OPINION
¶ 1 After a jury trial, appellant Kenneth May was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) while a person under fifteen years of age was in the vehicle. See A.R.S. § 28-1383(A)(3). The trial court sentenced him to a presumptive prison term of 3.75 years. May raises six issues on appeal, but we find one disposi-tive. He argues, inter alia, the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence. We agree and, because that evidence was significant and prejudicial, we reverse his conviction on that ground. We also preliminarily address a suppression issue because it is likely to recur on remand.
BACKGROUND
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict and re
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solve all reasonable inferences against the appellant.
See State v. Riley,
¶3 Another officer arrived on the scene and arrested May for DUI after observing symptoms of intoxication. During the investigation, an adult male appeared on the scene and told the arresting officer the male passenger was his thirteen-year-old son. With May’s consent, Deputy Curtin, a sheriffs department phlebotomist, drew a sample of May’s blood at the scene. Testing showed he had a .195 percent alcohol concеntration.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
¶4 May first challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, claiming the seizure of his blood violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In reviewing this issue, we consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to upholding the court’s ruling.
State v. Livingston,
¶ 5 May specifically argues the procedure used to take his blood sample was not “performed in a reasonable manner” and thus violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure, citing
Schmerber v. California,
We are thus not presented with the serious questions which would arise if a search involving use of a medical technique, even of the most rudimentary sort, were made by other than medical personnel or in other than a medical environment-for example, if it were administered by police in the privacy of the station house. To tolerate searches under these conditions might be to invite an unjustified element of persоnal risk of infection and pain.
Id.
¶ 6 Although May relies on that language,
Schmerber
“did not attempt to set any specific rules for blood tests conducted outside the hospital setting.”
People v. Esayian,
¶ 7 Deputy Curtin testified at the suppression hearing that he had drawn May’s blood while they stood at the rear of a police car. Wearing protective gloves, Curtin cleaned the surface of May’s arm, plaсed a tourniquet around it, applied an antiseptic to the site of the venipuncture, and secured the arm with one hand while it rested on the trunk of the *455 car. He then drew two vials of blood. Cur-tin also testified that he had experienced no problems during the blood draw and that May had not moved his arm. An expert witness May called testified that Curtin had violated the standard of care by having May stand while his blood was drawn. She testified that doing so creates a risk the individual could pass out or faint, move his arm and cause the needle to fall out, and possibly cause nerve damage.
¶ 8 The trial court found the seizure reasonable because the procedure Curtin used resulted in only a “slightly higher” risk of complications “in a field setting” than those of a clinical setting. 1 We have no basis for disturbing that ruling. May consented to having his blood drawn. And Curtin testified that, based on his knowledge and training, the standard of care required him to clean the arm and “not caus[e] any injury to the patient.” Further, May’s witness testified that on-site and clinical testing are equally rehable and both present possible risks to the patient but, in her opinion, “the risk of injury goes up” with on-site testing.
¶ 9 The trial court essentially determined that the possible increased risks associated with on-site testing did not render the blood draw here unreasonable.
See Schmerber,
¶ 10 May also contends the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress because Curtin was not a trained phlebotomist. But in Arizona, a physician, registered nurse, or other “qualified person” may withdraw blood from the operator of a vehicle to determine his or her alcohol concentration. A.R.S. § 28-1388(A). A phlebotomist is a “qualified person” under the statute.
State ex rel. Pennartz v. Olcavage,
EVIDENCE OF PASSENGER’S AGE
¶ 11 As noted earlier, at the time of the traffic stop there were two other people in May’s ear, a female adult and a younger male. Just before trial started, the prosecutor told the trial court that the state had not located the male passenger or his putative *456 father who had appeared at the scene. 2 Having failed to identify or lоcate that passenger or the father, the state sought to prove the passenger’s age through the arresting officer’s testimony about what the father had told him at the scene. After a brief hearing outside the jury’s presence, the trial court ruled that the state had failed to prove the male passenger was “unavailable.” Ariz. R. Evid. 804(a), 17A A.R.S. Thus, the trial court ruled that Rule 804(b)(4), Ariz. R. Evid., did not apply. But, over May’s objection, the court allowed the officer to testify about that passenger’s age pursuant to Rule 803(19), Ariz. R. Evid., 3 which allows hearsay reputation evidence of various “fact[s] of personal or family history.”
