OPINION
T1 Joe Arthur Martinez Jr. appeals his conviction and the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Martinez argues that the trial court erred when it denied his suppression motion because police officers effectuated a traffic stop of a vehicle in which Martinez was a passenger without reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal behavior and, therefore, violated his constitutional rights under the federal and Utah constitutions. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
12 Because of the fact-dependent nature of search and seizure inquiries, we review the relevant facts in detail.
1
On February 2, 2006, the cashier of an Ogden Texaco service station called the Weber County Sheriff's Office to report that suspicious individuals were pacing outside of the store. At the suppression hearing, Deputy Michael Streker testified that the cashier described three individuals-one female wearing a gray hoodie and two males, one of whom was wearing a beanie. According to Deputy Streker, the cashier stated that "the female would walk up to the ... front doors, and when a customer would walk in, the female would then walk away to the east side of the building where the two males were located." As Deputy Streker arrived at the Texaco to investigate, within two minutes of the cashier's call, dispatch notified him that two of the individuals had just left the Texaco as passengers in a tan, gold, or beige car. Dispatch gave him the license plate number, and almost immediately thereafter, he located and stopped the vehicle.
2
The backseat passengers matched the description given by the cashier, and Deputy Streker testified that
ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
13 Martinez argues that his constitutional rights were violated when Deputy Streker stopped the vehicle in which he was a passenger.
5
We review a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress for correctness, "giving no deference to the [triall court's application of the law to the facts." State v. Yazzie,
ANALYSIS
§4 The Fourth Amendment protects a person's right to be free from "unrea
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime ...; (8) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense had been committed or is being committed.
State v. Markland,
15 The United States Supreme Court has further clarified the term "reasonable, articulable suspicion":
The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements, each of which must be present before a stop is permissible. First, the assessment must be based upon all of the cireumstances. The analysis proceeds with various objective observations, information from police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions-inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.
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The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process just described must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. ...
United States v. Cortez,
16 Thus, the only issue in this case is whether the officer who stopped the vehicle had reasonable, articulable suspicion that Martinez and his companions had committed any of the recent convenience store robberies in the area, were planning or attempting to rob the Texaco station, or both. Martinez first argues that the articulation of Deputy Streker's reasonable suspicion must be limited to only those facts he personally observed or independently verified. We disagree.
17 "[Plolice officers can rely on a dispatched report in making an investigatory stop," as long as "the dispatched report contain[s] articulable facts to support a finding of reasonable suspicion." State v. Pena, 869
«T8 Deputy Streker relied on a dispatched report based on a call from the cashier at the Texaco. The cashier was "a reliable source," given her status as an unbiased, "identified citizen-informant."
7
Salt Lake City v. Bench,
T 9 Moreover, even if Deputy Streker were required to corroborate the witness's report, he did so in this case. Deputy Streker arrived at the scene two minutes after he received the dispatched report and found "the person[s], the vehicle and the location substantially as described by the informant." Mulcahy,
10 Even considering all of the facts contained in the dispatched report and the additional facts known to Deputy Streker, the issue of whether or not reasonable articulable suspicion existed at the time of the stop poses a close question. Our decision turns on the factual nuances of this case as compared to those from other authoritative search and seizure cases.
11 In Terry v. Ohio,
There is nothing unusual in two men standing together on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone. Nor is there anything suspicious about people in such cireumstances strolling up and down the street, singly or in pairs. Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked in. But the story is quite different where, as here, two men hover about a street corner for an extended period of time, at the end of which it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or anything; where these men pace alternately along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; where each completion of this route is followed immediately by a conference between thetwo men on the corner; where they are joined in one of these conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly; and where the two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks away. It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years' experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior further.
Id. at 22-23,
112 The facts here are similar to those in Terry. The suspects in Terry were loitering around a store and repeatedly peering through its windows. See id. at 6,
13 In addition, the facts and time line of this case are similar to those present in Terry. First, the officer stopped the vehicle in which Martinez was a passenger on the same street where the Texaco is located. Likewise, although the officer in Terry stopped the suspicious men on a different-but adjoining-street, the stop occurred "a couple of blocks away" from where they were peering in the window.
8
See
T14 The Terry Court, however, also stated that "further investigation" is warranted when "two men hover about a street corner for an extended period of time, at the end of which it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or anything." Id. at 23,
15 Although the similarities with Terry-as well as the additional facts that exist in the present case-convince us that Deputy Streker's actions were consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a review of similar Utah cases is also informative.
