68 W. Va. 89 | W. Va. | 1910
Alma Montgomery and others have appealed from a decree of the circuit court of Fayette county, made on December 6, 1907, permitting L. E. Poteet and E. L. Nuckols to redeem from alleged forfeiture a tract of 100 acres of land claimed by appellants.
Peachy Williams became the owner in 1865 of a larger tract of land and in 1869 she and her husband, Linas Williams, attempted to convey out of it the 100 acres in question, in fee, to Elias Lively. This deed is inoperative as a conveyance of the wife’s interest, because of defects in the certificate of her acknowledgment. » Linas Williams died in 1895, and his wife Peachy died prior thereto. Poteet and Nuckols claim the land
Appellants claim title to the same land as follows, viz: deed from H. A. Robson, commissioner of school lands, to J. M. Johnson, May 28, 1890; J. M. Johnson and wife to Meredith Settle, July 1,1891; and Meredith Settle to appellants, February 18, 1901. In order to ascertain the State’s title, and what right, if any, it had to sell the land in 1890 we must return to the deed made by Peachy Williams and her husband in 1869 to Elias Lively. Notwithstanding this deed was inoperative to convey the wife’s fee simple estate, it nevertheless purported to convey the fee; and Elias Lively and wife conveyed it to M. A. Eisher-, Janua^ 16, 1871. M. A. Eisher made no conveyance of the land, and died intestate in 1874, leaving two children— Mary A., who married Elias Humphreys, and Eliza J., who married Joseph Woods. L. E. Poteet and E. L. Nuckols also claim, by mesne conveyances from these two heirs of Margaret’ A. Eisher, whatever title or right, if any, in the land descended to them on the death of their mother. The land does not appear to have been, for any considerable length of time, in the actual possession' of any one. The state, claiming the land by virtue of delinquent tax sales made in the name of M. A. Eisher prior to 1890, in that year proceeded by H. A. Robson, commissioner of school lands, to sell it, and did sell it at public sale to J. M. Johnson at the price of $250; and on the 28th of May, 1890, said Johnson received from the commissioner a deed. Whatever title was thereby vested in J. M. Johnson has passed by the several m\e&rte conveyances to appellants, as above set forth.
At April rules, 1902, another commissioner of school lands, successor to H. A. Robson, filed a petition against this land, .again alleging its forfeiture to the state in the name of M. A. EishePs heirs for non-entry from 1885 to 1902. This petition is against “the unknown heirs of M. A. Eisher dee’d.,” and avers their right to redeem. These appellants filed their petition in that proceeding averring their title and the manner of its ac
Shortly before this decree of reference was made L. E. Poteet and E. L. Nuckols had filed their joint petition in the cause, praying to be allowed to redeem. And J. M. Richards had, in June 1902, filed an original bill against appellants praying for a cancellation of the deeds through which they claimed title A demurrer'to this bill was sustained; and at the November rules, 1903, a joint amended bill was filed by said Richards, Poteet and Nuckols. Appellants demurred to, and answered, the amended bill, and the two causes were heard together upon the pleadings, petition, the reports of the commissioner, exceptions thereto, and depositions of witnesses; and on the 6th of December, 1907, the decree complained of was made.
The commissioner reported that the land had been sold three times for delinquent taxes in the name of Mí A. Fisher; first in 1881, second in 1886, and again in January 1888; that it liad not been redeemed and was forfeited to the State; that it had been stricken from the land books in 1886, and did not thereafter appear until 1891 when it was charged to J. M. Johnson; that it was sold in May 1890 by H. A. Robson, commissioner of school lands, and purchased by J. M.- Johnson at the price of $250; that on the 28th of May, 1890, said commissioner conveyed it to said Johnson by deed. This portion of the commissioner’s report is not excepted to, and being a report upon matters of fact, must be taken as true. Chapman v. Pittsburg & S. R. Co., 18 W. Va. 184; Ward v. Ward, 21 Id. 262; Lynch v. Henry, 25 Id. 416; Chapman v. McMillan, 27 Id. 220; Poling v. Huffman, 48 Id. 639. The report also ascertains that M. A.
The principal error we find is in the court’s holding that, by the tax sale, and forfeiture, the State did not acquire title to an estate in fee in the land. Some of the other errors assigned result from the effort -of the court to apply this erroneous principle in determining the rights of the petitioners.
