State v. ManningState v. Manning
Thе sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to quash the bill of information. For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information charging the defendant, Roy M. Manning, with two counts of third offense driving while intoxicated (“DWI”), in violation of
The defendant then withdrеw his former plea of not guilty and after being advised of his rights pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama,
The defendant now apрeals challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to quash. He asserts that he was not properly advised of his Boykin rights in the two predicate offenses and therefore, they can
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently enunciatеd the burden of proof placed on the state when a defendant attacks the use of prior guilty pleаs to enhance a DWI charge. In State v. Carlos, 98-1366 (La.7/7/99),
However, in thе present case, the motion to quash was heard and denied in May of 1999, prior to the rendition of the Carlos opiniоn. At the time that the present motion was heard, the state bore the burden of showing that the defendant knowingly and expressly waived his Boy-kin rights when entering a guilty plea if the state wished to use that plea in a subsequent DWI prosecution. To mеet this requirement, the state may rely on a contemporaneous record of the guilty plea proceeding, i.e., either the transcript or the minute entry. However, a guilty plea-rights waiver form, even if well-executed in every detail, without minutes or a transcript of the plea is not sufficient to show a knowing and voluntary waiver of Boykin rights. State v. Pertuit,
In the present case, we find that the state failed to meet its burden of showing that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waivеd his rights in the two predicate offenses. At the hearing, the state was adamant in its argument that the burden of proof was on the defendant as the moving party. When the state declined to present any evidence, the defendant Lattempted to show that he was not informed of his rights when he pled guilty to the predicate offenses by introducing сopies of the waiver of rights form executed in connection with those prior pleas. After further argument by counsel, the state did introduce one of the waiver of rights form previously introduced by the defendant. Although the state had expressed its intent to also introduce the second form, there is no indication in the record that it produced any further evidence. The introduction of a copy of one of the waiver forms is clearly insufficiеnt to sustain the state’s burden of proof.
We also note that even if we applied the burden-shifting principles set forth in State v. Carlos, supra, the state still failed to meet the initial burden of proving the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that the defendant was represented by counsel at the time that they were taken.
In his appellate brief, the defendant also argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to quash because he was not represented by counsel when he entered pleas to the predicate offenses. He further complains beсause the courts in the predicate pleas failed to comply with the requirements. of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 556.1. Since we hаve already determined that the denial of the motion to quash must be reversed, we find it unnecessary to address these arguments at this time.
For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the judgment of the trial court which denied the defendant’s motion to quash. The matter is remanded for fur
REVERSED AND REMANDED.