense that AMUNDSON, J., C.J., MILLER, pro- contained cocaine is somehow *7 concur. third-party perpetrator rule. by the hibited J., HENDERSON, concurs with argument, supports If that claim or Luna writing. accused of a overruled. One it be should SABERS, J., specially. concurs allowed Dakota should be crime South permitted to ask the day in court and HENDERSON, (concurring). Justice guilt story and decide her jury to hear her Concerning the third not be tied innocence. Her hands should Luna, my it was rule as established her back. behind now, then, “a as it is that there was opinion retrospect, it seems ironic that possible guilt facts to out the train of should ‍​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‍be forced Dakota accused South than the defendant.” a third other themselves fight for their life tо defend J., Henderson, dissenting at and, “uncharged” against all other Thus, proffered should not Luna’s time, showing prevented from the same be kept have been the crime they did not commit case, evi- did. We “charged” someone else because eventually brought jury’s to the dence play- a more even should strive to maintain Hence, appears to there be attention. ing field in the future. appeared high- prejudice. In (a drunk enters a ly prejudicial violent him, shortly after the

store with blood therefrom, and only a half

crime and block

Case Details

Case Name: State v. McDonald
Court Name: South Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: May 19, 1993
Citation: 500 N.W.2d 243
Docket Number: 17879
Court Abbreviation: S.D.
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