State v. ManuelState v. Manuel
This case presents the questions of whether the controlled dangerous substances contraband forfeiture statute,
The state seized two vehicles allegedly owned by Delbert James Manuel and instituted this proceeding under
On November 13, 1981, a police informant arranged for the purchase of 100 Methaqualone (Quaalude) tablets from defendant, Delbert J. Manuel, later that evening. The informant and defendant met in a vacant parking lot, where their transaction was observed from a distance by two police officers. Defendant drove to the point of exchange in a black 1981 GMC pickup truck, registered in his name.
About four months later, on March 18, 1982, a police informant met defendant in a motel parking lot for the purpose of buying 104 Diazepam (Valium) capsules for the price of $100. Defendant arrived at the location in a tan 1976 Buick four-door sedan, which defendant claims belonged to his wife. The transaction was monitored electronically and also observed from a distance by four police officers. Defendant was followed from the parking lot by officers, who stopped defendant and arrested him for distribution of controlled dangerous substances,
On March 22, 1982, officers of the state police submitted affidavits reciting the above facts and obtained warrants to seize the 1981 GMC pickup truck and the 1976
A forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character. Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law. The forfeiture is clearly a penalty for the criminal offense and can result in even greater punishment than the prosecution. U.S. v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965); Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1885); State v. Billiot, 254 La. 988, 229 So.2d 72 (1969); Cornman v. Conway, 178 La. 357, 151 So. 620 (1933).
The defendant‘s motion for release of the vehicles is similar to a motion to quash in that he contends the forfeiture proceedings are based on an invalid statute. See
A statute authorizing the forfeiture of a person‘s property must in substance and application conform with several provisions of our state constitution.1 No person may be deprived of property except by due process of law.
In other words, personal effects may not be taken at all unless they are classified as contraband. Personal effects classified as contraband and other property may be taken but only by due process of law. In any event, a person‘s ownership rights may not be diminished except by reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of police power. Furthermore, a person‘s property may not be seized except with a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate upon a showing of probable cause, unless the seizure falls within one of the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The first question which should be answered, therefore, is whether the article to be forfeited is contraband. If the article is contraband, whether it is also a personal
It is generally recognized that there are two kinds of property which may be classified as contraband. Things which intrinsically are illegal to possess and are therefore insusceptible of ownership are categorized as contraband per se. Such articles include illegal narcotics, unregistered stills, unlawful alcohol, and illicit gambling devices. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania supra; Brown v. State, Etc., 392 So.2d 415 (La.1980). Things which may be forfeited because they are the immediate instruments of a crime, but which are not ordinarily illegal to possess, are classed as derivative contraband. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, supra, U.S. v. One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F.2d 1026 (1 Cir.1980). Derivative contraband encompasses guns, automobiles, ships and other such property when used to effectuate a proscribed activity. Id. This court and our courts of appeal, without explicitly labelling the type of property affected, have consistently upheld and applied statutes authorizing the forfeiture of both contraband per se3 and derivative contraband.4
We believe that “contraband,” as used in the constitutional phrase “personal effects, other than contraband” means derivative contraband, and not contraband per se. Personal effects include derivative contraband but not contraband per se. A person cannot make an article which is contraband per se his personal effect because it may not be legally possessed or subjected to private ownership. Thus, an exception of articles insusceptible of ownership from the personal effects category of private property would be no exception at all and therefore meaningless. The convention proceedings, however, indicate that the exception was intended to have force and to include such articles as automobiles and weapons whenever they had been used as the immediate instruments of a crime. 9 Records of
In State v. 1971 Green GMC Van, 354 So.2d 479 (La.1977), we held the predecessor forfeiture statute unconstitutional primarily because it allowed the confiscation of the vehicle without any requirement that the owner know of the illegal activity, have consented to it or have any connection at all. However, after striking down the statute, we further criticized other of its provisions. The constitutional defect that proved fatal to the prior statute has been cured by the current statute. Since our further discussion of the statute was unnecessary to the holding in 1971 Green GMC Van, we now carefully reconsider our prior statements.
In that opinion, we rejected the state‘s argument that the contraband exception in
Nevertheless, the due process clause of our state constitution does impose some restraints against the forfeiture of property.
A forfeiture statute conforms to the 1974 Louisiana Constitution‘s
Applying these precepts to the controlled dangerous substances forfeiture statute,
As we construe the controlled dangerous substances forfeiture statute,
The statute creates a two-step procedure for the seizure and subsequent forfeiture of property. Before property may be seized, the government must obtain a warrant from a magistrate by showing that there is probable cause to believe that statutory grounds to forfeit the property exist. Property may be seized for forfeiture on probable cause without a warrant if the seizure is incident to a valid arrest or falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement for searches and seizures of criminal evidence which we have recognized. Property which has been the subject of prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding may be seized without a warrant.
The procedures for forfeiture require the district attorney to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a hearing instituted by him that: (1) valid grounds exist for forfeiture of the property under the statute which do not conflict with the constitution; (2) the seizure was in conformity with the constitution and the law or was made upon reasonable grounds to believe that it so conformed; (3) the owner of the conveyance was knowingly and intentionally a consenting party or privy to a violation of the controlled dangerous substances statute; (4) the value of the contraband was in excess of five hundred dollars or the contraband was intended for commercial sale.
In any forfeiture proceeding, an acquittal of the owner of the property of charges under the controlled dangerous substances statute or a dismissal of such charges shall create a rebuttable presumption that the property shall not be forfeited, unless a compelling reason for such forfeiture is shown by clear and convincing evidence.
Defendant argues that the statute is unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Defendant finally complains about the four month delay between the alleged drug offenses and the seizure of the vehicles. The evidence reflects that the officers delayed arresting the defendant and seizing the vehicles in order to avoid revealing the identity of a confidential informant and to
We conclude that the forfeiture statute is not unconstitutional on its face because of any of the grounds considered and that it has not been applied unconstitutionally in this case.
Applying the forfeiture statute to the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to return the vehicles, we further conclude that the state has shown probable cause to proceed with a forfeiture action against each vehicle. The evidence is uncontroverted that the defendant used the vehicles to transport illicit drugs to a rendezvous point where he engaged in unlawful distribution of them in violation of the controlled dangerous substances law. Thus, there is probable cause to believe that the vehicles were used as immediate instruments of commercial drug distributions in violation of the controlled dangerous substances statute with their owner‘s knowledge and voluntary consent. The evidence is somewhat equivocal whether the defendant owned one of the vehicles but sufficient to support a finding by the trial court of a probable cause to believe that he did. At trial of the forfeiture proceeding, of course, the state must prove each element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt because forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal. Consequently, the trial judge‘s denial of the defendant‘s motion to return the vehicles is affirmed and the case is remanded for a speedy trial of the forfeiture proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
MARCUS and WATSON, JJ., concur.