THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. DONALD JERRY MARTIN, Petitioner.
No. 46421
En Banc.
July 15, 1980.
Norm Maleng, Prosecuting Attorney, Gregory P. Canova, Senior Deputy, and Dennis R. Nollette, Deputy, for respondent.
Timothy K. Ford, amicus curiae.
STAFFORD, J.-In this case we are concerned with a defendant‘s right to plead guilty to a charge of premeditated murder in the first degree (hereinafter first degree murder) and the consequences of such a plea.
Petitioner, Donald Martin, asserts a right to plead guilty to a charge of first degree murder and thus avoid the possible imposition of the death penalty resulting from a jury trial. Respondent State contends that petitioner cannot plead guilty to first degree murder or, alternatively, that after pleading guilty, the special sentencing procedures set
As discussed below, however, it is clear the present death penalty statute does not prevent a defendant from exercising the right to plead guilty to any crime with which he or she is charged. It is equally clear that after pleading guilty to first degree murder, a defendant is no longer subject to the possible imposition of the death penalty under
A brief review of the facts is necessary to bring the statutory issues into focus. On July 3, 1979, Donald Martin was arraigned on a charge of first degree murder in the death of Ivy Brown. Martin orally pleaded guilty and defense counsel presented the court with Martin‘s unsigned “Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty” pursuant to
Defense counsel also informed the court he had advised Martin that, as a matter of law, the maximum sentence imposable following a plea of guilty was life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. See
The arraignment was continued and on July 17, 1979, the trial judge refused to accept Martin‘s guilty plea on the sole ground that the State‘s right to request the death penalty prevented such an admission of guilt. Accordingly, Martin made no plea to the charge at issue.
On July 20, the State filed an amended information in which Martin was charged with first degree murder in both the Brown death and the death of John Haasager. Notice of intent to request the death penalty was filed in both cases. Martin was arraigned on the amended information on July 23. Since the trial court had refused to accept his earlier plea of guilty in the Brown case, Martin stood mute and
The trial court proceedings were stayed pending a motion for discretionary review in this court. Martin continues to assert a right to plead guilty to the charge of first degree murder. This plea, he contends, will result in the imposition of a maximum sentence of life imprisonment with a possibility of parole and thereby avoid the possibility of having a jury impose the death sentence. Three basic issues are presented: (1) whether, under the existing law of this state, petitioner may plead guilty to first degree murder; (2) if he can plead guilty, whether a special sentencing jury as specified in
I
RIGHT TO PLEAD GUILTY
At the outset the State contends petitioner does not have a right to plead guilty to first degree murder. We do not agree. While a defendant does not have a constitutional right to plead guilty, it is well established that the State may confer such a right by statute or by other means. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970). In this state such a right has been established by Supreme Court rule.1
A defendant may plead not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty.
The State next contends that insofar as
In oral argument, the State relied on the second clause of
[E]xcept in capital cases, where the person informed against . . . for a crime is represented by counsel, such person may, with the assent of the court, waive trial by jury and submit to trial by the court.
This court has long interpreted the clause as preventing a defendant upon whom the death penalty might be imposed from waiving a jury trial in favor of a trial before a court. State v. Baker, 78 Wn.2d 327, 474 P.2d 254 (1970); Brandon v. Webb, 23 Wn.2d 155, 160 P.2d 529 (1945). The clause thus limits the trial options available to a defendant in capital cases. The clause does not, however, affect the
No person informed against . . . for a crime shall be convicted thereof, unless by admitting the truth of the charge in his plea, by confession in open court, or by the verdict of a jury, accepted and recorded by the court . . .
We have never interpreted
if the defendant plead guilty to a charge of murder, a jury shall be impaneled to . . . determine the degree of murder and the punishment therefor.
(Italics ours.)2 See State v. Horner, 21 Wn.2d 278, 150 P.2d 690 (1944).
