*1 they guilty him be- believe unless the defendant not convict law, and the attempted You state doubt. yond a reasonable your question. your method of objected to Prosecutor correct, your Hon- Foley: my of the law Isn’t statement “Mr. or? correct, jury may but I doubt if the Well, it be “The Court: may you It be mean all the elements. understand what would may easily. interrogate further.” very You developed opinion that the trial court was evident that It is “every element of what was meant not understand jurors did attorney make could charge,” the court indicated meant. explain jurors what was if he would inquiry further unduly in- did not limit the that the trial court hold We therefore Juris, 389, in 35 Corpus rule is thus stated governing The quiry. 437: section go in exam- parties should be allowed to
“The extent to which governed by qualifications cannot well be ining jurors as to their super- under the The examination is conducted fixed rules. court, the trial and the nature and extent and direction of vision may may be answered questions of the examination what largely necessarily left to the sound discretion of the must clearly not be interfered with court, the exercise of which will unless abused.” it free proper We examined the find from error. have record Cooley Bohling, CC., affirmed. concur. judgment foregoing C., -is opinion PER CURIAM:—The Westhues, judges opinion of the court. All the concur.
adopted as the and Pat Por- Mangiaracina, Johnnie Cuezze The State John 58. Appellants. ella, Two, February 21, Division *2 appellants. Miniace for
Joseph N. Boy McKittrick, Attorney General, Nolen, and Olliver W. Assist- Attorney General, ant respondent. Pat
BOHLING, Mangiaracina, Por- 0. John Johnnie Cuezze grand larceny. They ella appeal present from a conviction information,-in day charging issue: that on cer- Is unlawfully feloniously appéllants tain “did- then there *3 steal, carry $500, away” and take “automobile-” the-value of of Brueck, “fifty-four the property of Wm. T. fur coats” of the $300, value property Furs, Inc., corporation; of of a Rubins ' n aggregate duplicitous? $3500 value of” “of Brueck was a fur salesman and his automobile contained coats Inc., of Furs, Rubins employer, asportation. his at the time"of the The main State’s instruction authorized a from two punishment years’ to five imprisonment upon guilty a verdict of of lar- ceny‘of property thirty -“of the value-of dollars or of more” Wm. T. (Appellants’ Brueck. brief not instructions.) does attack the The separate verdicts appellant “guilty grand larceny found each of as charged in the and assessed the information”' of years’ each at five imprisonment. Revised Statutes (Mo. Ann., p. 2865), 1929 Stat. provides “Every that: person who shall be of felon convicted (cid:127); ; iously stealing, taking -carrying- away any goods, . . . . or other personal property, thing or valuable 'whatsoever of dollars, the value of thirty more, mare, or any horse, or gelding . . . belonging to grand another shall guilty be deemed of lar ceny . .;” . punishments “grand larceny” for un der Revised (Mo. Statutes 1929 Ann., p, 2871), Stat. range from two years” to “ten stealing for an “automobile;” years” “seven stealing for mare, gelding a “horse, . -. years” “five in all other larceny.” of “grand cases In 1921 the Assembly General- enacted now Section Re vised Statutes Mo. 'Ann., p. Stat. (Laws 1st -5240 Ex. Sess. 1921, p. 105, 29), (a) sec. reading: “Any subsec. person who shall be feloniously convicted of stealing, taking carrying away any or vehicle, motor any or part, tire equipment or a of motor vehicle of a value $30.00 more, or or attempting ... . of feloniously
102 vehicle, punished . . . shall . such motor . .