Appellees, in brief of counsel, deny that there was any forfeiture. But they are stopped from denying a forfeiture for two reasons, (1) in the original bill filed by J. M. Richards the forfeiture is alleged, and the amended bill filed by him, Poteet and FPuckols jointly, adopts this allegation. They have thus admitted it by their pleadings. (2) The commissioner reports that the State purchased the land for delinquent taxes and that it was not redeemed and there is no exception to this finding. Moreover, it appears from the report that the land was off the books from 1886 to 1890, both inclusive. This, of course, works a forfeiture. But counsel insists that the whole of the year 1890 would be necessary to complete the forfeiture, and that the land was sold by the' State to Johnson in May of that year. In reply to this point we say that in order for the land to appear on the land books for assessment purposes for 1890, it must have been entered thereon before the first of April, as the law then was, and not appearing on the books on the first of April, 1890, it was properly regarded as not appearing on the books for that assessment year. But the State’s title did.not depend wholly upon a forfeiture for non-entry. It was a purchaser of the land for delinquent taxes. The commissioner reported that it had been sold long prior to that time, as many as three times, for delinquent taxes in the name of M. A. Fisher, and each time was
The important question is, what estate in the land did the' state acquire? It is admitted that, according to the decisions of this Court, notably in Laidley v. Land Co., 30 W. Va. 505, and Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 32 W. Va. 134, Elias Lively acquired no greater estate in the land under his deed from Peachy Williams and her husband, than an estate for the life of Linas Williams, because of the fatal omissions in the certificate of acknowledgment to the deed by the married woman. The deed from Elias Lively and wife to Margaret A. Fisher could convey no greater estate than this. Margaret A. Fisher was therefore the owner of an estate in the land only during the life of Linas Williams. But this is a freehold estate, 2 Min. Inst. 71 and 1 Bouvier’s Law Dic. p. 693; and section 54, chapter 29, Code of West Virginia, treats the person who has the freehold estate as the owner of the land for purposes of taxation. The full value of the land in fee is assessed for taxation against such freeholder, and the payment of taxes by him protects from sale and forfeiture the estate in reversion, or remainder. On the other hand, his failure to pay the taxes, or to keep the land on the assessor’s books, will render the entire estate in the land liable to be sold, or to become forfeited. Our assessment laws make no provision for separating the two estates, and valuing each to its respective owner, in case one has the life estate and the other the remainder in fee. When the plan of assessing the land itself, and not simply an estate therein, is pursued by law, there seems to be no question of the right of a state legislature to provide for the sale, and forfeiture of the fee simple estate, on the failure of the life tenant, who is assessed, with the taxes, to pay the same and to keep the land on the land books. Cooley on Taxation, 960; Black on Tax Titles, sec 421. Has our legislature made such provision? Section 25, chapter 31, Code of West Virginia 1906, is in part as follows, viz: “When the purchaser of any real estate so sold8 and not redeemed as aforesaid, his assignee, or heirs or devisees,
Section 32 of same chapter operates, in cases of tax purchases made on behalf of the state, to invest the state, on the failure of the former owner to redeem within one year, with “such estate, right, title and interest in the real estate mentioned in such lists as would have been vested in an individual, purchaser thereof at such sale who had obtained proper deeds therefor and caused them to be admitted to record in the proper office.” In view of these statutes, - the State acquired by its purchase at the delinquent tax sale, not only the estate of Margaret A. Fisher for the life of Linas Williams, but also the estate in remainder of Peachy Williams and her heirs. .
It is admitted that neither Peachy Williams, nor her heirs, have had the land assessed with taxes in her, or their names, and that they have paid no taxes chargeable thereon since
But we think subsequent legislation has cured whatever defect in the state’s title there was, if any, for failure to make the heirs of Margaret A. Fisher, deceased, parties to the state’s petition; and, therefore, we are not called upon to decide what effect such omission would otherwise have had on the title. The legislature has a constitutional right to provide for the sale of the state’s lands, either by a proceeding ex parte and ministerial, or by a judicial proceeding inter partes, regardless of the means by which the state acquired title. In fact, prior to the enactment of chapter 95, Acts 1882, amending the law concerning proceedings for the sale of the state’s land, there was no provision for making the former owner, or claimant, a party. The
This act is expressly retroactive, and it cures any defects in proceedings had to sell the state’s land prior to the passage of the act. It does not cure defects resulting only from mere error, but it extends to and cures defects which relate to jurisdiction. The language is “notwithstanding any irregularity or error in such proceeding or informality in such sale or conveyance, or want of jurisdiction in the court to decree such' sale.” It goes even farther than this, and vests in the purchaser all other- title which the state may thereafter have acquired, provided the purchaser has not suffered his own title to become forfeited. This statute completely estops'the state, after it has once sold the land, from proceeding to sell it again under any claim thereto whatever, except for a subsequent forfeiture of the title of the purchaser or those claiming under him. See also State v. Jackson, 56 W. Va. 558; State v. King, 64 W. Va. 546; and Cecil v. Clark, 44 W. Va. opinion on pages 674-675 and 676. ’Although these cases were decided before the statute, we are now considering was passed,
In 1902 the state was without title to the land and should not have brought the present suit. It is a fundamental principle, that in order to authorize the state to institute proceedings under chapter 105 of the code for the sale of its land, it must have title. We do not understand this to mean, however, that the state must have the only title, or even the best title to the land. But when it proceeds against land as forfeited it must show itself to be the owner of, at least, some forfeited title. Section 1 of chapter 105, Code; Twiggs v. Chevallie, 4 W. Va. 463; Strader v. Goff, 6 W. Va. 257; State v. Collins, 48 W. Va. 64; and State v. Jackson, 56 W. Va. 558. By the present suit the state is proceeding against the same land, claiming it as forfeited in the name of M. A. Fisher’s heirs, that it sold and conveyed by commissioner’s deed to J. M. Johnson in 1890, as forfeited in the name of M. A. Fisher. The state is claiming the right to sell the land the second time on account of the same forfeited title. It is estopped from doing so.' State v. Jackson, 56 W. Va. 558; and State v. King, 65 W. Va. 611, (Pt. 2 Syl.); and Id.546 (Pt. 17 Syl.).