To adopt the State‘s suggestion that
The State next contends Martin‘s plea of guilty was not “unconditional“. Without question the plea was dependent upon a correct judicial interpretation of the statutory scheme. Yet, it would be unwarranted to consider as “conditional” a guilty plea which can be accepted only upon a correct interpretation of the law. To hold otherwise would improperly limit a defendant‘s right to be correctly
We note in passing that an “unconditional” plea is not to be equated with an “unequivocal” plea. In Woods v. Rhay, supra at 605, we held that a guilty plea must be “freely, unequivocally, intelligently and understandingly made in open court by the accused person with full knowledge of his legal and constitutional rights and of the consequences of his act.” A plea is “equivocal” “whenever a defendant attempts to make a plea which by its very wording couples a protestation of innocence with an assertion of guilt . . .” State v. Stacy, 43 Wn.2d 358, 363, 261 P.2d 400 (1953); see State v. Mullin, 66 Wn.2d 65, 66, 400 P.2d 770 (1965); State v. Knutson, 11 Wn. App. 402, 404, 523 P.2d 967 (1974); State v. Watson, 1 Wn. App. 43, 45, 459 P.2d 67 (1969). It is clear Martin‘s proffered plea was not equivocal.
II
SPECIAL SENTENCING IN GUILTY PLEA CASES UNDER RCW 10.94
The State alternatively contends the trial judge properly refused to accept Martin‘s guilty plea because a capital defendant remains subject to the death penalty even upon a plea of guilty. It is asserted we should imply the existence of a special sentencing provision in which the death penalty could be imposed in guilty plea cases. This, it is suggested, could be accomplished by the impaneling of a special jury to assess punishment, similar to that provided for in
Clearly the legislature did not anticipate the possibility that an accused might plead guilty to a charge of first degree murder. Thus, it simply failed to provide for that eventuality. As attractive as the State‘s proposed solution may be, we do not have the power to read into a statute that which we may believe the legislature has omitted, be it an intentional or an inadvertent omission. Auto Drivers Local 882 v. Department of Retirement Sys., 92 Wn.2d 415, 421, 598 P.2d 379 (1979); Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. State, 91 Wn.2d 132, 134, 587 P.2d 535 (1978); Jepson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 89 Wn.2d 394, 403, 573 P.2d 10 (1977). The statutory hiatus is unfortunate. Nevertheless, it would be a clear judicial usurpation of legislative power for us to correct that legislative oversight.
III
THE NATURE OF THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY
The trial court should have informed Martin that under existing law the maximum penalty on a plea of guilty to first degree murder is life imprisonment with a possibility of parole.
Assuming the trial court was satisfied the guilty plea was made competently, knowingly and voluntarily, it should have accepted Martin‘s plea of guilty to the Brown murder charge. The case is therefore remanded for the rearraignment of Martin on the charge of first degree murder in the Brown case and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WRIGHT, BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.
HOROWITZ, J. (specially concurring)-I concur in the conclusions of the majority opinion for the reasons independently considered, which are next set forth.
This case principally considers a defendant‘s right to plead guilty to a charge of first degree murder and the consequences of such a plea.
The petitioner, Donald Jerry Martin, asserts a right to plead guilty to first degree murder and thus, under the provisions of Washington‘s death penalty act,
I therefore cannot agree with the State. A thorough consideration of the historical, legislative, and constitutional aspects of the defendant‘s right to plead guilty and the State‘s right to trial make it clear that Washington‘s present death penalty statute does not impair the defendant‘s traditional right, sought to be exercised by Martin in this case under
A brief review of the facts will bring into focus the statutory and constitutional issues which must be decided in this case.
