Does a trial judge abuse his sentencing discretion when he uniformly refuses to consider a grant of probation for an offense even though probation is an available sentencing alternative? We hold, and the state concedes, that this mechanistic approach to sentencing is not the exercise of sentencing discretion. The sentence must therefore be vacated, and this case must be remanded for the resentencing of Dale Martin.
Martin was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance in violation of sec. 161.41(1) (b), Stats. Probation is available as a sentencing alternative for this offense. Section 973.09, Stats. The trial judge, however, stated that he would never grant straight probation to a person convicted of this offense. This preconceived policy is impermissibly tailored to fit only the crime and not the offender and is impermissibly, at least in part, closed to individual mitigating factors.
See Williams v. New York,
*328
There is a strong policy against an appellate court interfering with a trial court’s sentence.
Hanneman v. State,
This court has the authority to modify the sentence.
Rosado v. State,
By the Court. — Judgment vacated and cause remanded for resentencing.
