State v. MatthewsState v. Matthews
Lee S. Matthews was indicted by the grand jury for the second degree murder of Dorothy A. Pennino in violation of
FACTS
Defendant and his stepson, James Marchadie, were originally charged together with the murder of Dorothy Pennino. Marchadie, age 24, pled guilty to manslaughter in July 1981 and was sentenced to serve seventeen years at hard labor. He testified at defendant‘s trial in April 1982 that defendant and he had decided the night of June 29, 1980 to make Mrs. Pennino, their next door neighbor, stop her constant quarrelling with their family. Defendant and Mrs. Pennino had had an affair which apparently defendant had broken off some time before. Thereafter, Mrs. Pennino had
Mrs. Pennino‘s body was found floating at the edge of the canal the next night, June 30, 1980. On the roadway above, the police discovered jewelry and other items belonging to Mrs. Pennino, a pool of blood and a pair of sunglasses belonging to one of defendant‘s stepchildren. Dr. Patrick Besant-Matthews, the pathologist who performed the autopsy, testified that the cause of death was drowning. He was unable to determine whether or not the victim had been beaten about the face because of the significant tissue deterioration caused by exposure to water and marine organisms. He further testified that while he had found evidence of alcohol in Mrs. Pennino, much of that was produced by the body‘s decompensation or fermentation and thus she probably had had two or three drinks at most before her death.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
Defendant contends the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that the state did not prove defendant caused the victim‘s death. He argues that the victim died from drowning rather than from injuries sustained in the beating.
In a prosecution for murder, the criminal agency of defendant as the cause of the victim‘s death must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. This court has held that “[i]t is not essential that the act of the defendant should have been the sole cause of the death; if it hastened the termination of life, or contributed, mediately or immediately, to the death, in a degree sufficient to be a clearly contributing cause, that is sufficient.” State v. Wilson, 114 La. 398, 38 So. 397 (1905) (death from pneumonia caused by gunshot wound); State v. Matthews, 38 La.Ann. 795 (1886); State v. Scott, 12 La.Ann. 274 (1857). A similar standard for determining causation-in-fact approved by LaFave and Scott in their treatise on criminal law was adopted by this court in State v. Durio, 371 So.2d 1158 (La.1979): “Was the defendant‘s conduct a substantial factor in bringing about the forbidden result?” W. LaFave and A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 35, at 250 (1972). Accord F. Wharton, Criminal Law § 26, at 126 (14th ed. 1978); O. Warren, Homicide § 71 (1938); see also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977) (defendant‘s conduct was a “sufficiently direct cause of the ensuing death” under New York law to sustain a conviction of murder in the second degree where defendant and another
It is equally clear that the legal cause of Mrs. Pennino‘s death was the beating inflicted on her by defendant. He battered the victim into unconsciousness by smashing her head into concrete and then left her body in an isolated spot at night on the slope directly above the canal where she was found drowned the next evening. While the immediate cause of death was drowning, these acts of defendant were a clearly contributing cause even if the victim rolled, crawled or stumbled into the water.
In sum, the evidence clearly supports findings that defendant had specific intent to at least inflict great bodily harm on Mrs. Pennino and that his conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about her death. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of second degree murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Therefore, the motion for a new trial was properly denied.
Assignment of Error No. 2 is without merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 3 AND 4
Defendant contends the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial on the ground the state failed to prove he beat the victim except by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
Marchadie testified that he was present and helped while defendant beat Mrs. Pennino into unconsciousness. The trial judge instructed the jury on the credibility of witnesses and specifically on accomplice testimony. See State v. Hamilton, 312 So.2d 656 (La.1975). The jury in weighing Marchadie‘s credibility had the benefit of a full cross-examination which revealed no promises were made in exchange for his prior plea of guilty to manslaughter, seventeen-year sentence and testimony at defendant‘s trial.
A jury may convict upon an accomplice‘s uncorroborated testimony. State v. Hamilton, supra; State v. Matassa, 222 La. 363, 62 So.2d 609 (1952). This court on appeal will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a factfinder‘s determination of guilt. State v. Trosclair, 443 So.2d 1098 (La.1983). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find a rational trier of fact could have concluded the state proved defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Hence, the trial judge did not err in denying the motion for a new trial.
Assignments of Error Nos. 3 and 4 are without merit.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, defendant‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.