On July 3, 1979, the petitioner Martin was arraigned in King County Superior Court on a charge of first degree murder in the death of Ivy Brown. Martin appeared at the arraignment prepared to plead guilty if the court would advise him, pursuant to
Arguing that
The arraignment was continued to allow further briefing on the issue thus raised. On July 17, 1979, the trial judge
The proceedings in the trial court were stayed pending a motion for discretionary review in this court. Defendant continues to assert a right to plead guilty and thus avoid the death penalty. In fact, the defendant‘s obvious reason for the plea is the defendant‘s ability to avoid the death penalty if he pleads guilty to first degree murder. The question implicit in his proffered plea is whether a statutory scheme which prevents imposition of the death sentence on defendants who plead guilty unconstitutionally penalizes the exercise of defendant‘s right to trial by jury on the charge of first degree murder. This case, in which the defendant attempts to enter an unbargained-for plea, raises the constitutional issue even more clearly than did Jackson, supra, in which the violation of the defendant‘s constitutional rights in this type of case was established even though the defendant had entered no plea at all. See State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55, 70 (1972) (Francis, J., dissenting). “A case brought before this court should be governed by the applicable law even though the attorneys representing the parties are unable or unwilling to argue it.” Maynard Inv. Co. v. McCann, 77 Wn.2d 616, 623, 465 P.2d 657 (1970). The question remains, too,
I
RIGHT TO PLEAD GUILTY
Few cases have considered a criminal defendant‘s right to plead guilty to the crime with which he is charged. Analytically, adoption of the State‘s assertion that it can prevent the defendant from pleading guilty in effect creates a governmental “right” to jury trial which the law has never recognized.
The right to jury trial has been the subject of extensive judicial comment. The right to jury trial has historically been a personal right of the defendant intended to be asserted against the State. Blackstone speaks of the trial by jury as the Englishman‘s “grand bulwark of his liberties” placed “between the liberties of the people and the prerogative of the Crown.” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *349. The State could not assert a right to jury trial. Indeed, at earliest common law, the defendant could not be forced to go before a jury, although the alternative was a tortuous prison sentence. 1 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 326 (6th ed. 1938). The United States Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968) stated that the “right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.”
These conceptions of the right to jury trial are inconsistent with any intrinsic governmental right to force the unwilling defendant to jury trial, since the jury system itself was established for the individual‘s, not the State‘s benefit.
A defendant‘s right to plead guilty is not absolute, as is, for example, his right to put the State to its proof at trial.
Our rules do not explicitly state when the trial court may decline to accept a plea. However, unlike provisions in some other states, Washington rules and statutes nowhere suggest that prosecutorial approval is required before a defendant may plead guilty.
Thus, the criminal defendant in Washington has a right to plead guilty unhampered by the prosecutor‘s opinions or desires. The State suggests that
No person informed against or indicted for a crime shall be convicted thereof, unless by admitting the truth of the charge in his plea, by confession in open court, or by the verdict of a jury, accepted and recorded by the court . . .
This provision merely reaffirms the general rule that the defendant may plead guilty.
The State relies on the second clause of
[E]xcept in capital cases, where the person informed against or indicted for a crime is represented by counsel, such person may, with the assent of the court, waive trial by jury and submit to trial by the court.
This court has interpreted the statute as amended to prevent the defendant upon whom the death penalty might be imposed from waiving jury trial in favor of trial before a court. Brandon v. Webb, 23 Wn.2d 155, 160 P.2d 529 (1945); State v. Baker, 78 Wn.2d 327, 474 P.2d 254 (1970). It thus limits the trial options available to the capital case defendant.
But the clause does not, as erroneously asserted by the State, affect the other two methods of assessing guilt set out in
To now interpret
The State next contends that Martin‘s plea was not unconditional. The defendant‘s plea did rely on a correct interpretation of the statutory scheme that prevents imposition of the death penalty when the defendant pleads guilty. But to describe his request as a condition which made his proffered plea not unconditional would require either an unwarranted extension of the rules limiting the court‘s acceptance of guilty pleas to those pleas which actually freely acknowledge guilt or an unjustified limitation of the defendant‘s right, established by court rule and the constitution, to know the possible sentencing consequences of his guilty plea before waiving his rights to jury trial, to remain silent, and to confront his accusers.
Doubtless it is not intended that the word “unconditional” be equated with “unequivocal.”
The defendant expressed no unwillingness to acknowledge his responsibility for the homicide; he merely required and requested the court to inform him of the sentencing consequences of his plea, i.e., life imprisonment with possibility of parole.
