Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s order that he pay $55,490.69 in restitution following his convictions for misdemeanor assault in the fourth degree, ORS 163.160, and interfering with a peace officer, ORS 162.247. In the underlying assault, defendant caused the victim to incur substantial medical bills, the largest of which arose out of the victim’s resulting knee surgery. In his first assignment of error, defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering restitution of $27,677.50, the amount of the hospital bill for the victim’s knee surgery, because there was no testimony or evidence that the hospital bill was reasonable. In his second through seventh assignments of error, defendant challenges the trial court’s imposition of various smaller restitution charges, ranging from $134 to $7,701 for assorted medical serviсes, equipment, and medication.
For the reasons discussed below, we сonclude that the trial court erred when it ordered restitution of $27,677.50 for the hospital bill arising out of the victim’s knee surgery because the state did not present evidence that the hospital bill reflected “reasonable charges.” Because we remand this case for resentencing, we do not reach defendant’s second through seventh assignments of еrror.
We begin by stating the facts in the light most favorable to the state. State v. Gibson,
Upon hearing the cоmmotion below, the victim came out of his upstairs apartment, saw his sister crying and upset, and began to yell at and walk towards defendant. Defendant sprinted back towards the victim, tackled him from the side, bit him, and then began punching him in the head. As a result, defendant dislocated the victim’s shoulder, broke his nose, and caused significant damage to his left knee, including the teаring of the victim’s anterior cruciate ligament.
Following defendant’s conviction for assault, as well as a conviction for interfering with a peace officer, the state sought restitution of $55,490.69. That amount reflects the victim’s various medical expenses caused by the assault and his lost wages resulting from the assault. As noted above, defendant objected at the restitution hearing to the hospital bill for the victim’s knee surgery, which totaled $27,677.50. Defendant objected that the hospital bill alone did not establish that the charges were “reasonable” medical charges as required by the criminal restitution statute, ORS 137.106(l)(a), and its definition of recoverable “economic damages” under ORS 31.710. Although defendant had some additional objections to the victim’s mileage and gas costs for travelling to the doctor, had questions about insurance reimbursements, and raised an issue about defendant’s ability to pay restitution, defendant did not object to any of the other medical bills as unreasonable.
In response to the objection to the hospital bill, the trial court noted that “usually in civil cases thе reasonableness of the fees is presented through a doctor or somebody who is sufficiently expert in that to come in and say * * * this was reasonable.” The trial court noted that there might be a distinction between economic damages in civil law when compared to criminal restitution, but ultimately concluded that, while a one-day hospital bill for surgery of $27,677.50 may “seem very high,” it was reasonable in light of the fact that it arose from and was necessary to address the victim’s significant knee injuries. The trial court also relied on an assertion that it was “common sense” and there was no objection to the nature of the knee injury. Defendant first assigns error to that ruling.
Turning to the standard of review, we review orders of restitution for errors of law. State v. Thorpe,
The process by which the state may seek to recover restitution against a criminal defendant and on behalf of a victim is set forth by statute. ORS 137.106(1) (a) provides, in relevant part:
“When a person is convicted of a crime * * * that has resulted in economic damages, the district attorney shall investigate and present to the court * * * evidence of the nature and amount of the damages. * * * If the court finds from the evidence presented that a victim suffered economic damages, in addition to any other sanction it may impose, the court shall enter a judgment or supplemental judgment requiring that the defendant pay the victim restitution in a specific amount that equals the full amount of the victim’s economic damages as determined by the court.”
(Emphasis added.) “Economic damages” is specifically defined by statute. ORS 137.103(2). With one exception not relevant here, “ [e] conomic damages * * * [h] as the meaning given that term in ORS 31.710.” Id. ORS 31.710(2)(a), in turn, defines the term to mean, in relevant part, “objectively verifiable monetary losses including but nоt limited to reasonable charges necessarily incurred for medical, hospital, nursing and rehabilitative services and other health care services.” (Emphasis added.)
We have concluded that “there are three prerequisites to an order of restitution: (1) criminal activities, (2) economic damages, and
We have reviewed the definition of economic damages in ORS 31.710 many times, both in the context of criminal restitution orders and civil cases. Although criminal restitution has just three simple elements and is set forth in the criminal statute, ORS 137.106(l)(a), that statutе, through ORS 137.103(2), incorporates the civil statutory definition of economic damages set forth in ORS 31.710(2)(a). As the Supreme Court recently explained in State v. Ramos,
With respect to the general definition of economic damages in ORS 31.710(2)(a), we have concluded that such damages do not have to be proved as “objectively verified” but rather the legislature only required that they be “objectively verifiable monetary losses.” See DeVaux v. Presby,
In recent cases, we have examined the specific types of economic damages that the state may recover under ORS 31.710(2)(a) as well as the kind of evidence available to prove those damages. In State v. Labar,
In addition to those cases discussing the types of recoverable economic damages, and the evidence required to prove them, we have also examined in both civil and criminal restitution cases the amount and kind of proof required to demonstrate that a victim’s hospital or medical services are “reasonable.”
Based on the text of ORS 31.710(2)(a), which permits only recovery of “reasonable” hospital and medical services, and our review of several prior civil and criminal restitution cases addressing the same issue, we agree with defendant that submission of a hospital bill, without more, is insufficient proof for recovery of “reasonable” hospital or medical services. Some additional testimony or evidence is required to support the reasonableness of the bill for the hospital or medical services.
As we hаve explained, when summarizing the common law on economic damages that predated the enactment of ORS 31.710(2)(a),
“Oregon courts have long held that a plaintiff seeking damages for medical expenses must establish the reasonableness of those expenses and cannot simply rely on a medical bill for that purpose.”
White v. Jubitz Corp.,
“Oregon courts did not impose a quantum of proof on either party to show what actually had been paid but, rather, required proof that the amount billed for services was reasonable. To do that, a plaintiff generally presented evidence of the reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses through the testimony of physicians and other medical professionals familiar with the injury, treatment, and costs involved.”
White,
We have held that, when the legislature enacted ORS 31.710(2)(a) and its definition of economic damages, it did so “in light of that underlying law.” White,
The state also contends that evidence of the hospital bill, alone, may be evidence of the reasonableness of the bill in a criminal restitution case, even assuming that it would not be admissible for that purpose in a civil case, because criminal restitution does not rеquire “any particular form” of evidence, citing State v. Noble,
Accordingly, based on the text of ORS 31.710(2)(a), which requires proof that any charges for hospital or medical services are “reasonable,” and the longstanding case law that proof of reasonableness requires more than evidence of the medical charges themselves, we hold that the trial court erred in applying the law when it overruled defendant’s objection to the use of the hospital bill for $27,677.50 as evidence of the reasonableness of those charges and then in including them in the order of restitution. We also hold that the trial court could not simply rely on a review of the bill and “common sense” to conclude that such charges were reasоnable.
Because we conclude that the trial court erred in imposing restitution and, accordingly, remand for resen-tencing, we do not reach defendant’s unpreserved second through seventh assignments of error.
Remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.
Notes
There are a number of other bills and costs imposed by the trial court as restitution that defendant does not challenge on appeal.
Former ORS 18.560 (1987) “was enacted in 1987 as part of a larger ‘packagе’ of so-called ‘tort reform’ legislation.” DeVaux,
As noted above, we held in Labar,
The trial court correctly noted that it was undisputed that the victim was injured by defendant, incurred the medical bill, and the victim’s surgery was necessary. Regardless, as discussed above, ORS 31.710(2)(a) still requires proof that the charges for the hospital services were “reasonable.”