State v. McCallState v. McCall
Upon petition for common law certiorari the petitioner seeks review of an order of the Honorable Hal P. Dekle as Circuit Judge ordering the state to produce for respondent‘s inspection and copying all transcribed statements in the possession of the state of witnesses whom the state intends to call at the trial or who have given transcribed statements pertaining to the trial wherein the respondent is charged with rape. We find that the remedy by appeal would be inadequate, grant certiorari and quash the order.
The respondent has stated in his brief that his reason for asking for production of these statements was to effectively prepare for trial and discover any possibility of the state having interviewed witnesses under oath who would cast doubt upon the credibility of the victim and her brother‘s testimony. Respondent contends that refusal to supply the statements violates his right to the effective assistance of counsel in preparation for trial and that the suppression
In McAden v. State, 155 Fla. 523, 529, 21 So.2d 33, 36 (1945), our Supreme Court found from a review of the authorities that in the absence of a controlling statute the cases generally hold that the defendant‘s counsel is not entitled to a transcript of the testimony of state witnesses taken before a prosecuting officer preparatory to trial. The Second District in State v. Lampp, Fla.App. 1963, 155 So.2d 10, 12, stated that “Unless introduced by appropriate legislation, the doctrine of discovery is a complete and utter stranger to criminal proceedings.”
The attorney general in an opinion4 concerning
Respondent‘s motion for production of statements is a general demand for production, inspection and copying as a matter of right and contains no allegation that his is an exceptional case or there are unusual circumstances which demand production.
We have, therefore, determined that the facts of this case are not sufficient to justify an exception to the rule that statements of witnesses are not ordinarily the proper subject of discovery and conclude that the order in question departs so far from the established practice and the public policy of this state that certiorari is granted and the subject order is quashed.7
PEARSON, J., dissents.