State v. Martin

2004 SD 82 Dakota, Plaintiff

STATE South Appellee, MARTIN,

Kenneth L. Defendant Appellant.

No. 22631.

Supreme Court South Dakota.

Argued March

Decided June Psychiatrist Dr. Manlove testi-

fiеd at trial that Martin from suffered delusional disorder the time he shot According Manlove, Ludeman. to Dr. Martin believed that his gave faith in God power him the to raise people from the dead. He developed a that if theory he a person killed experience and let them dead, hell and then raised them from the person change would their behavior Franks, and be “saved.” Martin told Dr. expert State, for the picked that he Ludeman at random. After shooting Ludeman, Martin did not attempt raise Larry General, Long, Attorney Jeffery him from the dead. Dr. Manlove testified Tronvold, General, Attorney J. Assistant although that killing Martin knew Lude- Pierre, Dakota, Attorneys South plain- for illegal, man was in the context of his delu- and appellee. tiff sion, Martin killing believed the was not Stonefield, wrongful. Dr. Michael Franks Office of the testified Mar- Public tin significant Defender suffered from a Pennington County, Rapid personality disorder, City, Dakota, but that he Attorney South knew the murder defen- and wrongful dant and he was not appellant. jury insane. convicted Martin of first degree murder. SABERS, Justice. appeal, [¶ On Martin 4.] raises several challenges conviction, to his all which 4, 2001, August [¶ On Kenneth Mar- are centered around selection and tin he was to kill going decided someone jury instructions. night. He marijuana smoked some gun. and built a ap- silencer for his At During jury dire, voir the State proximately 10:30 Martin p.m., walked exercised thirteen consecutive peremptory across the street to the home of Robert against objected strikes females. Martin Ludeman, officer, Rapid City police and thirteenth to the State’s and fourteenth his fiancée LeAnn Barta. When Ludeman claiming they strikes violated his door, came him shot twice equal rights. protection The trial cоurt the chest once in and the abdomen. Lude- justification accepted the State’s for the man also suffered blunt force trauma to challenged and strikes denied Martin’s right his head and hand. He died his challenge. living room floor. Martin fled the scene requested in- three coming

when he Barta saw toward the structions. The first two instructions dis- front door from the living room. tinguished “wrongfulness” the terms day, believing

[¶ 2.] The next that Bar- “illegality” and would have informed the him, had ta seen Martin called 911 and legally could find Martin in- reported proved part that he was the if he shooter. Martin sane that he “harbored charged society approve was arrested and alternative belief sincere would degree counts of first second murder. conduct if it his shared his understand- pleaded guilty He not guilty ing underlying of the circumstances his actions.” The third instruction in clos- light of the State’s assertions if Martin was found jury that

informed the argument. insanity, ing he would by reason of center human services to the be committed in de- the trial court erred 4.Whether a court clear and prove to until could jury in- nying Martin’s release convincing evidence “wrong- defining the term structions risk of create a substantial “would not fulness.” person.” Martin bodily injury to another con- “legal as the refers this instruction peremp- 9.] Whether State’s de- instruction. trial court sequences” tory right violated Martin’s strikes nied the instructions. protection. equal arguments, Mar- During closing [¶ 7.] objected to the [¶ 10.] legal for con- request tin renewed jurors peremptory strikes of 13 State’s instruction, that it sequences asserting objection, the 14. At the time of Martin’s state- prosecutor’s necessitated peremptory State had exercised fourteen jury closing dire and during ments voir strikes, against thirteen of which were аrgues that the State arguments. Martin argued that vio women. Martin the State by finding Mar- jury to the insinuated right protection by re equal lated his insanity, guilty tin not reason solely moving jurors panel from the based relieving any him of conse- jury gender. on killing. Among prose- quences for cutor’s were the assertions statements v. ex 11.] J.E.B. Alabama [¶ that, in guilty but “any other verdict T.B., 127, 146, 1419, 114 reí. 511 U.S. S.Ct. ac- won’t be held degree, [Martin] first 1430, 89, (1994), 128 L.Ed.2d 107 the Unit countable,” holding and “to think about not gender held Supreme ed States Court accountable, reprehensi- that’s this man jury discrimination selection violates objec- court sustained Martin’s ble.” The Equal Protection Clause. When a defen statements, these and other but tions to jury alleges gender dant discrimination motion denied the instruction Martin’s selection, prima- or she must make for a mistrial. showing facie discrimination. intentional 636, Leapley, 498 Honomichl v. N.W.2d jury found (S.D.1993) (citations omitted). If the 639 murder, appeals and Martin degree first case, it prima defendant establishes a facie raising issues: four pur presumption creates a rebuttable peremptory 1. the State’s Whether Id. can poseful discrimination. The State right Martin’s strikes violated presumption “articulating rebut protection. equal reasonably [gender] specific clear and neu court in de- the trial erred Whether explanation using peremptory tral for its jury in- Martin’s nying challenge.” explanation Id. The “need not legal consequences on the struction challenge; rise to level of a ‘for cause’ insanity guilty by of a not reason of juror merely rather it must be based on verdict. gender, and the characteristic other than explanation pretex- court in de- must proffered the trial erred Whether ¶ Webster, 141, 18, an in- tual.” v. 2001 SD nying request State 392, JEB, (citing legal 397 511 U.S. consеquences struction on the 637 N.W.2d 145, 1430, 128 L.Ed.2d at guilty by insanity of a not 114 S.Ct. at Kentucky, 476 referring to and his mistrial motion in 107 Batson verdict

