This appeal arises from an order suppressing evidence. Rodney McAfee stands accused of driving under the influence. He was arrested by two Ketchum police officers after they approаched McAfee’s parked van and ordered him to get out of the vehicle. A magistrate suppressed all evidence gathered while McAfee was outside the vehicle. On appeal, the district cоurt reversed. In the present appeal, we must address two issues: whether the district court’s reversal of the magistrate’s suppression order is appealable under I.A.R. 11, and whether the arresting officers werе required to have an articulable and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or an emergency situation before they could properly order McAfee out of his van.
When reviewing a district court decision imparted in its appellate capacity, we examine the record before the magistrate independently of, albeit with due regard for, the district court’s determination.
State v. Jones,
On June 11, 1987, McAfee was observed at approximately 2:00 a.m., waiting in a van at a Ketchum stop sign for one or two minutes before abruptly turning the corner, parking at an adjacent curb and turning off the van’s lights and engine. Two Ketchum police officers observed McAfee’s conduct and parked their vehicle directly behind the van. At the suppression hearing, both officers testified that neither of them had any reason to suspect that the van was being operated in violation of any traffic laws or other criminal statutes. Both claimed that there had been recent; criminal activity in the area; thus, the erratic oрerating procedures, the late hour, and the fact that a van was well-suited for transporting burglarized property aroused their curiosity about the intentions of the driver. Additionally, the officers testified that they thought the van may have been experiencing mechanical problems due to the manner it was being operated. How-; ever, neither could particularize facts that may have lead them to think McAfee was having trouble with the van.
One officer called out to McAfee asking him to come out of the van. The other officer looked in the back of the van and saw part of McAfee’s leg. McAfee did nоt hear the officer because he had fallen asleep. Finally, the officers were able to awaken McAfee, whereupon at the officers’ direction he stepped out of the van from the passenger side. Once the officers were able to see McAfee outside the vehicle they determined that he might be intoxicated. The officers asked McAfee for his driver’s license and requеsted him to perform some field sobriety tests. McAfee complied but failed the tests. He was then arrested and taken to the Ketchum Police Station. Once in custody, McAfee submitted to a blood alcohоl test that revealed blood alcohol concentration levels of .210 percent and .221 percent respectively. The magistrate granted McAfee’s motion to suppress the evidence оf intoxication, holding that neither officer had any reasonable articulable suspicion, before ordering McAfee out of the van, that he had violated a traffic law nor any other criminal law. On appeal, the district court reversed the magistrate’s suppression order based on the “whole picture” analysis set forth in
State v. Haworth,
The state now argues that to allow McAfee to appeal the district court’s decision would nullify sub-section (7) of Rule 11(c), I.A.R., which allows no appeal from a trial court’s order denying a motion to *1009 suppress. 1 We find no merit to this argument. We hold that once the state has taken an appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress under sub-section (7) and an appellate decision is obtained, then sub-section (10) of the rule is triggered and allows further appellate review.
The second issue focuses upon whether McAfee’s fourth amendment rights were violated when the officers ordered him to exit his van. Whenever an officer detains a person — however briefly — a seizure has taken place.
Mason v. State Dept. of Law Enforcement,
In Mason, an officer observed erratic driving — occupying two lanes of traffic— and he saw the driver collide with another vehicle while attempting to park. Upon exiting his vehicle, the driver was observed staggering and walking unsteadily while emitting an odor of alcohol. In Clayton, a police officer obsеrved a vehicle parked next to a bar. The vehicle’s lights were on, the engine was running, and Clayton was in the driver’s seat with his head slumped forward. In both Mason and Clayton, the court found sufficient reasonable articulable suspiciоn to permit the officers to detain the motorists for further investigation.
However, McAfee did not drive erratically, nor was he slumped over the steering wheel. He parked, shut off the lights and engine, laid across the passenger seat and fell asleep. The magistrate found that the officers had not received any reports that may have aroused their suspicion of McAfee or his van. Nor was there testimony thаt the police were looking for a particular individual or vehicle wanted in connection with other criminal activities. The officers were simply suspicious because the van had stopped. MсAfee was legally parked in a place where he had a right to be. Apparently no traffic laws or other law had been violated. Therefore, upon examining the “ ‘whole picture” ’ of McAfeе’s situation, we conclude that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion that could form the basis of a lawful seizure.
Next, we examine the community care-taking function set forth in
Clayton. Clayton
adopted thе view that local police, unlike federal law enforcement officers, “frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what ... may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”
Clayton,
The state argues that, at the very least, the officers properly approached McAfee’s van to talk to McAfee in order to assure themselves that he wаs not in danger and no criminal activity was afoot. The state urges that circumstances which justify investigative stops and detentions include unusual activities at unusual hours in high crime areas, or indications of distress or mechanical breakdown of vehicles.
United States v. Pajari,
The fact that McAfee lawfully hesitated at a stop sign for a longer period than usual, in the middle of the night, in an area where recent burglaries had taken place, does not rise tо the articulable level of suspicion necessary for a seizure by the Ketchum police department. Citizens do not become prospective detainees merely because they are driving late at night and decide to lawfully park on a city street.
The district court’s judgment is therefore vacated and the magistrate’s suppression order is reinstated. This case is remanded to the magistrate division for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Rule 11. Appealable judgments and orders.— An appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme Court from the following judgments and orders:
(c) Criminal Proceеdings. From the following judgments and orders of the district court in a criminal action, whether or not the trial court retains jurisdiction:
(7) An order granting a motion to suppress evidence.
(10) Decisions by the district court on criminal appeals from a magistrate, either dismissing the appeal or affirming, reversing or remanding. [Emphasis added.]