State v. MartzState v. Martz
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Joseph
Defendant appeals her conviction for frequenting a place where controlled substances are used.
The state concedes that the elements of frequenting are not necessarily included in the statutory definition of possession. 1 It also acknowledges that the indictment did not allege facts establishing the elements of frequenting. It follows that the trial court lacked authority to convict defendant for that offense. See State v. Moroney, 289 Or 597, 616 P2d 471 (1980).
The state argues that we should not consider the trial court’s error, because defendant failed to preserve it below. However, the error is plain on the face of the record. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction.
Reversed.
Notes
Under
“[a] person commits the offense of frequenting a place where controlled substances are used if the person keeps, maintains, frequents, or remains at a place, while knowingly permitting persons to use controlled substances in such place or to keep or sell them in violation ofORS 475.005 to 475.285,475.295 and 475.940 to 475.995.”
The word “permitting” in the statute means
“that one who, (1) having legal authority over persons who use, keep, or sell illegal controlled substances, at the specified place where the defendant frequents or remains, (2) authorizes or consents to such use, possession, or sale.” State v. Pyritz, 90 Or App 601, 605, 752 P2d 1310 (1988).
“It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance * *
The statutory definition of “possess” is “to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over property.”