STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JAMES MARCUM, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 19CA7
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HOCKING COUNTY
2020
2020-Ohio-3962
Benjamin Fickel, Hocking County Prosecutor, Logan, Ohio, for Appellee.
Ryan Shepler, Kermen & Shepler, LLC, Logan, Ohio, for Appellant.
Smith, P.J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Hocking County Court of Common Pleas judgment entry that sentenced Appellant, James Marcum, to three concurrent five-year terms of community control, with a requirement that he enter a community based correctional facility (“CBCF“) and successfully complete the program and follow through with the recommendations. The trial court advised Marcum that a violation of community control may result in more restrictive community control sanctions or the imposition of separate, reserved prison terms, ordered to be served consecutively for an
FACTS
{¶2} On March 9, 2018, the State charged Appellant with identity fraud in violation of
{¶3} On January 8, 2019, Marcum reached a plea agreement with the State whereby he would plead guilty to identity fraud and the two counts of forgery, with the remaining two counts being dismissed. As part of the agreement, the State agreed to recommend community control sanctions, including the completion of a CBCF program and restitution. During the plea hearing, the trial court found that Marcum was eligible for community control sanctions. After a colloquy with Marcum, the trial court accepted the pleas.
{¶4} The trial court then proceeded to sentencing and asked “[a]s to reserved sentences, would those be consecutive?” The State responded: “Considering his past record, I would say yes.” Defense counsel stated “I
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO CONCURRENT TERMS OF COMMUNITY CONTOL BUT CONSECUTIVE RESERVED TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT.”
{¶6} In response, the State concedes that the trial court made no findings pursuant to
Standard of Review
{¶7} We may reverse a felony sentence only “if the court clearly and convincingly finds either that ‘the record does not support the sentencing court‘s findings’ under the specified statutory provisions or ‘the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. ’ ” State v. Taylor, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 15CA12, 2016-Ohio-2781, ¶ 40, quoting State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St. 3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1. ” ‘Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof * * * which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established. ’ ” Marcum, supra, at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118, paragraph three of the syllabus (1954).
{¶8} It has previously been explained as follows regarding the deferential nature of this standard of review:
” ‘This is a very deferential standard of review, as the question is not whether the trial court had clear and convincing evidence to support its findings, but rather, whether we clearly and convincingly find that the record fails to support the trial court‘s findings. ’ ”
Legal Analysis
{¶9} Pursuant to
A trial court has three options for punishing offenders who violate community control sanctions. The court may (1) lengthen the term of the community control sanction, (2) impose a more restrictive community control sanction, or (3) impose a prison term on the offender.
{¶10} Initially, we note that it appears a trial court is not prohibited, per se, from sentencing an offender to concurrent terms of community control but consecutive prison terms as a possible punishment for violating those community control sanctions. See e.g. State v. Dusek, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 18CA18, 2019-Ohio-3477, ¶ 4 (the trial court imposed concurrent community control sanctions but notified appellant that violating those sanctions could result in consecutive prison terms).1 ”
[I]t is possible that the specific prison term of which notice is given pursuant to
R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) may never be ordered to be served. For instance, should the defendant be found to haveviolated the terms of community control, the sentencing court may elect pursuant to R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(a) or(b) to sentence the defendant to a non-prison term sanction; or, if the sentencing court elects to sentence the defendant to a prison term, pursuant toR.C. 2929.15(B)(2) , the prison term may be less than the specific prison term of which notice was given when the defendant was originally sentenced to community control.
{¶11} White and Duncan make clear that when imposing community control sanctions as a sentence, a trial court must notify the defendant of any permissible possible punishments, including a specific prison term that may be imposed if the offender violates their community control sanctions. Consequently, it is axiomatic that as long as the offender had notice of the permissible, possible punishments, the court has discretion which punishments to impose if a violation occurs, including consecutive prison terms. Further, no punishment, regardless of its nature, is actually imposed until after the defendant commits a violation. See e.g. State v. Gray, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 18CA3857, 2019-Ohio-5317, ¶ 1. Therefore, only after an offender violates his or her community control sanctions, and if the court
{¶12} In this case, the trial court‘s statements at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing entry informed Marcum that if he violated his community control sanctions he could be subject to more restrictive community control sanctions or consecutive prison terms for an aggregate forty-two month prison term. Therefore, the court fulfilled its obligation of notifying Marcum of the specific prison terms that may be one of the two possible punishments that the court could impose if he violated his
Conclusion
{¶13} Accordingly, we do not find that the trial court‘s sentence was clearly and convincingly contrary to law by merely notifying Marcum at his sentencing hearing that if he violates his community control sanctions he could be sentenced to consecutive prison sentences even though the court made no findings pursuant to
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to Appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Hocking County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. & Hess, J. Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
Jason P. Smith
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
