STATE OF OHIO v. CURTIS MATTHEWS
Appellate Case No. 23953
In the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second Appellate District, Montgomery County
April 29, 2011
2011-Ohio-2067
Trial Court Case No. 08-CR-137; Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court
OPINION
Rendered on the 29th day of April, 2011.
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by R. LYNN NOTHSTINE, Atty. Reg. #0061560, Montgomery County Prosecutor‘s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
KRISTINE E. COMUNALE, Atty. Reg. #0062037, Law Office of the Public Defender, 117 South Main Street, Suite 400, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
HALL, J.
{¶ 1} The state appeals from a trial court‘s order dismissing an indictment that charged the defendant, Curtis Matthews, with the offense of tampering with records. The trial court determined that the time specified in Ohio‘s speedy-trial provisions within which Matthews had to be brought to trial for this offense was expired. We agree. Also, the Fifth
I
{¶ 2} Matthews was indicted on December 22, 2006, on one count of theft by deception in violation of
{¶ 3} A little over a year later, on February 22, 2008, Matthews was indicted again. This indictment charged him with one count of tampering with records in violation of
{¶ 4} On April 22, 2008, Matthews moved to dismiss the 2008 indictment. He argued that the time specified in Ohio‘s speedy-trial provisions within which the state had to bring him to trial for this offense was expired. Matthews contended that the state knew in 2006 that he had two driver‘s licenses and used them to commit the theft, so it was in 2006 that the speedy-trial clock began to run on the tampering-with-records charge. The time specified in the speedy-trial provisions expired before he was charged in 2008. Matthews also argued that prosecuting him for tampering with records, when he had already been convicted
{¶ 5} Although the state had requested a hearing, the trial court did not hold one. Instead, based on the parties’ written arguments, the court sustained the motion to dismiss, finding that the speedy-trial time for the tampering with records offense had expired. The court did not address the double-jeopardy issue.
{¶ 6} The state appealed to this court, and this court reversed. See State v. Matthews, Montgomery App. No. CA 23051, 2009-Ohio-6694. That decision noted that the state‘s concession formed the basis of the trial court‘s decision: “Relying on the State‘s concession, the trial court reasoned: ‘It is difficult for the Court to imagine how the original indictment for theft might have been returned without determining that the Defendant had tampered with government records to “facilitate or effectuate” the theft.’ The court found that, with respect to the two driver‘s licenses Defendant used to commit the 2006 theft offense, ‘the State had knowledge that these “different persons” were one and the same person, which knowledge formed the basis for its 2006 indictment.‘” Id. at ¶5. Ultimately, we concluded that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing–an error that precluded us from reviewing the error assigned. We remanded for the court to hold a hearing.
{¶ 7} At the evidentiary hearing, the defense submitted the discovery packet that the
{¶ 8} The only witness to testify at the evidentiary hearing was the Ohio State Highway Patrol trooper who investigated the tampering charge. According to the trooper, Matthews first applied for a second driver‘s license in 2000. Since then, he has continually renewed both licenses by filing renewal applications for both. The trooper said that the license renewal on July 1, 2004, was the act that led to the 2008 tampering-with-records charge.
{¶ 9} He said that his investigation involved acquisition of the applications for renewal of the driver‘s licenses, and unsuccessful attempts to interview the defendant who could not be located. As indicated, the State Patrol investigation did not begin until February 16, 2007, and ended when it referred the case to the Montgomery County Prosecutor a year later, in February 2008.
{¶ 10} On March 23, 2010, the trial court again sustained the motion to dismiss. The court said in its written decision that the evidence presented at the hearing supported the facts upon which its prior decision was based. The trial court did not address the double-jeopardy issue. Instead, adopting the rationale of its prior decision, the court once again dismissed the 2008 indictment on speedy trial grounds.
{¶ 11} The state once again appealed.
