State v. MasseyState v. Massey
The defendant, Brian Massey, is charged with possession of cocaine. The trial court granted his motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence or suspicion to execute an investigatory stop authorized by
FACTS
LEGALITY OF THE SEIZURE
The United States and Louisiana Constitutions prohibit unreasonable
Authorization for a temporary stop withоut arrest by police of a person in a public place is set forth in
A. A law enforcement officer may stop a рerson in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions.
B. When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this Article and reasonably suspects that he is in danger, he may frisk the outer clothing of such person for a dangerous weapon. If the law enforcement officer reasonably suspects the persоn possesses a dangerous weapon, he may search the person.
In order to stop a person temporаrily to facilitate an investigation, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Jones, 483 So.2d 1207 (La. App. 4th Cir.1986). writ den. 488 So.2d 197 (La.1986). “Reasonable suspicion” is something less than the probable cause requried for an arrest, and the reviewing court must look to the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether the detaining officer had sufficient facts within his knowledge to justify an infringement of the suspect‘s rights. State v. Belton, 441 So.2d 1195 (La.1983), cert. den., Belton v. Louisiana, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct. 2158, 80 L.Ed.2d 543 (1984); State v. Jones, supra.
In this case, the officers obtained a рrecise, correct description from the informant of a man alleged to be selling cocaine in a high crime area. The defendant was observed leaning into a car stopped in the middle of the street, an act not illegal in itself, but consistent with the sale of drugs. The officers, based on these circumstances, intended to stop and question the defendant as authоrized by
A person‘s liberty and privacy, his right to be free from governmental interference, is not violated simply because a police officer attempts to converse with him, as long as the рerson is free to disregard the questioning and walk away. U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); State v. Lanter, 391 So.2d 1152 (La.1980); State v. Duplessis, 391 So.2d 1116 (La.1980). If property is abandoned without any prior unlawful intrusion into a person‘s right to be free from governmental interference, that property may be seized lawfully. In such cases there is no expectation of privacy and thus no violation of the person‘s custodial rights. Only when the person is actually stopped without, at least, “reasonable suspicion,” or when a stop without reasonable suspicion is imminent, is the “right to be left alone” violatеd and the seizure of the abandoned property unlawful. State v. Belton, above. See also State v. Andrishok, 434 So.2d 389 (La.1983) and State v. Lambertus, 482 So.2d 812 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986).
In this case the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop the defendant and question him. The informant accused defendant of illegally selling drugs and provided policе with a specific, accurate description of defendant and his location. The officers were duty bound to investigate the complaint and were authorized to stop defendant and question him regarding the accusation.
Defendant correctly perceived that a stop was imminent and abandoned his
The defendant argues that State v. Ruffin, 448 So.2d 1274 (La.1984) and State v. Chopin, 372 So.2d 1222 (La.1979) control. Ruffin was based upon lack of probable cause to arrest a defendant, not upon a lack of reasonable suspicion to stop аnd question. In the Chopin case, the officers did not receive any information concerning illegal activities. They observed that when the defendant, who was walking down the street carrying a bag, observed the officers, he became nervous, began walking fastеr and then ran from the officers, who stopped, questioned and arrested him. Ruffin and Chopin rely upon and apply the same legal principles cited, relied upon and applied in this opinion. The significantly distinguishable facts of those cases, however, make their results inapplicable to the case before us.
The district court erred by granting defendant‘s motion to suppress the cocaine. We, therefore, reverse that judgment and enter judgment denying the motion to suppress. The matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.