403 1712, 79, 97, 14, 106 S.Ct. U.S. are at and sometimes it’s difficult to (1986)). L.Ed.2d up come with as defense well knows. [] process selection juror questionnaire with a gan pre-trial far, For the ones have we done so we juror’s is- opinions that addressed about valid go reasons. I’d [Juror into relevant to the case. Based on those sues old, # years divorced, first. 14] She’s questionnaires, parties many struck response and her questionnaire jurors they began cause before ‍‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‍voir was, question some are in- dire, voir each During party dire. offense, at the sane time which is permitted peremptory challenges, all of there, neither here nor but I don’t like it which had to be exercised.1 as as I well like the others.2 juries empanelled Two were The State’s reasons for a peremptory try Martin. The first selected was strike need “persuasive, not be or even June, 2002, due emergen- but to a medical plausible. At step inquiry, cy, mistrial was after declared validity prosecu- issue is the facial of the was sworn. In the first the panel, State explanation. tor’s discriminatory Unless a twenty-two exercised nineteen of its per- intent prosecutor’s inherent in the ex- emptory challenges against women. Al- planation, the reason will offered though in the to nothing there record [gender] deemed neutral.” Purkett v. challenge indicate a Batson to the first Elem, 765, 768, 514 1769, U.S. 115 S.Ct. selection, couples Defendant the first (1995) 1771, 834, (addi- 131 L.Ed.2d 839 selection with the thirteen consecutive omitted). brief, tional citation Mar- against strikes females in the second selec- tin concedes that there is at least one to prima tion make his facie case. The trial faсially non-discriminatory reason for the court found that under Batson and J.E.B. 14; strike Juror her to answer the prima Martin a showing made facie questionnaire regarding We and ap- discrimination the does State agree facially that this is a non-discrimina- Batson, pear finding. to this dispute 476 tory justification. The trial court also 1723, at U.S. 106 S.Ct. at 90 L.Ed.2d agreed that the had presented State non- J.E.B., (1986); 511 114 U.S. S.Ct. discriihinatory justifications for the strike. accept 128 L.Ed.2d 89. find- We finding That of fact is entitled to deference ing clearly because it is not erroneous. Court, from this and we will not overturn The trial court required absent determination that the strikes, justify the State to and the clearly erroneous. conces- responded: State sion, coupled given with the deference I think claim is unfounded. findings We the trial court’s fact lead to the every juror have a reason for each and proffered сonclusion that the non- State stricken, always justification we have do. discriminatory for its strike. Therefore, We have 22 [peremptory and we back to strikes] burden shifted provides: appeal, argues SDCL only 1. 23A-20-3 2. On protection equal jurors strike Juror 14 violated his prospective When ex- are called for amination, therefore, rights, court shall call box we do not address prospective jurors equal number justification striking State’s Juror jurors impaneled, number of to be the num- peremptory challenges par- ber of allowed the ties, alternates, any. and number of if divorced. single a third was justifications status as prove that Martin to Third, juror question- answer to the her gender discrimination. a pretext were was, defense regarding naire burden, Mar- to meet In attempting time of the of- “some are insane at the responded: tin’s counsel jurors who sat as answered fense.” Males responses on the I think [her] don’t stating, question similarly, for exam- considerably different- questionnaire are ple: peo- other responses of than the 1) some circumstances —if “under in for come ple qualified were by a is found to be insane individual fact The that she’s jury service. competent psychologist.” unbiased Many disqualify doesn’t her. years old 2) I don’t think “yes, men are over some cases.” non-gen- hers response or that their 3) insane; “yes it is an person go can discriminatory. der appropriate law not abused.” challenge, hold- court denied the trial 4) appropriate “I law.” believe is an ing: that in order determine argues na- recognizes subjective The court justifications gen- are whether the State’s necessary in the exercise of ture that’s der-neutral, necessary compare it is challenges latitude that peremptory placed characteristics those individuals in mak- to exercise counsel are entitled rejected through on the with those logical illogical ing decisions for their e.g., peremptory strikes. See United only issue is whether or purposes. Wilson, (8th States v. 853 F.2d 606 Cir. discriminatory in a they’re not done 1988). that some argues The State while does feel that The court not manner. jurors had male one of characteristics sup- and the record the circumstances State, had listed none all three. significant a