II
{¶ 12} The state alleges in its sole assignment of error that the trial court erred by sustaining Matthews‘s motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of Ohio‘s speedy-trial provisions. Such an appeal presents us with a mixed question of fact and law. See State v. Brown (1998), 131 Ohio App.3d 387, 391. In reviewing a mixed question, we must defer to the trial court‘s supported findings of fact but review the application of the law to those facts de novo. See id. The state contends that the tampering charge initiated a new speedy-trial time. The state also contends that the charge does not implicate the Fifth Amendment‘s Double Jeopardy Clause. We conclude that the Fifth Amendment does not preclude the defendant‘s Tampering prosecution, but that the trial court did not err in dismissing the case on speedy trial grounds.
I. The State knew the facts to pursue the Tampering-with-Records in 2006
{¶ 13} In its previous opinion, this court stated:
{¶ 14} “When charges filed in separate earlier and later criminal actions arise from the same facts and the State knew of those facts when the earlier action was filed, the statute of limitations applicable to the charges in the later action commences to run when the limitation period commenced to run on the charges in the earlier action. State v. Adams (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 67; State v. Bonarrigo (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 80. The rule does not apply when the charges in the later action arise from different facts or the State did not know of those facts when the earlier action was filed. State v. Baker, 78 Ohio St.3d 108, 1997-Ohio-229. Additional crimes based on different facts should not be considered as arising from the same sequence of events for the purpose of speedy trial computation. Id.
{¶ 16} “To prevail on his speedy trial motion, Defendant was required to show that the State was aware in 2006 that Defendant had obtained a falsified driver‘s license, not merely that he used a falsified license to commit a theft....” State v. Matthews, Montgomery App. No. CA 23051, 2009-Ohio-6694, ¶ 8-10.
{¶ 17} On remand the trial court concluded that “The evidence adduced at the hearing supported those facts upon which the Court based its October 28, 2008 decision, and neither dispelled any of these facts nor supplied new facts such that the Court‘s decision would be otherwise....” In the original October 28, 2008 decision, the trial court had effectively concluded that the State of Ohio knew of the information necessary to pursue the Tampering charge at the time it pursued the indictment for the Theft charge. On the specific facts of this case, that conclusion is not unreasonable. The State of Ohio admitted it knew the defendant
II. The Double Jeopardy Clause Is Not Implicated
{¶ 18} In his motion to dismiss, Matthews argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause also required the trial court to dismiss the 2008 indictment. Matthews argued that, by charging him with tampering with records, the indictment subjects him to a second prosecution for the same offense. Matthew argued in the alternative that the state is collaterally estopped from prosecuting him for this offense. Although the trial court did not address either argument, we briefly will.
{¶ 19} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
{¶ 20} In this case, we do not even get to the Blockburger test because the test‘s threshold condition is not satisfied. There is no act or transaction charged that violates both the tampering-with-records provision and theft provision. Wrongfully obtaining food stamps was the act that violated the theft provision. But the act that violated the tampering-with-records provision was wrongfully falsifying, destroying, removing, concealing, altering, defacing, or mutilating a writing, computer software, data, or record. Not only are these different acts but they were committed at different times.
{¶ 21} “The Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel,” In re Burton, 160 Ohio App.3d 750, 2005-Ohio-2210, at ¶10, citing State v. Lovejoy (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 440, 444, which Matthews argues applies here. “Collateral estoppel is the doctrine that recognizes that a determination of facts litigated between two parties in a proceeding is binding on those parties in all future proceedings.” State v. Duncan, 154 Ohio App.3d 254, 2003-Ohio-4695, at ¶47, citing Lovejoy, at 443. It “means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Ashe v. Swenson (1970), 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469. The doctrine “generally applies in the case of a previous acquittal.” Burton, at ¶10, citing Lovejoy, at 444 (saying that “[c]ollateral estoppel generally refers to the acquittal prong of double jeopardy“).
{¶ 22} It is not clear from Matthews‘s brief what ultimate fact he believes has been
III
{¶ 23} The trial court‘s order dismissing the 2008 indictment charging Matthews with tampering with records is Affirmed.
GRADY, P.J., and DONOVAN, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
R. Lynn Nothstine
Kristine E. Comunale
Hon. Gregory F. Singer