II
SPECIAL SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS
The State contends that, if the defendant can plead guilty to first degree murder, the trial judge still did not err in refusing to accept Martin‘s plea because he remained subject to the death penalty. The prosecutor argues that a special sentencing provision in which the death penalty can be imposed must be implied to determine the punishment of the pleading defendant. However, an appropriate analysis of Washington‘s death penalty statute,
The prosecutor suggests that a special jury be impaneled to assess punishment when the defendant pleads guilty. He cites cases requiring the impaneling of a sentencing jury in cases in which the defendant pleads guilty. E.g., State v. Baker, 78 Wn.2d 327, 334, 474 P.2d 254 (1970). But the present death penalty scheme is unlike that considered in this court‘s earlier cases requiring the jury to determine punishment in murder cases even when the defendant had pleaded guilty. Unlike the first degree murder statutes then in effect, no such provision for impaneling a special sentencing jury now exists.
It has been suggested that former
The United States Supreme Court was asked in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 20 L. Ed. 2d 138, 88 S. Ct. 1209 (1968) to infer a special sentencing procedure where none was provided by statute. The Supreme Court refused to take on that legislative task:
[E]ven on the assumption that the failure of Congress to [expressly authorize the infliction of capital punishment upon defendants convicted without a jury] here was wholly inadvertent, it would hardly be the province of the courts to fashion a remedy. Any attempt to do so would be fraught with the gravest difficulties. . . .
It is one thing to fill a minor gap in a statute—to extrapolate from its general design details that were inadvertently omitted. It is quite another thing to create from whole cloth a complex and completely novel procedure and to thrust it upon unwilling defendants for the sole purpose of rescuing a statute from a charge of unconstitutionality.
United States v. Jackson, supra at 579-80. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
The significance of this rejection should not be overlooked in ascertaining legislative intent. Consideration of the legislative history of an enactment has long been held to be a legitimate method of determining the legislature‘s intent. Ropo, Inc. v. Seattle, 67 Wn.2d 574, 409 P.2d 148 (1965); State ex rel. Fair v. Hamilton, 92 Wash. 347, 159 P. 379 (1916). The majority in Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wn.2d 441, 536 P.2d 157 (1975), acknowledged the value in appropriate circumstances of considering sequential drafts of a bill. Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., supra at 450. Unlike the enactment considered in that case,
The inappropriateness of the analysis advanced by the State cannot be overemphasized. To adopt the State‘s position, we would have to find in the structure of
The majority is apparently convinced that the legislature should have provided [a certain remedy]. If the legislature thought that [the remedy] should be provided for, it inadvertently omitted any language expressing that intent. Since we are not a legislative body, it is our settled rule that we cannot and will not read into a statute anything which we may conceive that the legislature has unintentionally left out.
Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm‘n, 84
The need for interpretative restraint is greatly increased in this case because of the subject matter of the court‘s claimed implied repeal of the defendant‘s right to plead guilty and claimed provisions for a special sentencing jury if the defendant does plead. The United States Supreme Court has more than once reminded us of the indisputable fact that “death is different,” and that this difference must impact on the court‘s decision making, requiring the utmost solicitousness for the defendant‘s position. See Gregg v. Georgia, supra at 187; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114, 82 S. Ct. 157 (1961); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148, 77 S. Ct. 1222 (1951). To force the defendant to face the death penalty on the basis of claimed implied provisions of an otherwise unconstitutional death penalty scheme does not adequately respect that difference. See also State ex rel. McDonald v. Whatcom County District Court, 92 Wn.2d 35, 593 P.2d 546 (1979); State v. Grant, 89 Wn.2d 678, 685, 575 P.2d 210 (1978); State v. Arndt, 87 Wn.2d 374, 385, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976) (“rule of lenity” requires that ambiguous criminal statutes be construed in favor of the defendant).
III
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL AFFECTED BY DEATH PENALTY SCHEME
As is clear from a reading of
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 20 L. Ed. 2d 138, 88 S. Ct. 1209 (1968) invalidated a statute which permitted the imposition of the death penalty only upon conviction following a plea of not guilty and a jury trial. The Supreme Court explained the statutory scheme “needlessly encourages” guilty pleas and thus penalized the exercise of the defendant‘s right to jury trial.