port there is basis that points that cases The State also out exercising is their that state believe argu- which Martin for this upon relies dis- challenges based on peremptory “jurors ment shared had situations where criminatory record purposes. disparately one characteristic that was history, оf the certainly reflect the both race.” treated due to cur- process and the previous selection Eighth 16.] The Circuit process, rent but I would not selection Court has held that the determination jurors being those two as identify last explanation “is a whether an is neutral logical part on the perception a without It is question comparability. of well-estab deny for their exercise. I’ll the state peremptory challenges lished that cannot challenge. the Batson ju lawfully against potential exercised compari- argues a jurors race potential rors one unless son of characteristics State used to another with characteris comparable race 14 justify with the char- exclusion Juror are v. Nor challenged.” tics also Devose remaining (8th Cir.1995) (addi on the ris, 201, acteristics of those 53 204 F.3d omitted). leads to thе conclusion State’s agree tional We citations justification pre- striking Juror 14 was juror is an comparative analysis important old, First, years textual. 71 determining peremptory she was factor in whether year however, it points discriminatory, out that a 63 old man are challenges jury. determinative, ap and a year especially man sat on the at the 73 old is divorced, Second, Our of review on pellate she was and Martin level. standard be, given it points jurors appeal heightened, male listed their as should out two

405 ability weight mea- depending that the trial court has the ent on the number of credibility attorney’s justifi- peremptory challenges sure lawyer has at finding cation for a “A of inten- strike. the time [ ] and of chal- number finding discrimination is a of fact tional lenges remaining with the other side. re- appropriate entitled to deferencе Near the end process voir dire Farmer, viewing court.” State 407 v. lawyer naturally will be more cautious (S.D.1987) (additional 821, ci- N.W.2d 823 about “spending” challenges. his [ ] [ ] omitted). “A er- ‘clearly tation therefore, It should apparent, although roneous’ when there is evidence very dynamics of the jury selection it, reviewing support court on the process difficult, make it impossi- entire evidence is left definite and ble, on a cold record to evaluate or firm that a conviction mistake has been compare the peremptory challenge of City committed.” Anderson v. Bessem- juror one with the retention of another 564, 573, 1504, City, er U.S. S.Ct. juror which paper appears be sub- 1511, (1985) (citation 84 L.Ed.2d stantially similar. omitted). agree We with the court in Peo- Dunn, v. People 40 Cal.App.4th such ple comparative analysis Dunn that (internal (1995) Cal.Rptr.2d 645-46 appellate cоurt does disservice quotations additional citations and the trial lawyers courts because it can: omitted). credibility undermine trial court’s determinations and [ ] discount the vari- it Although determinative, is not ety [subjective] factors and consider- interesting note empan- ations, including prospective juror’s elled of six consisted females and six

body language answering manner males. questions, legitimately which inform trial lawyer’s per- decision to exercise ‍‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‍[¶ 18.] The burden of proving that emptory challenges. ][C]omparative [ discriminated purposefully the State rests analysis to evaluate the bona fides of a Honomichl, at all times on the defendant. prosecutor’s stated for peremp- reasons (citation omitted). 498 N.W.2d at 639 Sim tory challenges ac- does not take into ply arguing that of jurors some the who many go count the considerations which wеre selected share one of traits for into an attorney’s to decision select cer- juror which the stricken is insufficient jurors tain challenging while others who carry to proving Defendant’s burden of appear to similar. lawyers be Trial rec- that clearly the trial court’s ognize is a that it combination of factors erroneous. The trial court is affirmed on any single rather than which one often this issue. leads to a peremptory the exercise of addition, challenge. particular In Whether the trial court [¶ jurors combination or mix a which denying proposed erred in does,

lawyer may, seeks and often jury legal on instruction conse- change jurors as are certain removed quences guilty of a not verdict. jury in It may seated box. be ac- a in ceptable, juror proposed jury have example, for to one particular point purpose informing a view struction but unac- ceptable jury guilty by have than of the of a consequences to more one with not that insanity factors in reason of view[.] [T]he same used verdict. The instruction juror evaluating may given provided: a be differ- would have 406 not consequences of a verdict of if return a you instructed are

