"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. THE ENTRY INTO AND SEARCH OF THE RESIDENCE AND THE SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AS GUARANTEED BY THEFOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLEI , SECTION14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO."
{¶ 3} McCoy argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the evidence seized was discovered only after an unlawful entry and search of the house where he was arrested. On the threshold issue of standing, McCoy argues that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house because he was an overnight guest of the lessee of the premises. In addition, McCoy argues that the initial entry into the house by police was unlawful because there were no exigent circumstances that permitted the police tо enter the residence *3 without a warrant. Likewise, McCoy also argues that the arrest warrant possessed by the marshals for a different person did not authorize their entry into 1114 W. 18th Street. Accordingly, McCoy argues that the evidence gathered as a result of the alleged unlawful entry and search should be suppressed, and, in turn, his conviction should be reversed. This Court disagrees.
{¶ 4} "An appellate court's standard of review with respect to a motion to suppress is de novo." Akron v. Holmes, 9th Dist. No. 21590,
{¶ 5} "The
{¶ 6} The United States Supreme Court has found that the "capacity to claim the protection of the
{¶ 7} However, an individual need not be the оwner or possessor of the premises entered to have standing to claim a
{¶ 8} Moreover, "the purpose for which an owner maintains or a visitor uses an invadеd place may affect the reasonableness of a privacy expectation in the invaded place." State v. Gulley, 5th Dist. No. 2006CA00114,
{¶ 9} In the case at hand, the house in question was not furnished for everyday living. The contents of the house consisted of a video game system, a telеvision, a couch, and a mattress lying on the floor with no sheets or pillows. There were no beds, no toiletries in the bathroom, no clothing in the bedrooms, no table in thе kitchen, and no food in the refrigerator. In contrast, there were large quantities of marijuana and cocaine, and paraphernalia commonly usеd in the packaging, distribution, and consumption of marijuana and cocaine.
{¶ 10} It is obvious from the evidence that the house at 1114 W. 18th Street was a place for stоring and trafficking drugs, and not a traditional place of residence. When asked to describe the inside of the house in question, one of the arresting police оfficers stated: "It appeared to be a place where they were bringing in marijuana, cocaine, [and] they were repackaging it for distribution." The nature of the house had been so converted by the lessee that it had lost its character as a residential dwelling and with it the heightened protection inherent in such рroperty. Furthermore, McCoy presented no testimony or evidence outside of his own assertions that showed he actually had the permission required to reсeive protection as an "overnight guest". SeeGulley at ¶ 25 ("Although social guests enjoy
{¶ 11} McCoy has failed to show that his expectation of privacy as a visitor in a house used for trafficking illegal substances was the kind of privacy expectation "that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." See State v. Glover, 2d Dist. No. 20692,
Judgment affirmed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App. R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hеreof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App. R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App. R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
WHITMORE, J. MOORE, J. CONCUR