*861 MEMORANDUM DECISION
{1 Rudd Martin appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)G), (b)(i) (Supp.2010), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he constructively possessed methamphetamine discovered in the back seat of a patrol car where he had been detained. We affirm.
"The standard of review for a sufficiency claim is highly deferential to a jury verdict." State v. Workman,
T2 "[Aletual physical possession is not necessary to convict a defendant of possession of a controlled substance. A convietion may also be based on constructive possession." State v. Fox,
To find that a defendant had constructive possession of a drug or other contraband, it is necessary to prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug.
Id. at 319. The existence of such a nexus depends on the particular cireumstances of the individual case. See id. Martin argues that there was insufficient evidence that he constructively possessed the methamphetamine because other individuals had access to the back seat of the patrol car, his fidgeting was reasonably explained by the pain in his wrist, he made no incriminating statements and requested a drug test, his fingerprints were not found on the baggy, and he was searched prior to being put in the patrol car.
13 Although Martin did not have exclusive access to the back seat of the patrol car, there is sufficient additional evidence indicating that the methamphetamine belonged to him to support a jury verdict. See generally State v. Salas,
14 Martin testified at trial that he was changing position to make his wrists more comfortable because the handcuffs were too tight and his right wrist had previously been broken. However, it was the jury's prerogative to evaluate the eredibility of his testimony, and we will not second-guess that evaluation. See State v. Workman,
T5 The lack of incriminating statements made by Martin and the fact that his fingerprints were not found on the baggy, while certainly not indicative of guilt, do not prove that the baggy did not belong to Martin. It was the jury's responsibility to assign weight to this evidence in assessing the circumstances in their entirety. See id. Thus, these factors do not undermine the jury verdict where there was sufficient additional evidence to support it, see supra I 4.
T6 Finally, Martin argues that a reasonable jury could not have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs belonged to him because he was searched prior to being put in the patrol car. Martin asserts that it was just as likely that the officer missed the drugs when searching the back seat prior to his shift as that the sergeant missed them when he searched Martin's person. However, the evidence presented at trial suggested that the search of the vehicle was more thorough than the search of Martin. The officer testified that in searching the patrol car, he removed the bottom cushion of the back seat, allowing him to see down to the metal floor below, and he ran his hand across the crack of the backrest. Given that the drugs were not well hidden but were discovered "tucked into the backrest just barely under the backrest," they presumably would have been discovered in the search described by the officer if they had been there at that time. On the other hand, evidence at trial highlighted the limitations of a search of a person conducted incident to arrest. The sergeant testified that in searching a person under arrest he "check[s] pockets, waistbands, legs, back, arms" but does not check "every conceivable hiding place that ... a person could hide something on their body." He testified that he had "missed items" when conducting a search "a couple times," specifically recalling "an incident where [he] missed drugs on a person . and they were found later." He also testified that he knew of other officers who had missed small items when searching an individual and that it is easy to miss something soft, like a powder substance. Given this evidence, we cannot say that a reasonable jury could not have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs had been in Martin's possession.
17 There was sufficient evidence in this case to support the jury's verdiet that Martin constructively possessed the methamphetamine found in the patrol car. We therefore affirm.
T8 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B. MeHUGH, Associate Presiding Judge and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, Judge.