You a lack of criminal guilty by' of insani- reason of guilty not reason verdict any bearing defendant no on responsibility ty, requires the law ser- An jury the state human must decide. to issue be committed which he requested time as is would until such of the kind center instruction vices to state pursuant a de- eligible jury speculate for release invite the about would The defendant invite disposition statutes. ultimate fendant’s from human ser- release eligible for on the it to render verdict basis he has in the future until center vices the evidence be- something other than con- to the court clear proven Punishment, may fore or whatever it. release vincing evidence verdict, transpire after the is not bodily a substantial risk not create short, jury. concern of the it is sim- person. injury to another jury happens no what ply business acquitted on the to the accused he is give pro- refused The trial court therefore hold ground of We v. Robin- based State posed instruction in trial court did not err refus- (S.D.1987). son, 399 N.W.2d ing jury disposi- on the instruct the standard of review 21.] Our [¶ tion in the event the of the defendant give instruction for refusal guilty by him not were find well-settled: responsibili- a lack of criminal reason of of a a trial court’s refusal We review ty. under an abuse of instruction Robinson, 326(citing N.W.2d 324 The trial court has standard. discretion Huber, (N.D. State 361 N.W.2d 236 jury. instructing broad discretion 1985)). when, satisfactory are Jury instructions whole, they properly as a considered argues 23.] Martin the Court applicable law and inform the state permit should Robinson and de- overturn declining apply pro- Error jury. plead fendants who only if posed instruction reversible insanity of the to have instruction has prejudicial, and the defendant legal plea. He asserts consequences any prejudice. proving burden justifications overruling the case. two Webster, 141 at N.W.2d at 2001 SD First, jurors argues (internal omitted). citations defense distracted from their case by fact function the concern Robinson, we In were faced not go the defendant will free found question; a defen- with whether the same Second, guilty by reason by guilty not reason of in- pleading dant argues a compelling the court has simi- sanity entitled to instruction was reason to allow such an instruction because by lar Martin. We proposed to the one Huber, commitment to human services center cited a decision State Court, mandatory on a ap- guilty is verdict Supreme North Dakota insanity.3 reason of proval: only briefly ing statutory this instruction under the same We need address second Therefore, argues currently argument. simply many place. this Martin scheme mandatory already specifically has been disre- states with commitment statutes rationale garded by require or allow the the Court and insufficient either instruction Robinson, given. the Court was consider- overrule Robinson. argument The thrust Martin’s mation invites them to ponder matters a properly is that if is not informed that are province, not within their dis- consequences guilty by of a not reason tracts them from factfinding their re- verdict, insanity they will be inclined sponsibilities, and a strong possi- creates ignore insanity and find the evidence bility of confusion. otherwise, of fear that defendant out States, Shannon v. United 512 U.S. a they letting “psychopath will roam [ ] 2419,129 (1994) 114 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 459 All large.” but one of the cases cited (additional omitted). and internal citations pre-date Martin for this our argument de- The Court went on to state: cision in Robinson. Given that the Court jurors areWe not convinced that are as of the status of the law at the aware consequences unfamiliar with the of a Robinson, it released these time cases (NGI)] guilty by insanity [not they than persuasive have no more force suggests. verdict [Defendant] as It did at time Robinson was written. that, have been case in in con- Therefore, primarily we will look to the of guilty guilty, trast verdicts and not post-dates one case cited guilty by verdict of not reason Shickles, our decision. In State v. no ... commonly under- ha[d] Supreme largely Utah Court relied on meaning. stood There is no reason decisiоn, Lyles federal court v. United jurors assume that believe that defen- States, (D.C.Cir.1957), 254 F.2d 725 to rea- dants found NGI immediately are set legal consequence son that a ‍‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‍instruction Fisher, free. See 10 F.3d at Shickles, necessary. State v. 760 P.2d 291 cases, (“[H]ighly publicized such as (Utah 1988). first, We note that the feder- involving Hinckley, John have drama- al decision in place, pre- court possibility tized the of civil commitment Court, rejected by sumptively at the verdict.”). following an NGI time of our holding Robinson. Further-

more, out, points Lyles (Additional omitted.) as the State has Id. citations rejected by since been the United States provided authority has no persuades which Court, Supreme which noted: us that should be Robinson overturned. It that when The function of criminal is well established South function, sentencing has no is to as a fact finder should be Dakota act to deter- admonished to “reach its guilty. verdict without mine whether the defendant is We regard might to what sentence be im- to interject decline considerations of sen- posed.” juries principle tencing are jury’s into a duties. Since consequences not to consider the of their “properly instruction did law,” verdicts is a reflection of the basic divi- applicable state the the trial court’s legal system sion of labor in our affirmed. give refusal this instruction is jury. judge jury’s tween func- the trial court [¶25.] Whether tion is to find the facts and to decide denying request erred in whether, facts, those the defendant legal an for instruction on conse- guilty charged. judge, the crime quences in and his mistrial motion contrast, imposes sentence on the light in of the State’s assertions a defendant after the has arrived at closing argument. guilty regarding verdict. Information the argues consequences [¶26.] the of a verdict is there- an given jury’s fore irrelevant to task. More- trial court should either over, providing jurors sentencing legal consequences grant- infor- instruction on or wrong. I heard Mr. Stonefield by the did was on remarks a based