¶ 12 The arresting officer testified at trial that the male passenger “looked very young, like a child, teenager at best.” Based on the passenger’s physical characteristics, the officer opined he was under eighteen years of age. According to the officer, during the investigation a man arrived at the scene, told the officers that he was May’s brother and that the minor passenger was his thirteen-year-old son, and provided the son’s birth date. The officer also testified that the other man ultimately “took custody of the minor,” who “appeared to be happy or joyful ... to see this other male.” May was charged with and convicted of aggravated DUI based on his having committed the underlying offense while a person under the age of fifteen was in the vehicle. § 28-1383(A)(3).
¶ 13 May аrgues the arresting officer’s testimony about the age of the minor male passenger in May’s car constituted inadmissible hearsay and was erroneously admitted, over his objection, pursuant to Rule 803(19). We review this evidentiary issue for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Tucker,
¶ 14 As the trial court correctly noted at one point, the putative father was the out-of-court “declarant” for purposes of Arizona’s hearsay rules. Ariz. R. Evid. 801(b) (“A ‘declarant’ is a person who makes a statеment.”). And, the officer’s testimony about the father’s statements clearly was hearsay. Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”). Hearsay is generally not admissible. Ariz. R. Evid. 802. The question, therefore, is whether that testimony was admissible under the hearsay exception in Rule 803(19). 4
¶ 15 Rule 803(19) is entitled, “[rjeputation concerning personal or family history,” and can apply “even though the declarant is available as a witness.” That rule allows hearsay evidence concerning:
Reputation among members of a person’s family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person’s associates, or in the community, concerning a person’s birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history.
This hearsay exception predates the Arizona Rules of Evidence, and such evidence “ ‘is
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held admissible not only because of the extreme difficulty of producing any better evidence — that is, because it is the best evidence of which the nature of the matter admits — but also because of its general reliability.’ ”
In re Wallin’s Estate,
¶ 16 Here, the “person” to whom Rule 803(19) refers is the male passenger because it is his age or birth date that is at issue. Rule 803(19) generally would allow a father to testify to his son’s age even though he had no personal knowledge of it.
See State v. Cañez,
¶ 17 The hearsay involved here, however, is the putative father’s statement to the officer. Evidence admissible under Rule 803(19) could come from three sources: “(1) family members, (2) the community, and (3) associates.” Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Bergur, 5 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 803.24[2] (2d ed.2001). Because the officer was nоt a member of the male passenger’s or putative father’s family, the issue is whether the officer is “among [their] associates, or ... community.” Ariz. R. Evid. 803(19).
¶ 18 Rule 803(19) extends associates and community to include a victim’s girlfriend.
State v. Medina,
¶ 19 In Blackburn, the plaintiff was fired for having violated the company’s antinepo-tism policy. To rebut that claim, he alleged the company routinely did not enforce the policy. As evidence, he sought to introduce his own testimony that other employees were related, although he lacked personal knowledge of those relationships. The court in Blackburn stated that evidence could be admissible to prove “[t]hat two community members are brothеrs or that a member of the community is another member’s father” because it is likely that such “matters ... have been discussed within the community and ... become well-established ‘facts’ if no reason has been presented to doubt their truth.” Id. at 98. But, the court noted, in order “to testify about someone’s reputation within a community” pursuant to Rule 803(19), one
must demonstrate that he or she knows of the person and is truly familiar with the “community” in which the reputation has been formed, and that the basis оf the reputation is one that is likely to be reliable. Where the alleged reputation is ... a single instance of “someone told me so,” a proper foundation has not been laid for admitting such evidence under Rule 803(19).
Blackburn,
¶ 20 The record does not reflect sufficient “inquiry, discussion, interactions, or familiarity” between the officers and the putative father. Id. at 100. The father and son met the arresting officer for the first time at the *458 scene of a DUI investigation. 6 The father claimed to be May’s brother, gаve the officer the age and date of birth of the minor passenger, and left without showing any identification. The officer was not an associate of either the father or son or a member of their “community” for purposes of Rule 803(19).