Jackson has been limited in a series of federal and state decisions. The Supreme Court has refused to rule that guilty pleas are per se invalid simply because they were induced by fear of the death penalty or entered pursuant to plea bargains averting the death penalty. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235, 93 S. Ct. 1602 (1973); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 25 L. Ed. 2d 785, 90 S. Ct. 1458 (1970). Many state courts, in upholding their statutory death penalty schemes and pleas entered pursuant to them, have relied on the fact that the death penalty may be imposed whether guilt is determined by jury or not. Prothro v. State, 370 So. 2d 740, 743 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979) (statute provides for
However, in Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 58 L. Ed. 2d 466, 99 S. Ct. 492 (1978), the Supreme Court made clear that Jackson still invalidates the inappropriately drafted statutory scheme. In refusing to extend Jackson to Corbitt, and thus upholding the New Jersey murder punishment scheme, that provides the same maximum life term sentences for all defendants but allows the judge to assess a shorter term when the defendant pleads, the Supreme Court noted Jackson‘s distinguishing characteristics:
We agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court that there are substantial differences between this case and Jackson, and that Jackson does not require a reversal of Corbitt‘s conviction. The principal difference is that the pressures to forego trial and to plead to the charge in this case are not what they were in Jackson. First, the death penalty, which is “unique in its severity and irrevocability,” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 [49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909] (1976), is not involved here. . . . [I]t is a material fact that under the New Jersey law the maximum penalty for murder is life imprisonment, not death. Furthermore, in Jackson, any risk of suffering the maximum penalty could be avoided by pleading guilty. Here, although the punishment when a jury finds a defendant guilty of first-degree murder is life imprisonment, the risk of that punishment is not completely avoided by pleading non vult because the judge accepting the plea has the authority to impose a life term. New Jersey does not reserve the maximum punishment for murder for those who insist on a jury trial.
(Footnote omitted.) Corbitt v. New Jersey, supra at 217.
Washington‘s statutory scheme “reserve[s] the maximum punishment for those who insist on a jury trial” by allowing the defendant to plead guilty and thus avoid any statutorily prescribed scheme for assessment of the death penalty. As in Jackson, if this statute is not struck down, the situation in this state is that “[i]ndividuals forced to defend their lives in proceedings tailor-made for the occasion must do so without the guidance that defendants ordinarily find in a body of procedural and evidentiary rules spelled out in advance of trial.” United States v. Jackson, supra at 580. The faulty legislation has made the 30-day grace period to request the death penalty an extraordinary weapon in the hands of a prosecutor seeking a deal with a murder defendant. No statutory provision for the death penalty exists when the defendant pleads guilty; none can be implied by us today. We cannot “extend the capital punishment provision . . . in a new and uncharted direction, without the compulsion of a legislative mandate and without the benefit of legislative guidance.” United States v. Jackson, supra at 581. Washington‘s death penalty sentencing scheme is unconstitutional.
In sum, the trial court judge should have informed the defendant when he attempted to plead guilty that the maximum punishment for first degree murder on a plea of guilty is life imprisonment with possibility of parole.
UTTER, C.J., concurs with HOROWITZ, J.
ROSELLINI, J. (dissenting)—To me it is clear that the legislature, in enacting the laws which implement Initiative No. 316, intended that the special sentencing procedure set forth in
There is no constitutional right to plead guilty in a criminal case. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 20 L. Ed. 2d 138, 88 S. Ct. 1209 (1968). The United States Supreme Court, in that case, held that an act of Congress which permitted a defendant to escape the death penalty by pleading guilty (as do the statutes of this state, according to the majority opinions) encouraged the use of such pleas and consequently chilled the exercise of a defendant‘s right to contest his guilt. A defendant, though innocent, might well choose to plead guilty rather than risk a guilty verdict and the death penalty. The court indicated that the evil could be avoided by legislative provisions which either left the choice of life imprisonment or capital punishment to a jury in every case regardless of how the case was tried, or which required that all capital cases be tried to a jury.3
The primary goal in construing statutes is to ascertain the legislative intent. In doing so, first consideration is given to the context and subject matter of the statute itself. It should be considered as a whole. If it is susceptible to more than one construction, it should be given that construction which will carry out its objective. Anderson v. O‘Brien, 84 Wn.2d 64, 524 P.2d 390 (1974); Miller v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 81 Wn.2d 302, 501 P.2d 1063 (1972).