There was no. forfeiture of the title which J. M. Johnson acquired from the state. The face of the decree made in May, 1902, permitting these appellants to redeem shows there had
The court entertained the prevent suit apparently upon the theory that the state’ had acquired only such title in the land as was vested in M. A. Fisher át the time of the forfeiture; that by the proceeding in 1890 J. M. Johnson acquired no greater title than this; and, consequently, that- the title of Peachy Williams, and her heirs, to the estate in remainder was forfeited for non-entry after the death of Linas Williams, which occurred in 1895; and that the state had a right to dispose of such estate in remainder in fee. But, as we have before stated, this theory of the law is incorrect, At the time of t-lie sale to Johnson the state was seized of an estate in fee in the land, and by deed to Johnson in 1890 he acquired all the title then in the state.
For the reasons hereinbefore given, the independent suit brought by Richards, Poteet and Nuckols, against these appellants, and which was united with the state’s proceeding, should have been dismissed. Plaintiffs had neither title to the land nor right to redeem, and, therefore, no standing in court. Despard v. Pearcy, 65 W. Va. 140.
It is insisted that the deed from the commissioner to J. M. Johnson is void for want of proper description of the land conveyed. The deed describes the land as “a tract of 100 acres of land situate in Fayetteville District on Mossey Creek, Fay-ette County, West Virginia.” Moreover, it refers to the eom-
Counsel for appellees, in his brief, insists that the payment of the taxes on the land since the purchase by J. M. Johnson, by those claiming under him, has prevented a forfeiture of the Peachy Williams title. But we have already found that, by the purchase of the land under the delinquent tax sale and' the failure of the owner to redeem, the state acquired the entire estate, the fee simple in the land. Moreover, the amended bill filed by appellees, as well as the original bill filed by J. M. Eichards, admits a forfeiture and prays that plaintiffs may be allowed to redeem.
Counsel for appellees insists that since the act of 1882, chapter 30, amending and re-enacting chapter 30 of the Code as previously amended and re-enacted by chapter 117 of the Acts of 1872-3, there is no statute forfeiting tracts of land of less than one thousand :acres in quantity for non-entry on the land books. We can hardly think counsel is serious in this contention, notwithstanding he has devoted a considerable portion of his brief to a discussion of this point. If such is the state of our law we must admit a surprise to find it so. But we do not think counsel has correctly interpreted the statute. Pie argues, and with much apparent plausibility, that by the use of the word “since” in that portion of section 39 of the act of 1882, relating to the forfeiture of small tracts of land, which reads as follows: “And when for any five successive years since the ninth day of April one thousand eight hundred and seventy three, the owner of any tract or lot of land, less in quantity than one thousand acres.” etc., instead of the word “after” as used in the corresponding provision in section 39 of chapter 117 of the Acts of 1872-3, the Legislature intended to limit the time when the forfeiture for non-entry of such smaller tracts should occur to the time betwéen April 9, 1873
In the following cases the word “since”, as used in certain statutes to define their duration, has been construed by the courts to include time after the passage of the act. Jones v. Bank, 9 Atl. 22 (Me.); Roland Park Co. v. State, 31 Atl. 298 (Md.).
The decree complained of will he reversed, and a decree will be entered by this Court sustaining the exceptions taken to the commissioner’s report by appellants, and dismissing the State’s petition, so far as it relates to the tract of 100 acres of land in question, and also dismissing the bill of J. M. Richards and the amended bill of said Richards, L. E. Poteet and E. L. Nuckolls with costs to appellants against said Richards, L. E. Poteet and E. L. Nuekols in this Court, and also their costs accruing in the court below, since the 22nd day of April, 1902.
Reversed and Rendered.