steal twenty- exceeding not a term by penitentiary in the imprisonment exceeding one county jail not years in the five confinement .($1,000) or exceeding thousand dollars year, by fine not imprisonment.” fine and both such or more says the theft of two majority rule belonging owners, time to different' place,
articles at the same Lorton, (State v. single a in this State constitutes offense obtains 605, 611(II), 56 W. 55, 57; Citius, 331 Mo. 7 Mo. State v. all cases); to describe 72, 74(4), citing permissible and that it is each. single count, assigning in a an owner to the articles stolen law; cases, them, The cited as we read issue of substantive permitting of a and did not embrace an offense general statutory embracing provisions than that authorized charge the entire transaction. On the consult Wharton’s issue (10 Ed.), p. 1266, 6; Bishop’s Criminal n. Procedure New Crim- (3 Ed.), 437; (1908), inal Procedure sec. Peck v. State 54 Tex. 111 Crim. 16 Ann. and annotation Cas. Daniels, In 558, 559, quash charge State v. a a motion to stealing a “gelding” property “mare” and a count Bragg” considered, following “Richard W. was the Lorton case development, without well taken where the two animals were although stolen at the same time place, spe- the statute cifically made stealing “gelding” grand a lar- “mare” or ceny. Maggard, 469, 472, Am. St. 484, held, Rep. charge under a grand larceny, showing
larceny of different wagons articles from different in and the shed *4 “wagon a yard,”, and loft of rapid committed in and in .succession pursuance a design steal, of formed to was insufficient to sustain a grand larceny conviction for where the articles taken from place were not of the value of $30. 7786, supra, permits jail of a sentence or a fine or both and for reason, this well others, as as we think the instant issue distinguishable analogous from involving issues statutes authoriz- ing the imposition greater punishment for the of an commission by specified offense means. For 4058, instance: Revised 1929 (Mo. Statutes Ann., Stat. p. 2856), “robbery defines in the degree” first 4061, and Section Revised (Mo. Statutes 1929 Stat. Ann., p. 2863), given a punishment authorizes for said offense and greater a punishment “by when dangerous effected means of a and deadly weapon;” charge, and a robbery of in the first degree by means a dangerous deadly of weapon and ap- has our proval. Shuls, v. 245, [State 329 Mo. 251(II), 44 (2d) 94, 96(5, 6); Salisbury State (Mo.), v. (2d) 43 1021, 1024(5);
103 cited in (2d) 382, 384(5), and eases 56 (Mo.), Lonon S. v. State opinions.] said (2d) 1020, 1022(2), contains Blakely (Mo.), 24 W. S. v.
State allegation as to the value of domestic effect that to the statements stolen, 1929, (see R. nighttime” the Sec. S. “in fowls ranging a fine for a from Ann., providing Stat. years’ superfluous; is and imprisonment) to five jail or sentence nighttime” of the “in the entitles a defend words that the inclusion authorizing punishment; the and that ant instruction to than the although the of the fowls be less defendant $30 value larceny petit to an on under Section not entitled instruction Ann., p. (see Barker, Revised Statutes Mo. Stat. the of 322 Mo. 18 S. W. where value the fowls was $12). alleged to be appears necessarily and instant issue to close gist the authorities mentioned. The of the offenses de larceny are supra, prop-,
fined Sections and the erty taking, stealing away carrying another. The of and of an taking, stealing automobile carrying’ away and the fur of coats are cognate enough offenses. The instant information is broad to prevent prosecution larceny a automobile, second for the the of a prosecution larceny second coats; for the of the fur and the maximum, assessing may verdict under Section 4065 tendency have some appellants indicate would not have fared better had' prosecution larceny the automobile been. under larceny said Section 7786 for the of the fur coats under said Sections 4064 and in separate counts same infor 40.65 upon mation perhaps separate charging informations the in dividual offenses.
However, appellants insisting are in the circumstances here may they involved charged not be in the same count with the lar- ceny larceny automobile of- fur although eoats^ both were consummated the same act. a Section 7786 is later enactment than 4065; Sections 4064 said Section 7786 and. subject deals with larceny matter of the attempted larceny of automobiles, whereas Sections .4064 and deal with the com- subject mon grand larceny. matter quotation We adopt from Harris, 87 W. (2d) 1026, 1029(6), citing additional authority, as applicable general effect of “ Section 7786 upon said Sections 4064 and 4065: ‘Where there is dealing one statute subject general with in comprehensive terms another dealing with a part subject the same in a *5 more minute way, and definite the together two should be read harmonized, if possible, a with view giving to effect to a- consistent legislative policy; but any to the extent of necessary repugnancy them special between the prevail will general the over statute. Where
.104 to, exception later, regarded it will be as special statute is ’ ”. Our of, prior general one. . . qualification pro Assembly expressly in enactment Section 7786
General contrary inconsistent with parts to, “all vided that laws or of laws re hereby act are provisions or in with of this conflict 106, Thus pealed. p. . . 1st Ex. sec. 31.] Sess. [Laws larceny legislative larceny attempted to clear intent take- the general pro from of the automobile here involved out under the larceny as visions Sections. 4064 and 4065 and treat such apart separate punish from offense offense denounced comprehensive able under the 4064 and 4065 terms of Sections information, charging It that the manifested. follows instant larceny larceny count the coats, charges and the of the fur automobile by separate
offenses
provisions
denounced
of our
calling
separate
statutes,
punishments,
and distinct
with Sec
permitting
lighter
tion 7786
prescribed
than
-by Section 4065.
Huffman,
58, 63,
State
797, 798,
v.
Mo.
37 S. W.
(consult
Section 3521
Ann.,
now
R.
Section
S.
Mo. Stat.
2847)
(consult
Revised Statutes 1889
now
Sec.
R.
Ann., p. 2849), making
S.
Mo. Stat.
different
specified
burglary
acts
in
degree
subject
the second
to the same
punishment,
separate offenses,
charg
denounced
and an indictment
ing in one count a violation
of each
said sections was bad for
duplicity. Consult, also,
Collins,