T 16 In State v. Markland,
117 In Markland, there were fewer factors pointing toward reasonable, articulable suspicion than in the present case. The call to police about sereaming in the area did not provide any additional information. Police, who arrived within five minutes of the call, had no idea who screamed, from where it emanated, or why the unknown person screamed.
9
Further, even assuming a crime had been committed, there was nothing whatsoever to identify Markland specifically as a possible suspect. See id. ¶ 2. Additionally, there is no discussion about the source of the call, and thus no analysis as to its reliability. See id. ¶ 25 n. 2; see also id. ¶¶ 38-41 (Durham, J., dissenting). Recognizing that the lateness of the hour alone is not sufficient to support reasonable, articulable suspicion, see, e.g., State v. Carpena,
118 The Utah Supreme Court also held that the cireumstances supported reasonable, articulable suspicion in State v. Bruce,
119 As in Bruce, the color and general description of the convenience store robbers' car was a key factor in Deputy Streker's decision to stop the automobile in which Martinez was a passenger. See id. at 648. Indeed, in the present case, the cashier actually saw the suspicious individuals get into the same car that Deputy Streker pulled over; in Bruce, there was less certainty about whether the robber was actually in the orange Datsun, 10 see id. at 649. Unlike Bruce, there had not been a robbery immediately before the stop of Martinez's vehicle. Nevertheless, the eyewitness account here was more reliable because the cashier personally observed the suspicious individuals enter a vehicle and obtained its license number.
1 20 Martinez argues that the facts of this case are more similar to decisions in which the appellate courts of this state have concluded that the cireumstances did not support a reasonable, articulable suspicion. For example, in State v. Swanigan,
The stop was based solely on a description by a fellow officer who had observed the two walking along the street at a late hour in an area where recent burglaries had been reported. Neither officer had any knowledge that defendant and his companion had been at the scene of the crime.
The officers had not observed the men engaged in any unlawful or suspicious activity. On the facts presented, the stop was based on a mere hunch rather than the constitutionally mandated "reasonable suspicion"; consequently, the confiscated evidence was erroneously admitted at trial.
Id.
121 We believe that Swanigan is distinguishable from the case before us. In Swanigan, the men spotted in the vicinity of the home burglary were stopped over two hours later, and there was never a description of the robbers; the officers' belief that the individuals were involved in the robbery was based merely on the lateness of the hour and the fact of and proximity to the home burglary. See id. Here, Deputy Streker stopped the defendant minutes after the reported suspicious conduct. Moreover, Deputy Streker's subjective belief that the individuals outside of the Texaco were planning a robbery was based on more than the fact of and proximity to the recent criminal activity in the area. Deputy Streker's decision was also based on the cashier's description of the suspicious conduct, and the fact that the individuals matched the general descriptions of the recent convenience store robbers and were driving a vehicle of the same size and color as the robbers' getaway car. Thus, Deputy Streker knew more than simply that there had been recent criminal activity in the area. 11 Cf. id.
122 We are also unpersuaded by Martinez's reliance on State v. Carpena,
[ 23 Unlike this case, the officers in Carpena had no description of any suspects or vehicles used in any of the recent burglaries. Moreover, the stop in this case was based on the cashier's report of behavior by the individuals that day, which was consistent with the mode of operation of the robbers and could reasonably be interpreted as efforts to plan a future robbery. In light of the similarities between these individuals and the suspects in the prior robberies, combined with the reported observations of the cashier, Deputy Streker had more information to support his reasonable, articulable suspicion than did the officer in Carpena. Cf. Salt Lake City v. Ray,
1 24 Martinez also relies on State v. Trujillo,
The initial decision to stop was based merely on the lateness of the hour and the high-crime factor in the area. The subsequent "nervous" conduct on the part of the trio when approached by [the officer] is consistent with innocent as well as with criminal behavior.... [The officer] could not recall receiving reports of any eriminal activity in the area that morning. In fact, the only recent criminal activity in the neighborhood had been "car prowls," behavior inconsistent with the trio's peering in store windows. [The officer] did not observe the trio engage in any criminal conduct.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
125 Tryjillo is distinguishable from this case. The behavior reported by the Texaco cashier-repeatedly moving from the front doors to the side of a building to confer with others when customers enter-is consistent with robbery in general and the recent convenience store robberies in particular. Cf. id. ("[The only recent criminal activity in the neighborhood had been 'car prowls,' behavior inconsistent with the trio's peering in store windows." (emphasis omitted)); Ray,
126 Indeed, this court distinguished the stop in State v. Baumgaertel,
Carpena, Swanigan, and Trujillo suggest that travelling in a lawful manner at a late hour in a high crime area, and acting in a nervous manner in the presence of police is not sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is involved in erimi-nal conduct. The instant facts, however, are distinguishable from these cases. Here, while the above factors were present, the deputy also based his decision to follow the pickup truck upon his observation that he had not seen this particular truck when he had inspected Ernie's Automotive parking lot fifteen minutes earlier and that there was no legitimate reason for the truck to be there, since Ernie's Automotive had been closed for over eight hours. This observation elevated the deputy's decision to follow the truck from being a mere "hunch," to a fact sufficient for the deputy to conclude that the occupants of the vehicle may have been engaged in criminal activity.