ed mistrial describing repre- in clos- a term me as Attorney during voir dire and use State’s dire, jury voir I him use a term During hensible. heard ing argument. following ex- Attorney describing Sperlich had the as dishonest. Mr. State’s juror: straws, prospective a He change grabbing folks. That’s says and his com- turns around at the conclusion of this later suspect I State: do- choice, arguments. are What we’re being a and ments get one you’ll case arguing. Reprehensible? What guilty by ing is being one not guilty and case is reprehensible. this might happened there insanity, but reason man holding to think not yours It’s not And about mentally ill. guilty but accountable, reprehensible. that’s that and what distinguish between that, you do under- after haрpen could objected again, par- The defense stand? joined the trial court in chambers. ties Juror: Yes. request renewed its The defense that not you Do understand State: and when the trial court denied instruction guilty by guilty? So guilty is requested a mis- request, defense guilty is a not ver- motion trial. The trial court denied the dict, that? you understand do argues that the trial mistrial. Martin object legally that. I That’s Defense: permitted the instruc- court should have inaccurate. alternative, granted tion in the a mistri- objection. Court: Sustain al. (An we unre- approach? State: Could of re Our standard had.) bar discussion was corded side give view for refusal to instruction portion of his In the rebuttal Webster, supra. is abuse of discretion. See Attorney as- closing argument, the State’s a trial court’s denial of a mistri We review

serted: al motion for of discretion. State v. abuse anybody by doing if I offend aрologize I Anderson, 46, ¶21, 546 N.W.2d SD so, I upset. makes me submit but this 395, 401. you what we have here a cold- mistrial, justify granting To life killer. Robbie Ludeman’s blooded exist. showing prejudice actual must for no reason. tragically taken Prejudicial purposes error for of deter- anger That us. And fact of should mining whether error constitutes is, the matter is—the fact of matter grounds for mistrial is error “which this man needs be held accountable. produced probability all must have some And in the any other verdict but upon jury’s effect verdict and first he won’t held accounta- degree, rights harmful to the substantial ble. party assigning it.” objected

At this point, defense ¶ Anderson, 45, 36, 608 State v. 2000 SD objection and the court sustained (additional 644, 655 citations N.W.2d statement was stricken from record. omitted).4 quotations The State continued: Folks, courts you argues fact of other the matter need prosecutor this man have dеtermined that when a hold accountable. What statement, Although grant failure was abuse noted in his issue Mar- brief that mistrial appear argue specifically tin does not in his of the trial courts discretion. law, misstates may penalties, the defendant be or there would have been no consequences to a instruction legal entitled reversible error. adopt this Court should similar case, In present the jury the in Among support rule. the cases he cites was instructed: argument his is State. In Caldwell v. It your duty jury as a to determine case, prosecutor argued the you the facts and must do this from the rebuttal: evidence produced that has been here in by your Don’t verdict and tell us [sic] open court. This consists the testi- responsible, that he’s not don’t tell us mony witnesses, the exhibits that he license to has a kill. Don’t let received, which been stipu- facts him loalk out this cоurtroom with the lated to by attorneys, the judi- and facts with, rest us when this over case ‍‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‍is cially by noticed the court. This evi- get away don’t let him with murder. dence governed by various rules of get Don’t let him away with murder. law and under these rules has been State, Caldwell v. 722 N.E.2d my duty judge as to rule on the admissi- (Ind.2000) (emphasis supplied). The trial bility of the evidence from time to time. objection court overruled the defendant’s You yourselves must concern the comment and declined allow a rulings reasons these you consequences instruction or an admonish- must not any consider any evidence or held, appeal, ment. On the court “a defen- testimony which has been ordered dant is entitled to an on instruction things you stricken. put Such must out post-trial procedures if ‘an erroneous view your mind. subject of the law on planted has been ” jurors’] (citing Dipert minds.’ Id. [the jury was further instructed: State,

v. 259 Ind. 286 N.E.2d In at a arriving you verdict in this case (1972)). note, however, We the court shall not subject discuss or consider say proper went that a instruction of penalty punishment, as that is the provides “that the law for addi- responsibility of the court. tional but that proceedings this was not a (cid:127) trial properly [¶ 31.] The court in- matter jury to consider.” Id. The jury that structed the it was not to consid- same court reached the same conclusion in sentence, penalties er its reaching Dipert State the prosecutor when indi- and it objection sustained Defendants to a jury cated member voir during dire to the and struck comments them from the go defendant would “scot-free” jury record. properly instructed guilty by found not reason of not to those things consider stricken from Dipert, the court to give trial refused an the record. Based on the curative mea- jury regarding pros- instructiоn to the court, taken taking sures despite objection by ecutors comment whole, record aas we do not find that the only defense. The court held “it is jury impression had an erroneous cause such a attempt curative was not prosecutor agree law. We when made the court that this conduct consti- gives statement Dipert, tutes error.” erroneous reversible law, N.E.2d at 407. Had the court in- curative measures neces- trial sary to prevent structed the that there reversible error. Howev- were addition- er, case, procedures al in the after instant there no indica- insanity, tion that and instructed the trial court’s measures were not to procedures any consider those insufficient to cure misunderstanding me that he under- indicated to prosecutor’s [Martin] isolated by the engendered He was criminal act. that it stood statements. that think he understood understood —I did not abuse its The trial court [¶ 32.] as the it criminal act even he did was a mo- denying the Defendant’s discretion act, [ ] the act. he [But] even before judge The trial was mistrial. tion for to raise that he would be able believed made comments were present when the from dead and even person the their opportunity observe had and it things happen would greater Kidd, 286 N.W.2d impact. State and the world good himself would be omitted). (S.D.1979) (citation de- His Ludeman, that —that shoot- and for Mr. not “reach the they did termination do, thing to was ing him the correct was a mistri- either level that would warrant [ ] though he thing to do even right affirmed. is special al or instruction” act. that it a criminal understood was testimony, Dr. Manlove’s Based on the trial court 4. Whether [¶ 33.] two instructions which proposed defense denying Martin’s erred in provided: defining the term jury instructions used “wrongfulness” The term as “wrongfulness.” instructions, simply not these does mean statutory definition The [¶ 34.] “criminality.” person A “illegality” or “insanity” provides: wrongful simply an act not knows that person of a “Insanity,” condition by knowing illegal, but rea- deprived of partially or temporarily morally disapproved that it knowing son, at the time of com- upon proof that of'by society. him, against charged act mitting the that he defendant establish knowing wrongful- its incapable