It is evident on the face of the act under scrutiny here that the legislature was striving to draft a law which would meet constitutional requirements. And yet the majority has, by ignoring significant language in that legislation, construed it to have an effect which is invalid. At the same time, assuming the posture of the proverbial ostrich, it would have us believe it is unaware that it has rendered the law unconstitutional.
It is presumed that the legislature was aware of decisions of the United States Supreme Court, as well as this court; and in fact the provisions of
It was the expressed legislative intent that, in all first degree murder cases where the prosecutor has reason to believe that aggravating circumstances were present, he is entitled to seek the death penalty by requesting a special proceeding.
When a defendant is charged with the crime of murder in the first degree as defined in
RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a) , the prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting attorney‘s designee shall file a written notice of intention to request a proceeding to determine whether or not the death penalty should be imposed when the prosecution has reason to believe that one or more aggravating circumstances, as set forth inRCW 9A.32.045 as now or hereafter amended, was present and the prosecution intends to prove the presence of such circumstance or circumstances in a special sentencing proceeding underRCW 10.94.020 .
There is no language in
The prosecutor is authorized to request the death penalty in any case where a defendant is charged with murder in the first degree. And where he has made such a request, the same jury which tried the case decides the punishment.
The statutes relating to the death penalty, while not entirely free of ambiguity, reveal a legislative intent that the prosecutor should seek the death penalty in all cases of aggravated murder. The statute regulating the procedure was enacted to implement an initiative of the people and certainly there is nothing in that initiative (now codified in
The majority opinion finds a “right” to plead guilty in CrR 4.2(a). This rule does not purport to specify the cases in which various pleas can be accepted, but merely recognizes the kinds of pleas which are appropriate. It has always existed side by side with
To the majority it appears that the legislature did not anticipate the possibility that a defendant might plead guilty in a capital case. This view is not supported by the legislative history of the act, cited by amicus and pursued in the specially concurring opinion.4 That history shows
The majority suggests no legislative purpose which would be served by a law which permits a defendant to escape the death penalty by pleading guilty. It in fact concedes that the legislature never intended to permit such a plea. It is conceivable, though highly improbable, that the legislature might find the public interest so well served by a guilty
It is apparent that the legislature gave careful consideration to the mitigating circumstances which might warrant leniency. These are listed in
It is evident that the legislature did not consider a guilty plea to be a circumstance which, because of its mitigating character, should affect the penalty decision. That being the case, it is hardly conceivable that the legislature intended to permit an accused to escape all risk of the extreme penalty by simply pleading guilty. Provision of such a loophole would frustrate the entire purpose of the statute, which is to demand the imposition of this most severe punishment in certain cases and to permit it in no others. The cases where the penalty is demanded are those in which the guilt of the defendant was proven with clear certainty, where there were aggravating circumstances and insufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant leniency, and where the jury can be convinced that the defendant will be a continuing threat to society.
Were it open to a defendant to escape the death penalty by pleading guilty, it is obvious that the very class for whom the penalty is reserved would be the first to utilize the plea. The construction placed upon the act by the majority is one so unlikely to have been intended by the legislature that it enters the realm of absurdity. It is a well established principle of statutory construction that the law favors a rational and sensible construction. 2A C. Sands,
I would affirm.
HICKS, J., concurs with ROSELLINI, J.
[No. 46653. En Banc. July 17, 1980.]
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. RICKY NORMAN DESCOTEAUX, Petitioner.
Notes
“In answer to the arraignment, the defendant may move to set aside the indictment or information, or he may demur or plead to it, and is entitled to one day after arraignment in which to answer thereto if he demand it.”