Id. The present case is similar to Baumgaer-tel in that it was not just the suspicious conduct of Martinez and his companions that triggered Deputy Streker's stop. Nor was it merely the fact that there had been a rash of recent robberies in the area. It was also the similarity of the cashier's description of the suspicious individuals and their car to the robbery suspects and their getaway car, as well as the matching detail from the recent robberies regarding the behavior of the suspects.
CONCLUSION
T{28 Deputy Streker had "some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." See United States v. Sokolow,
[ 29 Affirmed.
€ 30 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Associate Presiding Judge.
Notes
. "We state the facts in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying [a] motion to suppress." State v. Marquez,
. Deputy Streker testified that after dispatch advised him that the suspicious individuals had left the Texaco and were headed east, he "drove right into the Texaco parking lot and then continued right back out and headed eastbound on 21st Street and pulled behind th{eir] vehicle."
. Deputy Streker testified that, at the time he was pulling over the car, Martinez and the other backseat passenger were "moving their arms around and bending forward ... like they were putting something down at their feet on the floorboard." Such conduct alone, however, does not establish reasonable, articulable suspicion. See State v. Schlosser,
. Deputy Streker filed a supplemental police report because his original report did not contain information about the recent convenience store robberies. According to Deputy Streker, he inadvertently left that information out of the initial report. He testified, however, that his sergeant arrived at the scene of Martinez's arrest and contacted the detectives investigating the previous robberies, who eventually responded and questioned Martinez and his companions. The trial court found the supplemental report and Deputy Streker's testimony credible and persuasive, noting that, but for the supplemental police report, it would have granted Martinez's motion to suppress.
. Although Martinez asserts that the police violated both the U.S. and Utah constitutions, he did not argue that the analyses under both constitutions "are dissimilar or distinct as applied in this case, nor did he argue that the Utah Constitution affords him greater protection than the United States Constitution." State v. Trane,
. Many of the cases cited in this opinion were decided prior to State v. Brake,
. Martinez does not argue that the cashier was not a reliable source.
. According to a map recreated in a law review article discussing Terry, the distance between where the suspicious men were looking in the store window and where they were stopped by the officer was approximately 650 to 800 feet. See John Q. Barrett, The Street Locations: Downtown Cleveland, October 31, 1963, 72 St. John's L.Rev. app. A at 1384-85 (1998).
Unfortunately, the record here does not contain information about how long it took to locate the vehicle or how far away it was from the Texaco when stopped. The record does include the address of the Texaco-1514 West 2100 South-and the approximate location of the stop-1000 West 2100 South. Thus, it appears that Deputy Streker detained Martinez approximately five blocks from the Texaco.
. The sounds were heard "near the eastern end of the ... apartment complex." State v. Markland,
. In State v. Bruce, reasonable, articulable suspicion existed where the police broadcast reported that two men were in the orange Datsun, even though the witnesses only reported seeing one robber and never actually saw him in the orange car. See
. For example, where the robberies occurred, what type of stores were being robbed, general descriptions of the suspects and their getaway car, and some details of their "method of operation" are facts that establish more than just a report of recent criminal activity in the area. Although the recent store robberies were committed at night, Deputy Streker could have reasonably believed that the individuals outside the Texaco were "casing the store for a planned robbery," see Illinois v. Wardlow,
. Deputy Streker testified that the "method of operation" used in at least two of the three recent convenience store robberies was that the robbers would park across the street, watch customers as they came and went, and enter the store once it was clear.
. Martinez argues that his case is "remarkably similar to"" State v. Valenzuela,