was knowing wrongful- incapable was abnormality ness, including but if he charged prove ness of the act can or only by repeated unlawful manifested that, act, of the he was time behavior[.] antisocial deprived of rea- temporarily partially or son, 22-1-2(20). that he harbored sincere SDCL society approve lief that would trial, present- At the Defendant understanding of conduct if it shared his indicating testimony ed from Dr. Manlove his ac- underlying the circumstances “illegality” knowledge of the tions. necessarily knowl- killing of the was not give The trial court refused to edge the act. Dr. “wrongfulness” instructions, stating: per- way one Manlove testified that appreciates “in the concern of son insane court to be considered I for the process they did counsel and would note that of a delusional course worth, record, that I the con- for whatever that’s something right within relating the defi- system anxiety [ ] text of their but what similar delusion wrongfulness and wrong.” presence nition and considered otherwise be presented to testified, in which that is He “I to the conclusion manner came But I myself jury. don’t believe it’s within did understand [Martin] my my perception that to so capacity acts because wrongfulness of his presented by define it as counsel would thinking, context of his these delusional confusing ques- acts than statute right were acts.” On further less cur- that we we—than instructions tioning, doctor testified: 411 I rently anxiety. have. It is of some If find you that the Defendant has not say by proven that because the term merits consid- clear and convincing evidence I any eration. But believe effort Defendant was at insane committing offense, tamper pattern you with the instructions time next greater must consider potentially create misun- whether the Defen- derstanding mentally dant was ill enhancing than when the respon- offense was sibility jury. of the committed. step jury The first for the was therefore to a [¶ 37.] We review trial court’s determine proved whether the Defendant proposed