¶ 21 Under these circumstances, admitting the statement pursuant to that rule was contrary to its purpose. Testimony of personal or family history is generally admissible because it is believed that “constant (though casual) mention and disсussion of important family affairs” allow other members of the family, community, or associates to “know, as well as anyone can be expected to know, the facts of the matter.” 5 Wigmore, § 1486(a). Here, the putative father’s statement to the officer was not constant and, therefore, was not necessarily reliable. As May correctly points out, “the State called a police officer to repeat what an alleged family member tоld him about the juvenile’s age.”
¶ 22 Accordingly, the trial court erred in admitting the officer’s testimony pursuant to Rule 803(19) because there was insufficient foundation establishing he was an associate of the male passenger or putative father or member of their community. The officer’s testimony was hearsay, not excepted by Rule 803(19) or admissible under any other rule. Evidentiary error, however, is reversible only if the objecting party was prejudiced.
State v. Nordstrom,
¶ 23 Because the evidence in question was significant and prejudiced May, we cannot say its admission was harmless, nor does the state so argue.
See State v. Bass,
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
¶24 In a related argument, May contends that because “there was no admissible evidence that the juvenile was under fifteen,” May’s “felony conviction must be vacated and his offense reduced to a misdemeanor.” As noted above, we agree that only inadmissible hearsay evidence supported the age-of-the-passenger element. 8 But we disagree with May’s implicit suggestion that the state may not retry him on the felony charge of aggravated DUI under § 28-1383(A)(3). 9
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¶25 Although May neither argues nor cites the Double Jeopardy Clause in support of his argument, that clause “ ‘forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.’ ”
State v. Moody,
¶ 26 Here, our reversal of May’s conviction is not based on insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of guilt. Rather, the reversal is solely based on trial error — erroneous introduction of inadmissible hearsay evidence. Under these circumstances, a retrial on the original charge is not precluded.
See Lockhart v. Nelson,
DISPOSITION
¶ 27 May’s conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. 10
Notes
. May also contends the trial court applied an incorrect standard by requiring him to show "the blood draw result[ed] in actual injuty” rather than considering whether it posed an unreasonable risk. We disagree. The trial court specifically stated that, "to prevail..., [May] must establish that the search placed him at unreаsonable risk of harm or injury.” Similarly, the court ruled that the procedure Curtin had used did not "place[] [May] at any unnecessary risk of injury.” In addition, although the trial court mentioned the possibility of various civil remedies should a blood draw go awry, read in context, the court’s Fourth Amendment ruling did not hinge on that possibility, contrary to May's contention.
. The investigating officers failed to obtain or record the name, address, or other identification of the putative father with whom they hаd spoken at the scene.
. The hearsay exception set forth in Rule 804(b)(4), Ariz. R. Evid., permits certain evidence relating to personal or family history "if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.” In contrast, the hearsay exceptions prescribed in Rule 803 apply "even though the declarant is available as a witness." The trial court rejected the state's "proffer of evidence under [Rule] 804(b)(4)” because the state had failed to show the male pаssenger was unavailable under Rule 804(a). Although the court made no finding on whether the passenger’s putative father was unavailable, the state made no showing that he was and only sought a ruling that the passenger was "unavailable for the trial” because he might have left the state.
. The arresting officer’s testimony about the putative father’s statemeifts was admitted solely under Rule 803(19). The state did not argue below or on appeal, nor did the trial court find, that the evidence was admissible under the "catch-all” hearsay exception in Rule 803(24). But, in view of the court's finding that the state had not established "that the witness is unavailable pursuant to [Rule] 804(a)(5),” we presume the state similarly could not have satisfied the "reasonable efforts” requirement of Rule 803(24)(B). Nor does the record reflect that the state complied, or attempted to comply, with the procedural notice requirements of that rule.
. We are aware of оnly two Arizona cases discussing this hearsay exception after the Arizona Rules of Evidence were adopted.
State v. Cañez,
. The record does not reflect any discussion at all between the police officers and the minor male passenger about the latter’s age. But even had any such discussion occurred, it would not necessarily change the analysis or result here.
. Because we find the trial court erred in admitting the officer’s testimony pursuant to Rule 803(19), Ariz. R. Evid., we do not address May’s alternative argument, relying on
Crawford v. Washington,
. In arguing that sufficient evidence supported the age element of the charge, the state relies solely on the arresting officer’s hearsay testimony about what the putative father had told him at the scene.
. The cases May cites for a contrary conclusion,
State v. McGann,
. We do not address several other arguments May raises that might or might not arise on remand.
See State v. Thomas,