State v. McClainState v. McClain
Michael Doddo, Plantation, for respondent.
GRIMES, Justice.
This is a petition for review of the decision in State v. McClain, 508 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), which is in apparent conflict with State v. Weitz, 500 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). We have jurisdiction under
John McClain was charged with vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, contrary tо
We begin our analysis with the general proposition that all relevant evidence is admissible unless the law otherwise provides.
Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. This section shall nоt be
construed to mean that evidence of the existence of available third-party benefits is inadmissible.
This statute compels the trial court to weigh the danger of unfair prejudice against the probative value. In applying the balancing test, the trial court necessarily exercises its discretion. Indeed, the same item of evidenсe may be admissible in one case and not in another, depending upon the relation of that item to the other evidence. E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, § 185 (3d ed. 1984).
Professor Ehrhardt explains the application of the statute as follows:
Although Section 90.403 is mandatory in its exclusion of this evidence, a large measure of discretion rests in the trial judge to determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by any of the enumerated reasons. The court must weigh the proffered evidence against the other facts in the record and balance it against the strength of the reason for exclusion.
In excluding certain relevant evidence, Section 90.403 recognizes Florida law. Certainly, most evidence that is admitted will be prejudicial to the party against whom it is offered. Section 90.403 does not bar this evidence; it is directed at evidence whiсh inflames the jury or appeals improperly to the jury‘s emotions. Only when that unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence is the evidence excluded.
... .
... In weighing the probative value against the unfair prejudice, it is proper for the court to consider the need for the evidence; the tendency оf the evidence to suggest an improper basis to the jury for resolving the matter, e.g., an emotional basis; the chain of inference necessary to establish the material fact; and the effectiveness of a limiting instruction.
1 C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 403.1 at 100-03 (2d ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
Applying these principles to the instant case, it is clear that the probative value of the evidence of cocaine in McClain‘s blood was minimal. The amount of cocaine was so small that the chemist could express no opinion with respect to whether it would havе had any effect at all upon McClain‘s driving. On the other side of the scales, McClain could have been seriously prejudiced in the eyes of the jury if it became known that hе had ingested even a trace amount of cocaine. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence of the cocaine in McClain‘s blood.
The question remains as to whether this decision is in conflict with State v. Weitz. In Weitz the driver was charged with DUI in violation of
1) [N]o evidence was presented that proved what effect the presence of these drugs in appellee‘s urinе might have on his normal faculties; 2) the toxicologist‘s testimony revealed that it is impossible to determine within a reasonable degree of scientific probability the degrеe of impairment at the time of the offense based on the mere presence of drugs in appellee‘s urine; 3) the urinalysis results have insufficient probative value tо be legally relevant; and 4) the prejudicial effect of the urinalysis results outweigh any probative value.
Upon certification to the district court of appeal, the order of suppression was reversed. On the subjects of relevance and prejudice, the court said:
While it is true that knowledge that a defendant had ingested illegal drugs may prejudice some prospective jurors, it is
quite another matter to say that because of such possible bias no juror in a trial for driving under the influence of alсohol or drugs may hear that the defendant had ingested drugs prior to the incident.
500 So. 2d at 659. The court went on to point out in a footnote:
This trial judge‘s beliefs about the relevancy of drugs in the body and the prejudicial effect of that fact on the jury appear to virtually eliminate the possibility of a conviction for DUI/controlled substances in his court.
Weitz can be distinguished if the unquantified amount of drugs in that case differed from the unquantifiable trace of cocaine in the instant case. Moreover, the district court of appeal in Weitz was correct when it rejected the trial court‘s conclusion that it was necessary for the toxicologist to estimate the degree of impairment caused by the existence of the drugs. On the other hand, it would appear that the appellate court may not have given suffiсient deference to the trial court‘s exercise of discretion. In any event, we cannot subscribe to that court‘s suggestion that even if the defendant was unfairly prejudiсed by the evidence, he could have protected himself by exercising more jury challenges.
It may be that McClain and Weitz can be reconciled when the challenged evidence is viewеd in light of its relationship to the other evidence. In both cases, it could be said that the prejudicial impact of permitting the jury to hear that the defendant had taken illеgal drugs was equal but that it was the difference in probative value which tipped the scales. In Weitz, the defendant‘s low blood alcohol test belied the other evidence of his intoxication. Thus, the presence of even a small amount of drugs in the defendant‘s urine was significant because it provided an explanation for his impaired cоnduct. In the instant case, McClain‘s blood alcohol level substantially exceeded the figure necessary to raise a presumption of impairment. Therefore, evidence of a trace amount of cocaine in McClain‘s blood added little to the state‘s proof of intoxication.
Thus, we cannot say that the decision in Weitz was incorrect. However, we disaрprove of the opinion in that case to the extent indicated above. We approve the Fourth District Court of Appeal‘s decision in the instant case.
It is so ordered.
McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.