refusal of a instruction for abuse was insane at the time he commit- Rhines, 55, of discretion. State v. 1996 SD ted jury the homicide. The was instruct- ¶ 111, 415, 548 443. N.W.2d ed: order be entitled to reversal aof Insanity persоn means the condition of a conviction due to error instructing temporarily partially deprived or of rea- jury, appellant only must show son, upon proof that at the time com- error, prejudicial but error in in- mitting charged, the act the defendant requires showing struction. This [ ] incapable was knowing wrongful- its alleged error, probability, in all Insanity any ness. does not include ab- produced upon jury’s some effect normality only manifested by repeated verdict and was to the harmful substan- unlawful or antisocial behavior. rights party tial assigning it. (Emphasis If supplied.) the jury deter- Horse, 496, State v. Fast 490 500 N.W.2d mined prove that the Defendant failed to (internal (S.D.1992) and additional cita- insanity evidence, clear and convincing omitted).5 tions its step second towas consider whether given option Martin was ill mentally at the time the guilty, the Defendant not guilty, offense committed. Thе in- jury was not guilty or guilty structed: but ill mentally degree second murder psychi- Mental illness means substantial or first degree They murder. him found thought, atric disorder of or mood degree of first murder. The court which a person havior affects at the time provided with several instructions of the commission of the offense and illness, on insanity gave and mental but no impairs which person’s judgment, but regarding instruction term “wrongful- person extent that the is in- ness.” capable knowing wrongfulness Jury provided [¶39.] instruction #30 the act. Mental illness does not include part: abnormalities manifested only re- ¶ 5, 112, proving prejudice The burden of in cases 641 N.W.2d line Another give where trial court has refused to proposed cases indicates that even if the in- law, differently instruction has correctly appel- been stated in struction states proving several cases. One line of cases indicates that lant bears the burden of that failure give give prejudicial. failure to instruction that the instruction was See 43, ¶47, properly prejudicial e.g. Engesser, states the law v. error. State 2003 SD 661 Jacobson, 108, 739, 753; Webster, 7, Leisinger e.g., See v. 2002 SD at N.W.2d 2001 SD 141 ¶ 8, 693, 696; 394; Knoche, 651 N.W.2d Boomsma v. Dako- 637 State v. N.W.2d ta, 834, (S.D.1994). Corp., Minnesota & Eastern SD R.R. N.W.2d The latter in- ¶ 30, 245; prevailing 651 N.W.2d Parker struction is the view criminal Inc., Rey-Rapid City, Casa Del ‍‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‍2002 SD cases. himself told me that he knew was antisocial or otherwise criminal peated specifically. wrong. I asked him that conduct. wrong and I know “yes, He said was supplied.) (Emphasis I wrong. feel But others would it was the court’s argues [¶40.] it. struggled had to it. I lot with do “wrongful- the term instruct on failure to to The dude was It was hard do. jury finding from him the ness” prevented handy.” words are his. Again these In order not reason guilty I just to the one happened “He proof must offer prevail, Martin to I every had to rule picked. I break error, pro- probability, in all alleged “the people knew. And I knew most jurys the verdict upon effect duced some scary. I wrong. it as It was [ ] view sub- to the [defendant’s] and harmful was against do It went didn’t want to it. Horse, N.W.2d Fast rights.” stantial the everything, all rules.” to meet burden. fails at legally state, that he had a jury truly If on “I felt the believed The doctor went to illness, but defect or cognizable mental him that —talk- after this discussion with wrongful, they act was thoughts knew his that he did under- ing he about his guilty mentally to him but find to do was bound stand what he was about were words, any prejudice caused corroborating ill. wrong.” In other He noted several “wrongfulness” to instruct the upon coming failure factors relied to he mentally ill guilty conclusion; in a but at night, would result that Martin acted he primary silencer, the difference verdict he ran when Ludeman’s because used mentally guilty ill not him, but and guilty gun, tween fiancée toward he hid the cаme insanity is whether the defen- shirt, prior turning reason hid his himself wrong- incapable knowing in, the marijuana dant his asked his sister to hide By him his act. fulness of he didn’t to further bowl because want murder, jury rejected the his degree first Franks incriminate himself. Dr. conclud- suffering any under ed, “[n]ow, that he was perhaps example assertion of someone mental defect the cognizable legally truly who was delusional would have been crime, knowl- regardless of his stayed try- time of the someone who would have there wrongfulness killing. edge of the ing to raise Mr. Ludeman from the dead mean, fails to therefore show truly Defendant I that was believed that. give the prejudice in court’s refusal pinnacle trying he was what instruction. accomplish. But left and [ ] he didn’t. He words, tried to hide tracks.” In other plausible jury re- It is that the jury Defen- properly could determine definition, jected any claim under right dant knew thе difference between evening his actions were Martin knew wrong killing. at the time of the testimony directly There was “wrongful.” claim that he believed contrasting Martin’s jury summary, instruc- [¶42.] right. morally killing Ludeman would accurately tions set forth law with Franks, expert, Dr. testified as State’s regard insanity pat- to an defense. The with Martin: his conversation provided tern instructions Now, regard- explained proper Mr. Martin me with statement of law what insanity con- up day ing Nothing until talked he defense. [ ] was that from saying prevented of that is ridicu- tained therein himself out “this expert opinion can’t this. This isn’t true.” Dr. Manlove’s accepting lous. I do upon alleged Defendants day And even on the the event told based killing morally belief that Although 47.] [¶ Court is correct wrongful. The Defendant has failed to that in this case the State’s expert did court offer contrasting establish that trial abused its evidence legal illness, theory refusing give discretion mental courts give instructions. Affirmed. decline to simply instructions defense because State has introduced “testimo- GILBERTSON, Justice, Chief ny directly contrasting [the defendant’s] MEIERHENRY, Justice, concur. contrary, See id. On the claim[.]” well established for giving jury rule in- ZINTER, [¶ 44.] KONENKAMP structions does not look to the evidence Justices, in part concur and concur in opposing the by evidence offered the pro- result in part. ponent Rather, of the instruction. the tri- ZINTER, (concurring Justice and con- al court should determine whether result). in curring proponent of the instruction has offered l,6 2, concur I on Issues 3.1 competent support evidence to the instruc- concur in on 4. result Issue tion. Our rule is that: clear “Criminal de- are fendants entitled instructions Insanity Issue on Defense Instructions 4— theory their of the case when evidence I must concur [¶ 46.] in result on Issue support exists to theory.” State v. disagree because I two points with in the Bruder, ¶8, 12, 112, 2004 SD 676 N.W.2d ¶ 41, Court’s In analysis. justi- the Court Charles, (citing 67, State v. 2001 SD fies the to give failure Martin’s proposed ¶ 19, 628 N.W.2d 738 (citing State v. “morally definitional instruction on a 70, ¶40, Charger, 2000 SD 611 N.W.2d right” theory of insanity. jus- This Court 229)). “Denial of a defendant’s re- tifies the refusal because there was evi- quest [ instruction such a ] where Franks, dence from expert, the State’s Dr. request is properly submitted and sup- “contrasting Martin’s claim that by ported the evidence is reversible error lieved killing morally Ludeman would be it infringes because aon defendant’s con- right.” Relying upon opposing Id. this (cita- right process.” stitutional to due Id. evidence, the Court concludes that it was omitted). tions “plausible jury rejected that the [Martin’s] definition, claim any Therefore, that under I join Martin [¶ 48.] cannot knew evening ‘wrong- his actions that were upon Court’s extensive reliance the State’s ” ful.’ relying Furthеr expert’s testimony, ¶41, on State’s evi- supra see as the Franks, Dr. dence from deny Court ulti- basis to giving pro- defendant’s mately concludes Instead, that “the posed could instruction. in- correct properly determine quiry defendant knew the should be to determine whether difference right wrong Manlove, between at the expert, Martin’s Dr. provided killing.” time of the competent Id. to support evidence Martin’s issue, "Now, 6. On the Batson the Court observes that Martin's counsel told the trial court: although dispositive, interesting "it is previous clearly these number of empanelled jury note that the consisted six example, ] them are strikes. [ obvious For ¶ supra females and six males.” See I attorneys two women are [ ] wives defense only during write add the trial court town; patient [ ] another woman is a of Dr. hearing challenge, Martin also con- Manlove, and there are obvious reasons although ceded that the State struck con- people[.]” striking some of these These facts women, obvious, legiti- secutive there were support also the trial court's decision. many mate striking reasons for of them. insanity theory incorporating society” theory of traditional by “morally approved fact, did, “wrongfulness” and if that test. If Manlove insanity.7 Dr. “wrong- law,8 Dr. Manlove if never even asked statement correct theory was mor- component included some fulness” given. have been should instruction in soci- acceptance of his acts others al However, I concur result be- ety. assertion, contrary the Court’s cause anything, If trial Martin’s own “expert opinion of present Martin did theory of actually refutes his evidence alleged upon Defendant’s insanity based society.” acceptance “moral others morally killing was not belief that moral Although theory involved ¶ Instead, supra See wrongful.” others, Dr. first acceptance Manlove testimony con- Dr. Manlove’s review had not even discussed noted only upon his based opinion firms that raising from the dead theory people wrong” theory “right versus the traditional Thus, no anyone. Martin introduced Indeed, first when asked upon which a could evidence understanding of in- tell the his “oth- found that he had basis believe case, apply that he would this sanity law society morally accept his ers” would stated, “one needs un- Dr. be Manlove act. wrongfulness know the their able to delusion, act”; or, “something if under importantly, Dr. More Manlove ... right ... but would otherwise specifically was refuted the notion that Martin believed, added.) wrong.” (Emphasis might actually ap- be considered his acts Instead, also, express his ulti- proved by society. So when asked Dr. Man- insanity, Dr. in- recognized Manlove opinion “[Martin] mate love testified morality component. no corporated people societal would think that this was and, Instead, you specifically applied theory he the tradi- know—and that unusual it, indicating accept accept theory theory people that Martin “did wouldn’t his tional added.) wrongfulness (Emphasis of his Dr. Manlove fur- [.] understand ” “recognized in the context of his delusion- ther conceded that Martin acts because going thinking, right proceed acts were acts.” that if he were with his— al these added.) from somebody He further the idea that he could raise (Emphasis testified bring doing “what he was dead and shoot—kill them and that Martin believed wrong though than even them back from dead right rather shocking to against people he that it was the law.” and he didn’t want recognized added.) way, their bring (Emphasis Stated another attention.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, Dr. un- Dr. indicated that Martin “under- Manlove testified Manlove criminality of his act but that Martin himself knew that equivocally didn’t stood wrong.” (Empha- that it was think what he was do- understand “others would added.) Finally, he opined ing wrong, hoped sis Manlove but he that if it, act capacity get away “lacked the to know the could his would be added.) helpful (Emphasis did.” to the victim.” wrongfulness (Emphasis what added.) Thus, Thus, psychiatric psychiatric evi- Martin’s own evidence negated theory entirely phrased clearly in terms of the that Martin dence was ¶ legal supra 8. We need not reach this issue because See 35 for Martin's in- supported were not Martin’s instructions structions. ¶¶ 49, 50, competent evidence. See infra believing that shooting acted would be

morally accepted by society. others in Because Martin to intro- failed competent support

duce evidence to instruction, I

“morality” would affirm the basis, on that and I

conviction concur

result. KONENKAMP, Justice, joins this

[53.]

special writing.

2004 SD 80

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF

Richard Martin SCHNELL.

No. 22803.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued April

Decided June

Rehearing Aug. Denied

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Martin

Court Name: South Dakota Supreme Court

Date Published: Jun 23, 2004

Citation: 683 N.W.2d 399

Docket Number: None

Court Abbreviation: S.D.